trade were restricted, they must have concluded that having become its own sovereign, and governed by a liberal policy, it would take broader aud more rapid strides. But while the power of the executive has increased, so has that of the legislature. The power of the latter may not be of that ready and compact nature which will admit of its being employed for personal emolument, but it has been equally promoted with that of the former. Still, this extensive patronage of the executive will not avail him in preventing an invasion of his authority by the legislature, unless we suppose it open to corruption. This supposition will, however, be objected to by the opponents of the veto power, who presume greater integrity in the legislature than in him.

But even if, by the exercise of his official patronage, the executive has arrived at a power not anticipated by the framers of the Constitution, the plea should not be admitted, that on that account the veto power should be abolished. If, while it is alleged that his power is inconsistent with the balance of the government, and greater than they anticipated; it be also admitted, that in their generation it was useful and not too great, then let him remain in the possession of his primitive power, while he is deprived of those which have gradually accrued to him. Instead of taking from him a certain amount of power, and replacing it with an equal amount, let his original power be neither increased nor diminished. No one contends that the executive power has been unlawfully increased. It is probably too large for one man safely to possess, and should, therefore, be retrenched. Upon this question there has been much debate and no action. Congress can now vest the appointment of such inferior officers as it deems proper in the courts of law, and if necessary, an alteration of the Constitution can be made.

Though it may be correctly said, that no legislative act has been rejected by the executive because it entrenched on his appropriate functions, yet this fact does not serve to prove the inutility of the veto power. Its existence has prevented the usurpation which it was intended to guard against. Moreover, a violation of many of the provisions of the constitution has never been attempted. Such are those which guarantee the free exercise of natural rights, and assert the broad principles of civil liberty. The very boldness and guarded sanctity of the principle is its best defence. inviolability of the Roman tribune was a surer protection than the lictors of the decemvirs.

The

It is said that the executive has no right to veto a bill on the ground of unconstitutionality, because that ground is to be examined by another department. Now, it is well-known that in practice umpires are regarded as a last resort. The people, as has recently been seen in the case of an exciting question, were not disposed to refer its settlement to the judiciary, whose special duty it is to decide upon violations of the Constitution. The judiciary is naturally averse to invalidating a popular act, and thus incurring popular reprehension. The people, on that account, seek to prevent its being forced to a decision, and prefer to discuss, themselves, the conformity of a measure to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Representatives in Congress oppose bills that are introduced on precisely the same ground. A majority is never willing to permit the passage of a bill which it deems contrary to the Constitution, and leave the decision of that question to the judiciary. So short is the term of the executive, that he cannot be said to forbid the passage of a bill, but merely to refer it to the careful

revision of the people. If, after calm reflection, they desire its passage, their wishes can be carried into effect.

Another object of the veto power, as has been seen, was to prevent hasty and immature legislation. That object is now more important than ever, on account of the increase of public business. All the secondary reasons, for which it was conferred, still exist with undiminished weight. It is said to be the sole prerogative of the legislature to decide upon the expediency of laws, and to be an act of encroachment upon its privileges for the executive to interpose his opinions. Now, though it be a principle of our government that its departments should be so separate as not to be dependent on each other, it is also an established principle that they should be so united as to impose a mutual check on each other. The legislature possesses some executive power by having a share in making appointments, and on the same principle the executive has some share in legislation.

It is premised by those who declaim against the veto power, thut it has been wantonly abused and perverted from its original purpose. But the premise is not warranted by the facts. For sixty years it has been exercised but twenty-five times; twice by Washington; six times by Madison; once by Monroe; nine times by Jackson; four times by Tyler; and three times by Polk. During the same time seven thousand acts have been passed by Congress, and signed by the president; and thus the proportion of rejected to accepted acts is one to two hundred and eighty. This statement does not bear the appearance of a wanton abuse of the power in question; and it is rather a matter of surprise that it has been exercised so seldom. But the vetoes which have occasioned the outcry against it have been those which prevented the establishment of a United States Bank. It is plain, that if the bills which proposed it had not been negatived, no general complaint would have been made against this power. Accordingly the devoted champions of this monster corporation are the principal declaimers against it. They seek the abolition of a power which has frustrated their doubtful designs. But no one need be informed that Presidents Jackson and Tyler were sustained by the people in arresting the passage of those bills. The former had the satisfaction of delivering the executive power to his intimate public and private friend, who announced the intention to tread in his footsteps. In the contest which eventuated in the election of President Harrison, the bank was a mooted question in some portions of the country, while in others it was either unanimously condemned or not presented for discussion. In the extra session of 1842, the bank bill passed Congress by a bare majority in one branch, and was vetoed by President Tyler. Now, if the people desired the charter of this institution, why was it not presented by its advocates in 1844 and in 1848? In fact, since the extra session of 1842, it has only been referred to as a matter of history, and not as a matter of present interest. By that veto the country was saved from having entailed upon it a dangerous institution, and the people were called upon to decide upon its establishment. As the veto power has been a barrier to designing men, they now call its legitimate exercise a violation of the Constitution. The present executive has been charged, in a respectable review, with absolute usurpation for employing it. But is any one so credulous as to believe that the Supreme Court would, for a moment, entertain the charge? Even distingnished statesmen have declared that the president deserves impeachment. That certainly is no very laudable courage, however potential it may appear, which makes bold charges, and never dares to sustain them. It is a characteristic of partisans

