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CHAP. XLIV.]

Gradual change in

army.

THE NATIONAL ARMY.

187

The quality of the force thus arising changed with the changes of its origin. To the experienced the morale of the military eye, the troops in the national serv ice up to the epoch of the battle of Bull Run constituted an armed multitude, but not an army. Then it became evident that something more effective was necessary. Many months were consumed, and the skill of a trained officer, General McClellan, was exhausted; unstinted supplies were lavished; but, though a great improvement was accomplished, perfection was very far from being reached. Not without the utmost difficulty, and after many disasters, were the political aspirations of officers and men extinguished. It was in the West that the army first became what an army ought to be-a mere centre of human force, capable of being diought to be. rected with mathematical precision along any given line, and brought to bear irresistibly on any given point. In the judgment of a very high military authority, this degree of perfection was first manifested in General Grant's campaign from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.

What an army

To attain to this, an army must have lost all outward political thought; it must have implicit reliance on the mind which is guiding it. It must have complete cohesion in all its parts-from that tenacity results. Each soldier must thoroughly feel that, no matter how insig nificant he as a single individual may be, he is absolutely sustained in what he is about to do by the unswerving and unfailing power of the whole force. The highest excellence is reached when the converse of this conception is attained, and the individual soldier considers that on him personally the safety and honor of the whole army may be depending. In the wars of Napoleon the Imperial Guard had been brought to this state. It is not by the pageantry of reviews that this grand ideal is reached;

188

PROGRESS OF ENLISTMENTS.

[SECT. VIII.

the perfect soldier, like his own weapon, must have passed through the ordeal of fire. Congress at its extra session more than complied with the call of the President. He asked for 400,000 men-he was authorized to accept

Army legislation of
Congress.

500,000.

In a report to the President (December 1st, 1861), the Report on the prog- Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, states that, ress of enlistments, at the commencement of this rebellion, inaugurated by the attack upon Fort Sumter, the active military force at the disposal of the government was 16,006 regulars, principally employed in the West to hold in check marauding Indians. In April 75,000 volunteers were called upon to enlist for three months' service. The people responded with such alacrity that 77,875 were immediately obtained. Under the authority of the act of Congress of July 22d, 1861, the states were asked to furnish 500,000 volunteers to serve for three years or during the war, and by the act approved on the 29th of the same month, the addition of 25,000 men to the regular army was authorized, the result being an army of 600,000 men. If to this be added the number of discharged threemonths' volunteers, the aggregate force furnished to the government between April and December exceeded 700,000 men.

At first the government found itself deficient in arms and on the provi- and munitions of war through the bad faith sion of arms. of those intrusted with their control during the preceding administration. The armory at Harper's Ferry had been destroyed. The only reliance was on the single armory at Springfield and upon private establishments. Measures had promptly been taken to increase the capacity of the Springfield establishment until it was expected to produce in the ensuing year 200,000 rifles. A special agent had been sent to Europe, with two mill

CHAP. XLIV.]

REGULARS AND VOLUNTEERS.

189

ions of dollars, to obtain an immediate supply, part of which had been already received.

Regular officers may

teers.

By a very important provision of the law enacted in July (1861), it was permitted to detach regserve in the volun- ular officers to serve in the volunteer force. Special provision was also made permitting the appointment of general officers from any grade in the regular army, the officers not forfeiting their positions in the old army. This proved to be one of the most judicious laws in reference to the army passed by Congress at the inception of the war. In a great measure it broke down all distinction between regulars and volunteers. Regulars were commanding volunteers, and volunteers quickly became as well disciplined as regulars.

The bounties by states, and counties, and cities were given to volunteer troops, and not enjoyed by regular troops. It therefore became difficult to fill the regular regiments. In actual operations, all distinctions between them practically disappeared. If jealousy did exist, it was little more than in name-not more, perhaps, than occasioned wholesome rivalry.

West Point.

In the early period of the war, it was supposed by The Academy at many political demagogues that service in the army would prove to be the quickest and most effectual method of creating political capital for themselves. The battle of Bull Run, to some extent, dispelled that illusion. However, while it lasted, they, and the newspapers acting in their interest, spared no pains to depreciate those officers who had been professionally educated at West Point, and whom they considered as standing in their way. They not only derided all preparatory military study, but openly accused that national institution of inculcating aristocratic sentiments; and, what is worse, of a tendency to disloyalty. They pointed

190

LOYALTY OF THE WEST POINT ACADEMY. [SECT. VIII.

to the more prominent Confederate officers who had graduated there.

uates.

But, from a critical inquiry into the subject, General Loyalty of its grad- Cullum has shown that, at the commencement of the war, out of 1249 graduates of the Academy then supposed to be living, 821 were in the army, and 428 in civil life. Of the 821, only 184, or a little more than one fifth, went over to the South; 627, or nearly four fifths, remained loyal; 10 took neither side. Of the 428 in civil life, only 99, or less than one fourth, were known to have favored the Confederates; 292, or nearly three times that number, remained loyal. The career of 37 is unknown. It thus appears that, out of 1249, more than three fourths remained true.

of

Of the loyal graduates in civil life, 115 re-entered the national service. Among these, 54 were over the age 45 years. Of those who, from disability or other causes, did not take an active part in the war, many performed useful services in civil capacities requiring military knowl edge; others, who had tendered their services, were una ble to procure commissions. The graduates of the Acad emy were in command at nearly all the great victories of the national arms; they were the chief organizers and directing agents of the various staff branches of the service. They planned defenses, conducted sieges, bridged the boldest streams. They silently executed an incalculable amount of work in keeping in active motion the compli cated machinery of war.

Of the graduates of the Academy thus serving in the national army, one fifth were killed in battle, and more than one third-probably one half-were wounded.

Those officers in the Confederate service who had received their military education at the national expense had taken the following oath on entering the army as commissioned officers. It is from the tenth Article of War,

CHAP. XLIV.]

MCCLELLAN'S REPORT.

191

act of Congress 1806. It still remains for them to justify their conduct.

uates till

"I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will bear true allegiance to the Oath taken by grad- United States of America, and that I will entering the army. serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies and opposers whatsoever; and observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States, and the orders of the officers appointed over me according to the Rules and Articles for the government of the armies of the United States."

General McClellan

Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General McClellan was assigned to the command at Washing- mand of the Military Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the American army until the end of October.

ton.

that time.

"I found," says General McClellan in his report, "no State of the army at army to command—a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat.

"Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac.

"The number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty pieces.

"In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position or number of the troops,

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