"it would be useful to the judiciary department, by giving it an additional opportunity of defending itself against legislative encroachments, and would be useful to the executive by inspiring additional confidence and firmness in exerting the revisionary power." The superior arguments of Mr. Martin prevailed, that it would bring the two departments under each other's influence, and would commit the judiciary against the constitutionality of the disapproved bills, if, after having been passed by the requisite majority in Congress they were submitted to the decision of the supreme court. The motion of Mr. Gerry, to intrust the limited negative to the executive alone, was carried by a vote of eight states in the affirmative to two in the negative. It is probable that these two states opposed it only because the judiciary was not associated with the executive in exercising it. Mr. Bedford, of Delaware, was the only member who, in debate, opposed it in every form. The blank of Mr. Gerry's motion, by which a certain majority of the legislature could overrule the revisionary check of the executive, was ordered, by a unanimous vote, to be filled with two-thirds, which was afterwards altered to three-fourths. The original fraction was finally restored, and the following clause became a part of the Constitution :—

"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, shall become a law.",

From their debates we cannot ascertain all the reasons which the framers of the Constitution had for intrusting the executive with a veto power. So universally did the opinion prevail that he should be intrusted with it that it was unnecessary for them to defend the measure. We may, however, upon careful examination, infer from their debates, as well as from the public expositions and vindications of the Constitution by some of its authors, and from the messages of others of them who afterwards exercised it, what were the objects for which it was granted.

In accordance with their accustomed policy, they adopted an institution to which habit had conformed them, with such modifications as would adapt it to their character and form of government. The English executive had a negative on the acts of Parliament, and the colonial governors on those of the colonial legislatures. Though its unlimited exercise by rulers not appointed by the people had been productive of great oppression, they saw in it the elements of a good institution, if employed in a limited manner by temporary rulers of their own election. Whilst the Stuarts had made it an instrument of oppression by withholding their assent to beneficial laws till Parliament would increase their prerogative, yet since the renovation of the British constitution, at the accession of the house of Brunswick, it had not been exercised.

One of their objects in giving the executive the power to suspend the acts of the legislature, was to enable him to defend himself against its encroachments. Drawing their inferences from history and reason, they believed that in a free government the tendency was for the legislature to absorb all its powers. They sought to prevent this disastrous result by dividing it into two houses, by imposing checks on their united acts, and by carefully guarding the other departments against attack. They intended to invest

the executive with all the powers requisite for a free execution of the laws, and not inconsistent with the balance of the government, the genius of a republic, and the rights of the people. Assuming the power to be proper, they sought to guard it with barriers which would prevent its invasion. That this was one of their objects, may be inferred from the following quotations from a speech of Mr. Madison, and from the seventy-third number of the Federalist. In defending a union of the executive and the judiciary in a revisionary council, Mr. Madison said:

"It was much more to be apprehended, that, notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments, the legislature would still be an overmatch for them. Experience in all the states had evinced a powerful tendency in the legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the American constitutions, and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles.”— Madison Papers, 1163.

The following extract from the Federalist, illustrates the same idea :

"The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already more than once suggested; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the one or the other, the former will be absolutely unable to defend himself against the usurpations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authority by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body, to invade the rights of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence."

The second object of the limited negative was, by subjecting bills to the judgment and revision of different departments, to prevent immature, unwise and unequal legislation. Bills of this character were likely to be passed, through the press of business or the influence of sectional feelings. The executive, more open to calm reflection, and less liable, by being elected by the whole nation, to be controlled by local prejudices, was considered to be a fit depository of the revisionary powers. That this was one of their objects will be evident to any one who-marks the following extracts from the speeches of the members of the convention.

Mr. Sherman said:

"He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his (the executive's) wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the legislature."-Madison Papers, 786.

In advocating the union of the executive and the legislature in the revisionary council, Mr. Wilson said—

Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive; and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them have a share in the revisionary powers, and they will have an opportunity of taking notice of the character of a law, and of counteracting by the weight of their opinions the improper views of the legislature.—Id. 1162.

Mr. Madison, in advocating the same proposition, said—

It would moreover be useful to the community at large, as an additional check against a pursuit of those unwise and unjust measures which constituted so great a portion of our calamities."-Id. 1163.

"Col. Mason observed, that the defence of the executive was not the sole object of the revisionary power. He expected even greater advantages from it. Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the constitution of the legislature, it would still so much resemble that of the individual states, that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws. This restraining power was, therefore, essentially necessary. It would have the effect, not only of hindering the final passage of such laws, but would discourage demagogues from attempting to get them passed.-Id. 1168.

The same views are presented in the seventy-third number of the Federalist :

"It not only serves as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body,"

The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive, is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary, is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence or design.”

A statement of the reasons for exercising the veto power, which were given in the messages of those Presidents who were contemporary with and assisted in the formation of the Constitution, may serve to explain the purpose and determine the limits of that power.

On April 5th, 1792, President Washington vetoed a "bill for the apportionment of representatives among the states," with two constitutional objections. This veto was recommended by two members of his cabinet, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Randolph, and not opposed by Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Knox, because the President had not the power to make it. The motion in the House to pass the bill, notwithstanding his objections, was negatived by a vote of twenty-eight in its favor to thirty-three against it. bill was prepared and passed, which received his sanction.