to call those measures unconstitutional which they deem inexpedient or oppressive, and to accuse a political opponent of infidelity to his country. If the executive cannot veto bills at discretion without violating the Constitution, some meaning, till recently invisible, must have been discovered. It explicitly gives the executive plenary power in this respect, and imposes no restriction on its exercise. What terms could be broader or plainer. "If he approve (the bill) he shall sign it; if not, he shall return it with his objections."

Whilst the veto power is opposed so virulently by some leading politicians, they are aware that the requisite number of states cannot be obtained to consent to its abolition. Despairing of success in a constitutional manner, they require a pledge of their candidate for the presidency that he will not employ it. This course is a direct violation of the spirit of the Constitution. It was the implied agreement among its authors, without which it could not have been made, that all its provisions should be carried into effect, and no extra-constitutional power should be employed to defeat them. They each compromised with each other, and with the whole. They pledged fidelity to the Union, and the Union pledged fidelity to them. They would never have consummated their holy alliance, if they had dreamed that any party would endeavor to cancel his obligations by schemes unknown to the Constitution. The principle of their compact is the funda mental principle of every compact. If five men enter into an agreement, stipulating that its terms shall not be altered without the consent of four of them, it is a manifest violation of its spirit, for three of them being unable to obtain the number necessary to alter those terms, to seek to evade or nullify them. Let this doctrine of modern politicians be reduced to practice, and of what advantage are the conservative institutions of government? The judiciary is appointed to decide, unbiassed, uninfluenced, and unpledged, on the constitutionality of laws. Has any man, or any party, a right to exact a pledge of them that they will approve every law presented to them for their decision? Certainly not. Neither has any man, or any party, a right to exact a pledge of the candidate for the presidency that he will affix his signature to every act of Congress. The Constitution tells the president to return a bill to Congress which he does not approve, and that party tramples upon it which tells him to do otherwise. The dangerous doctrine alluded to should excite the alarm of every patriot and lover of constitutional freedom.

If the president ought not to be empowered to negative the acts of Congress, ought the governors of the several states to be allowed to negative the acts of the legislatures of those states? In several states the governors possess this power, and it has frequently been exercised in Massachusetts; yet this state has opposed more than any other the veto power of the national executive. Why do not the same persons who have declaimed against the president's veto, declaim also against the governor's? The pretence may be sought that it has not been abused in the states, but has been exercised for good and sufficient reasons. Besides the insuperable difficulty of determining the precise locality of such reasoning, it may be said that the cause why the veto power of the governors is regarded so leniently, is because it has never happened to frustrate the selfish designs of the monied order, or be engaged in a contest with a powerful corporation like the United States Bank.

The veto power has been described with every offensive term. It has been called " anti-democratic," a one man power," "a kingly preroga

