posititiously temporary drawback, it did not follow that when the army of McClellan was placed astride of the Chickahominy, the larger body of troops should have been placed north of that stream, in the stronger position, the immediate consequence of which was the disaster at Seven Pines. The army should, moreover, according to the best ancient and modern practice in war, have been supported as to its base, without which a base is only a name, by the completion of the tête de pont at Bottom's Bridge, and by têtes de pont on the upper Chickahominy, and besides, the line from the White House to Bottom's Bridge, beginning at the White House, should have been strongly held by detached works.

Taking things as they actually were, with the vicious first dispositions, the capture of Richmond should have been attempted while the battle of Fair Oaks was proceeding. Again, McClellan should either have caused the whole force north of the Chickahominy to retire south of it during the night of the 26th of June, destroying the bridges behind it, and thus have avoided fighting the battle of Gaines's Mill, or else he should, on the 27th, have heavily supported the troops fighting that battle. General McClellan should have been present in person near New Market Cross Roads, to see to the disposition of the troops, because it was the most critical point of the field. A general-in-chief should not leave so much as he did to his lieutenants, who, however competent, represent so many different minds and views and wills, and successful generalship, however much it may draw from accessories, is conditioned, as a finality, upon the action of one supreme thought and will. That he was not permitted to advance on Richmond again, when he so earnestly requested it, is ground for great rejoicing, for experience points to the probability that the Federal and Confederate sides would in very deed have "swapped queens.' Whether or not, in consideration of the loss of morale by

the Federal troops, and its corresponding gain by the Confederates, an advance on Richmond just after the battle of Malvern Hill would have been successful, must remain somewhat problematical. The relative gain and loss of such imponderable matter as morale remains unknown, save by the test of actual trial.

The enemy, on his part, made three grievous mistakes, to his cost, one in assaulting the position at Beaver Dam Creek, when it needed only to be turned, as it was the next day; another in Jackson's action leading to his losing so much time as he did in rebuilding a bridge across the Chickahominy, when it ought to have been known that, even with that accomplished, he would not be able to force the crossing at White Oak Swamp; and finally, the mistake of attacking Malvern Hill from a direction in which it was impregnable, as held by troops supported by the fire of the gunboats in the James.

Whilst General McClellan's army was in process of removal from the Peninsula, General Meade, having recovered from the serious wound which he had received at New Market Cross Roads, took steamer from Baltimore for Harrison's Landing. There he found everything in confusion incident to the transportation of the army to the Potomac. Generals McCall and Reynolds had by exchange been released from the Richmond prison, but had not yet been able to rejoin the army, in consequence of which he found General Seymour in command of the Division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, about taking ship with it for Falmouth, near Fredericksburg. It started on the night of the 15th of August. General Meade, therefore, finding no immediate need existing for his presence, went to Washington, via Baltimore, remaining there for a day or two, when, hearing of the arrival of the Division at Falmouth, he proceeded there by rail, and thus rejoined the army.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

It was on June 26, 1862, as will be remembered, that the action at Mechanicsville, on the Peninsula, was brought about by Jackson's and other forces of Lee's turning the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, an event followed at once by the retreat of the army during a period known as the Seven Days' Battles, resulting in a change of base from the Pamunkey to the James, where the army, in its final stand at Malvern Hill, reinforced by the fire of the Federal gunboats on the James, repulsed the enemy, and then took refuge at Harrison's Landing, where it was insured from further molestation by the continued presence of gunboats, by entrenchments, and by the occupation of commanding positions for artillery in the vicinity. By a coincidence, it was on the very same day that General Pope was appointed to the command near Washington of the previously disunited forces of that vicinity, which had been under McDowell, Fremont, and Banks, among which Jackson had just made such havoc, and which, when concentrated, were to be known as the Army of Virginia, Fremont resigning because he would not serve under his junior in rank, General Pope, and Sigel taking command of his corps.

It will therefore be perceived, when we remember that the first day's serious contest of the forces of the Army of Virginia, the battle of Cedar Mountain, which was a direct consequence of McClellan's retreat on the Peninsula, did