CHAP. XLVI.] MINOR WAR MOVEMENTS. 217 great events by which they were followed, these little ones become almost invisible. Relation of political and military ideas. During 1861 the government had not a just conception of the form which the war must necessarily assume in order to obtain decisive results. Political considerations completely outweighed the mili tary. This was no more than might have been expected. The cabinet had been drawn from civil life. It had not yet rejected the fallacy that the military must always be subordinate to the political idea. Appalling disasters occurred before it fully perceived how frequently that maxim has to be reversed. Early war move If it became necessary to assure the Unionists of Missouri, or those of Northwestern Virginia, or ments incorrect. to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, or to threaten Norfolk, expeditions were arranged for each purpose, and a great army frittered away. The battle of Bull Run was fought with less than 30,000 men, when there would have been no difficulty in bringing into action 60,000. The cabinet had yet to learn that a great victory won at a decisive point satisfies a thousand distant political demands-it had yet to see the Mississippi opened by operations, not in its stream, but far in its rear-it had yet to see Charleston, after resisting the most powerful direct attacks, fall helplessly by the march of an army a hundred miles distant in the interior. By degrees the correct ideas of professional military men forced their way, and affairs which, to the eye of inexperience, seemed of signal moment, dwarfed to their true proportions, and stood in their proper attitude of insignificance. In the three chapters of this section, I shall briefly relate the more interesting of these military affairs and the political movements connect Grouping of these minor affairs. 218 THE BORDER STATES. [SECT. IX. ed with them, considering them under the titles of transactions in Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia respectively. Their disconnected character and their subordinate relation to the great and decisive campaigns will be recog nized without difficulty. They form, in reality, only a prelude to the true war. The Border States. The Border States consist of the most northerly tier of slave states. They are Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware. Though perhaps not correctly, Tennessee is often numbered among them. products, The agricultural products of these states are such as Their agricultural belong to a temperate climate. The easterly ones produce breadstuffs and tobacco; the westerly have, in addition, hemp and live-stock. The value of slave labor is by no means so great in them as in the Gulf States, but in most of them negroes could be raised for sale very profitably. This gave them an identity of interest with the cotton-growing regions at the South. and their population. follows: From the census of 1860 it appears that the population of the Border States was as position. They stretch from beyond the Mississippi to the AtTheir geographical lantic, forming a great bulwark, protecting the cotton region from the contact of the North, and are nearly divided asunder by the Free State Illinois, which, toward the south, being bounded by the Mississippi on the west and the Ohio on the east, projects deeply into them. At the point of confluence of those streams is the important position Cairo. tion, It was, as we have seen (p. 95), the intention of the Their political posi- original seceding states to intrench themselves behind this great natural barrier, expecting that it would bear the burden of the war if any should take place, and be the scene of whatever devastation might ensue. In that favorable seclusion, it was thought that the cotton crop might be raised with out molestation. To obtain access to this staple, it was expected that England would not hesitate to break any blockade that the national government might establish, and that a recognition of independence, and perhaps military aid from Western Europe, might follow. 220 and importance to the Confederacy. THE BORDER STATES. [SECT. IX. It was therefore important to the leaders of the secession movement that the alliance of the Border States should be secured. To accomplish this, it was necessary, in accordance with the theory of the American political system, to obtain the direct consent of the people of those states through a Convention expressly called in each. The Legislatures and executive officers had no direct or lawful power in the matter beyond that of calling such a Convention. They could only act in obedience to the existing Constitution whose agents they were. The transference of allegiance was not in their control. The inhabitants of the Border States clearly foresaw that their geographical position placed them in the front of the conflict. In addition to the fact that they were by nature (vol. i., p. 102) more predisposed than their Southern neighbors to look to the consequences of their acts, their vicinity to the Free States caused them to be brought under influences antagonistic to the slave system. Under such circumstances, it could not be opinions and inter- expected that they would exhibit unanimity; on the contrary, they must necessarily be divided by clashing opinions and interests. Though the slaveowner might view a coalescence with the Southern Confederacy with satisfaction, the slaveless white might perhaps resist any attempt to detach him from the Union. Division in their ests. The problem for the secessionist leaders to solve was therefore how to deal with these divided Mode by which it cure them to the South. was proposed to se- border populations. border populations. At an early period, while the secession movement was a mere conspiracy, it was seen that the election of trustworthy governors must be secured. Through the governor a certain amount of control over the Legislature could be ob tained, and the vote of the Legislature was needed for CHAP. XLVI.] THE BORDER STATES. 221 calling a Convention of the people. Moreover, by mak ing sure of these influences, it was not impossible, though such actions might be arbitrary, to obtain possession of the military resources of each of those states. excited. On their account the government avoided action on slavery. No pains were spared to excite the slave interest by Their slave interests representing that the Free States had at last entered upon an abolition crusade, and that the Republican party inaugurated in Washington had determined on tyrannical measures toward the South. On the other hand, all through the summer of 1861 the national government used every exertion to retain these Border States in their loyalty. It was mainly on their account that no hostile measures were taken against slavery. That ominous subject could not fail, however, to intrude, and accordingly it had to be dealt with by the military commanders both at Fortress Monroe and in Northwestern Virginia. General McClellan, then in command in the latter, declared that he should not only abstain from interference with the slaves, but with an iron hand crush any attempts at insurrection on their part. Almost on the same day, General Butler, at Fortress Monroe, determined to regard them as "contraband" of war, and to employ them at a fair compensation. In his message to Congress at its extra session in July, The effect of their President Lincoln pointed out clearly what neutrality. the effect of the attitude of neutrality must necessarily be. "In the Border States so called, in fact the Middle States, there are those who favor a policy which they call' armed neutrality;' that is, an arming of these states to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be building an impassable wall along the line of separation - and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the |