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tive," a monarchical institution." On hearing the declamation against it, a person ignorant of the nature of our government would infer that we live under the kingdom and not the republic of the United States. There is a striking parallel between these representations and those made in France concerning the same power soon after the commencement of the old revolution, when its propriety was debated in the constituent assembly. Many of the less informed citizens were made to believe by their demagogues that the veto was a monster which was about to exterminate them and others,that it was a thief who was coming to steal their bread. The proposition was seriously discussed by them, that upon his appearance he be suspended on a lamp-post. A similar delusion would have occupied the minds of the American people by reason of the harangues of selfish partisans, if it had not been prevented by their superior intelligence. The assertion is unfounded that the veto power is not a democratic institution. The executive may be said not to prohibit, but merely to postpone the passage of a bill, appealing to the sober, second thought of the people. If a certain portion of the legislature can be obtained in its favor, it may become a law without his consent. The people will soon have an opportunity to approve or disapprove of his negative. It is merely suspensive, not absolute. The expediency or constitutionality of a bill is not unquestionable, which is opposed perseveringly by one third of the legislature. The assertion referred to is as unfounded, as would be the assertion that the Senate is an anti-democratic branch of the government, because it may arrest the enactment of a bill which has been passed by the immediate representatives of the people. The latter assertion has more support, because the character of the executive department can be sooner changed than the entire character of the Senate. An accurate observer of our institutions has correctly understood the character and properly appreciated the importance of the veto power. "The president is moreover provided' with a suspensive veto, which allows him to oppose the passing of such laws as might destroy the portion of independence which the Constitution awards him. The struggle between the president and the legislature must always be an unequal one, since the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering in its plans; but the suspensive veto forces it at least to reconsider the matter, and, if the motion be persisted in, it must be backed by a majority of two thirds of the whole House. The veto power is, in fact, a sort of appeal to the people. The executive power, which, without this security, might have been secretly oppressed, adopts this means of pleading its cause and stating its motives." (De Tocqueville's Democracy in America.)

The object of this article has been to define the reasons for which the veto power was intrusted to the executive rather than to examine their validity; to show that those reasons, if ever valid, are now valid; not to defend the vetoes of the present executive, but to prove his indubitable right to make them. It is unnecessary to defend the soundness and strengthen the conclusiveness of those reasons which were long revolved and carefully matured by Madison and his associates in the Federal Convention; defended with masterly ability by the chief author of the Federalist, and by all the commentators on the Constitution, and employed by Washington and nearly all his successors. If the names of distinguished partisans now striving for political elevation can be adduced to invalidate them, there can be adduced to confirm them the more weighty and less doubtful names of Chancellor Kent and Mr. Justice Story, who, retired from the conflicts of parties, sought only to be the faithful expounders and the honest defenders of the Constitution.

THE ABSOLUTE EQUALITY OF MIND.

A CONTEMPLATION of human nature surrounds the mind with perplexities and anomalies. Can the character of the human race be studied in each individual; or is the character of each man but a part-an atom, to be described by itself as an integrant and necessary portion of a great whole? The powers, the endowments and desires of humanity have been subjects of philosophical inquiry and research for the wisdom of every age and nation. Upon an accurate determination of these important elements of human character, depend a knowledge of the social relations which man should bear to his fellows, and a just appreciation of the dignity and destiny of the human race. In the ruder ages of antiquity, the superiority of man amongst his fellows, was predicated upon huge dimensions, physical strength and animal cunning. But soon the sway of gross animal organization was induced to succumb to the silent but irresistible power of mental superiority. Man was no longer classed and divided into castes, superior and inferior, upon principles of valor, and size, and strength; but a new organization of society obtained in accordance with new principles and new laws; acknowledging superior wisdom to be the greatest good, and investing it with the highest authority. The chimera of the right of brute force to govern mankind has passed away forever. The degrading and humiliating practice of judging human worth and human qualifications by the mere qualities of the animal organization, has ceased to exist.

Distinguishing and honoring mental power as superior to physical, was the beginning of civilization; but acknowledging a difference between the power of a mind, which accidental circumstances or positive industry has made prominent, and the power of other minds, which, from necessity or indolence, has remained in obscurity, has been the fruitful source of evil. Selfishness is a leading feature in the human character, and is consequently found in the wise and the foolish alike. This trait has induced men, thus houored for their attributed superiority, to devise schemes for the maintenance of the influence they have already acquired, to perpetuate their authority to the exclusion of all others. This has resulted in the pernicious, exclusive and tyrannical doctrine and usage of the hereditary descent of honors and power.

There has been no material advancement in civilization, or improvement in the actual condition of man for ages: true, there have been changes in the outward conformation of society; but these have been changes in form merely, confined to the same essential substance-changes in location upon the same level, not advancement, not an upward progression. There could be no actual advancement in civilization towards greater perfection, because the fundamental principle to which it owes its primary existencethe admission of superior intellectual endowment--has never been modified or corrected.

An intimate connection certainly exists between biology, (vitality, orga nization,) physiology, (life, the manifestation of specific properties after organization,) and psychological phenomena; and the three subjects, mental philosophy, biology and physiology, if studied in connection, with reference to each other, and their several relations and dependencies carefully ob