CHAPTER XX. THE BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, SPOTTSYLVANIA, A GREAT change suddenly came over the Army of the Potomac. A new star had risen in the western firmament, before whose lustre in the zenith the light of others was to pale. Fortune had so willed it, that the army, although diminished in numbers since Gettysburg, yet, having held in check the army of Lee, and even taken against it the offensive, had been the means of indirectly assisting towards Grant's gathering new laurels at Chattanooga. Now, when he appeared on the eastern theatre of war, the army had been increased to almost unprecedented force in numbers and material of war, all ready to the conqueror's hand. On the 26th of February, 1863, the grade of lieutenant-general had been created and Grant appointed to the place. On the 8th he arrived in Washington from the West, and the next day received his commission. The day afterwards he had a conference with General Meade at Brandy Station. Going back immediately thereafter to the West for final understanding with General Sherman as to plans of campaign, he returned to Washington on the 23d of March, whence he went almost at once to the field at Culpeper, and there established his headquarters. It is therefore in place here to mention incidentally, that he had expressly stated that, as being in command of all the armies in the field, his proper place was in Washington. Although, it is true, his presence on the hither side of the Rapidan made no essential difference at first, yet, when he thence entered upon and continued to direct on the ground the campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg, destined to last a year, his departure from the line of conduct which he had laid down as the duty of the commanding-general of all the armies to follow was absolute, and led, especially in the Valley of Virginia, to the very consequences which his originally announced intention had been intended to preclude. There were other consequences that followed this reversal of intention on the part of Grant. But for his immediate presence, the army would have emerged from the conflict, from the battle of the Wilderness to that of Cold Harbor, in far greater strength than was possible under his tactics, in which, had he been the mighty Thor himself, his weapon would have shattered on the steel of the opposing front of war. He persisted too long in the continuous attrition and hammering which he declared in advance to be his system of encountering the Army of Northern Virginia. Still another consequence of his determination to have his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac lay in a divided command, lessening the value of administration represented by a single centre of authority which, in all activities, is the condition of the highest degree of efficiency. It led also, on account of Grant's tendency to favoritism, to detriment to the service, through that propensity which, willingly or unwillingly, allows well- or ill-placed affections to be enslaved. The same consequences, it might be urged, the tendency being conceded, would have manifested themselves, had he established his headquarters in Washington. This is undeniable, but it should be remembered that the field, the immediate scene of critical events, introduces dangers from such indulgence far exceeding those possible to incur in cabinet direction of affairs; and in this case, as will in due time appear, they did not fail to manifest them selves as working injury to the military service, and therefore to the cause which it sustained. General Meade had seized an opportunity at his first interview with General Grant to say to him that if he would prefer another man for his position, not to hesitate for a moment in expressing his wish to that effect. Grant, however, knew too well the value of General Meade to relieve him from duty as the commander of the army. But the situation thereby accepted led to consequences of farreaching import, probably contemplated by neither at the time. One has already been noted as a result, in the imperfect co-ordination of orders. It was told by an officer of undoubted veracity that when, in the middle of the night, he once carried a written order to Warren, he began to swear as he read it, when, glancing at the signature, he resumed his calm, as he remarked, "I might have known it was from Grant." The position of General Meade, as commander of the army, with General Grant's headquarters near him in the field was anomalous, and led for him personally to many trying situations. If any signal success attended the operations, it was almost invariably set down to the credit of Grant, but if any check or disaster, to the disparagement of Meade. I well remember one affair near Petersburg, directed in person by General Meade, as to which the papers had laudatory accounts of General Grant's presence on the field, when, as I afterwards learned, he was far away from the scene of action. Taking it altogether, there never was in history, so far as I am aware, any case so detrimental as Grant's presence in the field with the real commander of the army, except that of a king, or a prince of the blood, who was formerly often there, as an inspiring influence, or from military aspirations, and from whatever motive, generally a hindrance instead of a help to military operations. The actual case seems most like that |