termination, however, by an event wholly unexpected by the army. Halleck was on this occasion, as he continued to be to the end of the war, the chief one of the impedimenta of the army. As the garrison of ten thousand men, which, under General French had evacuated the post of Harper's Ferry, upon the advance of Lee, remained in occupation of Maryland Heights, where it could have no influence whatever on the current of events, Hooker had requested that it might be ordered to reinforce him, and this Halleck refused to allow. The discussion led to acrimonious feeling on both sides, which resulted in Hooker's being relieved of the command of the army at a time when, so far as the conduct of the campaign up to the present was concerned, he merited nothing less than the fullest recognition and praise. Still, the occurrence may be regarded now as a fortunate ending of the controversy. But that is, as after the event, judging easily. Only such a man as Halleck, timid and irresolute, could have been blind to the danger of the experiment, for in emergencies timidity and rashness often go hand-inhand. What is, however, most conspicuously censurable in this proceeding is the motive which to all appearance brought about Hooker's fall, and the injudiciousness displayed in the choice of time for his removal, which ought to have taken place weeks before it occurred. Hooker, harassed as he had been by Halleck's recent interference with his plans, and piqued to the quick by the continued disregard with which his recommendations were treated by a man deciding at his ease in Washington, while he had the pressure of the field, asked to be relieved of the command of the army. It is questionable, judging by the character of Hooker, and by the circumstance that an engagement was known to be imminent, if Hooker was sincere in his request, if he really thought that it would be granted, if he did not rather imagine that in the emergency his self

assertion would be respected and tolerated. However that may be, his request was actually granted, and he was relieved of the command in the night of the 27th of June, and General Meade appointed to it. Both parties were obviously in the wrong, Hooker in proffering his resignation and Halleck in accepting it, but Halleck the more grievously. The crying injustice of the thing as it actually occurred was in the advantage taken of Hooker's act to relieve him when his course had been meritorious, instead of having relieved him when he had by signal failure justified that extreme measure. The circumstance forms one of the incontrovertible proofs of the unfitness of Halleck for the general administration of military affairs. Not only with reference to personal consideration is what has been adduced against the untimeliness of the removal irrefutable, but with reference to the situation of the army on the eve of battle, the removal, as unprecedented under such circumstances, and as involving the gravest risks, rendered the act of Halleck wholly unjustifiable.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST DAY OF GETTYSBURG.

THE field of Gettysburg was, from the nature of things, not to either hostile commander a pre-elected ground on which to join battle, but was forced upon both by conditions which neither could anticipate, but which each, seeking to control, could at best but modify. Only to one whose superlative knowledge included that of every disposition of troops, and that of every order emanating from the headquarters of both armies, would it have been possible to predict where the final collision would take place. Armies so situated, and groping for each other, may be likened to huge predatory creatures which put forth their tentacles in all directions, and when they find the nucleus of their prey, where the greatest force resides, concentratedly move to and attack from the point of greatest vantage. The general reader would not be interested in the itinerary of marches representing this first condition of things in both armies. It will therefore suffice to describe here incidentally, in due order of time, their respective positions just before their final concentration.

On the 28th of June the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac was at Middletown. On the morning of the 29th General Meade set the whole of his force in motion towards the north, to make, as he expressed it, the enemy loose his hold on the Susquehanna, for at that time Ewell had reached York and Carlisle, and was about to capture Harrisburg by crossing the bridge at that place, when he was recalled by