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It was undoubtedly only through General Grant's action that this contingent could be ordered from the Army of the James to join the Army of the Potomac. But its further movement ought to have been under the immediate direction of General Meade. It is unfortunately, however, an almost irresistible tendency in any but the most philosophic minds to enter abruptly into a train of events which others are conducting. The propensity is well illustrated by the proverbial soup, to which each person passing through the kitchen contributes a pinch of salt. The result, in this instance, of Grant's taking immediate direction of Smith's movement was that he was ordered to march, instead of, to Cold Harbor, for a wrong place, to Newcastle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, near the mouth of the Totopotomoy, several miles back of the lines of the Army of the Potomac as they were expected to lie, and did lie, on the 1st of June. In consequence, after a long, hot day- and night-march, on the 31st of May, Smith's column reached Newcastle Ferry, only to march the next morning for Cold Harbor, his troops reaching there unfit, through heat and fatigue, for the immediate action desired, which had to be postponed until a later hour.

armies were in close conaction by the line of the The infantry of the Army

On the 31st of May the two tact, but largely debarred from upper reach of the Totopotomoy. of the Potomac was kept, with skirmishers in advance, pressed up against the enemy, but made no general attack anywhere, as it was now perceived that, if it were possible to break through the opposing lines, it would be necessary to move from right to left some of the force then along the upper reach of the Totopotomoy. The day was therefore passed by the infantry in skirmishing and making feints of attack. The cavalry was, on the contrary, very active during the day; Sheridan, on the left front, capturing and

holding the enemy's position at Old Cold Harbor, finally relinquishing it under heavy pressure, and then, by orders from General Meade to hold it to the last extremity, making a successful stand there.

Sheridan's holding Old Cold Harbor was the turningpoint in the preliminary tactical movements of the Army of the Potomac. It was soon able to extend towards the left, with its line between Old Cold Harbor and New Cold Harbor, stretching thence southeast to the Chickahominy. The Sixth Corps was, during the night of the 31st, marched to the left, Sheridan meanwhile holding on with difficulty against the force brought to bear against him on the morning of the 1st of June. The Sixth Corps, however, began to arrive between nine and ten o'clock, and relieved the cavalry for other duty on the left flank. Wilson's cavalry division, on the right, had an engagement near Hanover Court House, and destroyed the two railroad bridges over the South Anna. In the course of the morning Smith came up from Newcastle, and was posted on the right of the Sixth Corps, Warren being on his right. The enemy, upon observing the coming up of the Sixth Corps to take position on Grant's extreme left, pushed Longstreet further to the right. The two armies are now effectively closed in on each other. The line of the upper Totopotomoy is no longer the scene of the main threats and attacks. The focus of the combat is to be at Cold Harbor, covering some of the most direct roads to Richmond and the Chickahominy. From left to right the corps now lie in the order of the Sixth, the four divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, the Fifth, the Ninth, and the Second. The final battle contemplated for the morning of the 2d of June had to be delayed until the afternoon, partially on account of the necessity of affording an interval of rest for Smith's jaded troops. Meanwhile, at six o'clock in the evening of the 1st the action began by an

attack from the front of the Sixth Corps and that of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps. From the left of the Sixth Corps to the right of Smith the following was the order of the troops for the designated attack. The Sixth Corps, -Getty's division, Russell's division, Ricketts's division. Smith's troops,-Devens's division, Brooks's division, Martindale's division. The whole of Ricketts's division, in the centre, the right of Russell's and of Getty's, Devens's, and part of Brooks's, came into fierce contact with the enemy, Martindale's division, on the right, and Neill's brigade, on the left, being refused, and holding the roads in those places. The result of the fighting was the loss of two thousand men within a brief space of time, and the gain of portions of the advanced line of the enemy. Ricketts's and part of Russell's division captured the enemy's second line on their front, but were finally driven out of it. The troops entrenched on the ground which they had gained. With only the force present on the left, no further progress could be made, and the struggle will intensify more and more towards the left. The Second Corps was ordered to make a night march from the right, and the Sixth and the three other corps on the left, to attack early the next morning while the Second was coming up on the left of the Sixth. After a heavy night march over difficult ground Hancock arrived early in the morning of the 2d of June with his troops very weary. Smith's troops, too, had not completely recovered from their fatigue, having gone into battle still wayworn. Besides, the vicissitudes of their march had resulted in their being deficient in ammunition. The attack was therefore postponed until five o'clock in the afternoon.

Without going into the minutia of the new dispositions on the left, let it be stated in general terms that the Army of the Potomac was now resting with its left on the Chickahominy, lying in the following order from left to right,—

the Second Corps, the Sixth, parts of the Tenth and Eighteenth, the Fifth, and the Ninth; the Fifth holding a line about three miles in length, so covered in parts by swamps that it was difficult there to attack or be attacked. The enemy continued, conformably with the opposite movements, to draw down reinforcements from his left to his right. The attack was again postponed. Instead of its taking place at five o'clock in the afternoon, it was ordered for half-past four on the morning of the next day, the 3d. This was necessitated by various causes, the great heat, the fatigue from the late night marches, and the general inadequacy of general preparation for the previously appointed time of five o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. Nothing therefore took place on the 2d of June more serious than skirmishing along the lines, except that the enemy, conceiving that the right might have been unduly weakened, made an attempt upon it, resulting in some success, as it unfortunately found Warren and Burnside, on the extreme right, in the act of making a change ordered, by which Warren was, by extending his left, to close up on Smith, and Burnside was to mass his corps in reserve in the rear of Warren's right.

The coming battle is popularly believed to have been one in which there was a simultaneous assault all along the line, but this was in places impossible. What in a general way took place remains to be recounted. It was almost precisely on the stroke of half-past four in the morning of the 3d, the appointed time, when the cavalry on the left quiescent, the cavalry on the enemy's right-rear active, that the infantry between, over a stretch of six miles, attacked wherever the enemy's lines were approachable. The army, free to approach the enemy from any position, barring Warren's and Burnside's, and represented by the Second and Sixth Corps, and the divisions of the Tenth and Eighteenth, advanced

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