A new

an

On March 1st, 1797, he veteod an amendment to an act, entitled " act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States." His objections were not based on the unconstitutionality, but on the injustice and impolicy of the act. He objected to the bill, that it discharged the dragoons without giving them proper remuneration; that it would be inconvenient and not compatible with economy to discharge them at the time contemplated by it; and that, in his opinion, cavalry was the least expensive and most useful portion of the regular army. "It will," said he, 66 be inconvenient and injurious to the public to dismiss the light dragoons as soon as notice of the law can be conveyed to them, one of the companies having been lately destined to a necessary and important service. It is generally greed that some cavalry, either militia or regular, will be necessary, and according to the best information I have been able to obtain, it is my opinon that the latter will be less expensive and more useful than the former." President Madison's first vetoes were made against two bills, concerning religious societies-the one incorporating and the other relieving a society. Constitutional objections were urged against them. On February 27th, 1817, he vetoed the Bonus bill, by which the share in the dividends of the

national bank, which the United States received, was set apart for purposes of internal improvement. Said he, in his message, "I am constrained by the insuperable difficulty I feel in reconciling the bill with the constitution of the United States, to return it with that objection to the House of Representatives, in which it originated."

On May 4th, 1822, President Monroe vetoed " an act for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland Road." The objection he made to it was, that Congress did not possess the power, under the Constitution, to

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pass such a law."

The vetoes of Presidents Jackson and Tyler, embracing reasons derived from the unconstitutionality and inexpediency of the proposed laws, will not be adduced, because, among their opponents are found the principal opponents of the veto power, who would not admit their authority. The views of President Harrison, expressed in his inaugural address, will not be received by them with the same prejudice, and will therefore be presented. Some of his reasoning is erroneous, but his conclusion is perfectly satisfactory. He believed that none of his predecessors had exercised the veto power on the ground of inexpediency, while a careful examination of their messages would have relieved him of his error. If he had borne in mind the debates in the convention, and especially a remark of Mr. Sherman, he would have qualified the proposition, if he had stated it at all, that "its members did not anticipate from this power any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation." He, however, thought that the Executive should negative hastily passed acts, by which the popular will has probably been disregarded. Now, as he had previously assumed that the immediate representatives of the people best understand their will, and as all admit that a hastily passed act should not be vetoed, if beneficial, and desired by the people, he could then only exercise this power on such hastily passed acts as he might deem inexpedient. He afterwards enforced the opinion, that in those cases in which a majority, influenced by sectional feelings, has invaded the rights of the minority, the Executive being, by his national position, a natural umpire between the different sections, should present, through his constitutional negative, the meditated invasion. At length he concluded with an opinion perfectly satisfactory to the friends of the veto power. "I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the constitution to the Executive of the United States, solely as a conservative power: to be used only, first, to protect the constitution from invasion; secondly, the people from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded, or not well understood; and thirdly, to prevent the effects of combinations, violative of the rights of minorities."

From the debates in the Federal Convention on the Constitution, the contemporaneous exposition of it by its advocates, and from the messages of the presidents who assisted in its formation, may be inferred the objects for which the veto power was intrusted to the executive. These were to defend him against legislative usurpation of his functions, and to guard against unconstitutional, inexpedient and hasty legislation. That the former was one of its objects has universally been admitted, but that the last two were also its objects has been obstinately denied; and the present executive, in carrying them out, has been charged with absolute usurpation. But how can a denial of the right of the president to negative such acts of the legislature as he deems inexpedient, be reconciled in the language of Mr. Sherman, that "we ought to avail ourselves of the wisdom of the executive in revising the laws;" with that of Mr. Wilson, that "the judges, by

having a share in the revisionary power, will have an opportunity of counteracting, by the weight of their opinions, the improper views of the legislature;" with that of Mr. Madison, that "it would be useful to the community at large as an additional check against unwise and unjust measures;" and with that of Colonel Mason, that "it would have the effect of hindering the final passage of unjust and pernicious laws." This denial is made in direct opposition to the explicit language of the Federalist, that the veto power furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws, is calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good; and that its secondary object is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence or design. The last word deserves special notice, as it conveys directly the idea, that the executive has the right to judge of the expediency of a proposed law. This denial is also made in the face of the fact, that President Washington's second veto was based entirely on grounds of expediency. His words deserve to be marked :—“ It will be injurious and inconvenient to the public,” &c. "From the best information I have been able to obtain, it is my opinion that the latter will be less expensive and more useful than the former." If this veto had been an act of executive usurpation, would it not have met with the unyielding resistance of Madison and other members of Congress who, hardly ten years before, had framed the Constitution?

It has also been vehemently maintained, the executive has no right to veto a bill on the ground of its unconstitutionality. But it has been seen that President Washington, when the debates on the Constitution bad hardly ceased, vetoed a bill on that ground, and that Madison's and Monroe's vetoes, rested on the same bases. Could it be that the president of the Federal convention and its most active members were so ignorant of its intentions, and so recreant to their sworn obligations, as thus to violate the work which they had pronounced sacred? Their knowledge of its spirit. and meaning, and their fidelity to its injunctions, alike defeat the supposition. It is a no trifling instance of the inconsistency and capricious judgment of faction, that the present executive has been boldly charged with absolute usurpation, for having exercised with the same reasons the same undoubted right which his predecessors freely exercised, without being accused of transgressing the strict limits of their official authority.

It has been said, that the reasons which actuated the authors of the Constitution to give the executive a veto power, no longer exist, and that it should therefore be withdrawn. It is argued, that as it was given to him to strengthen his weakness, and as his power has become confirmed by the increase of his patronage, he has ceased to require it for the purpose of defending himself against legislative encroachment. It may be replied, that they designed to secure to him all the powers they had vested in him, and that these can now be taken away by the legislature by the same means as they could then. It can pass laws depriving him of his authority as well as ever. Nor can it be shown that it is now less likely to transgress the limits of its own prerogative than it was at the institution of the Federal government. The fact that the patronage of the executive has increased, should not be alleged against the continuance of the veto power. The framers of the Constitution must have foreseen the rapid progress of the United States in population and extent of territory. They might have formed an inadequate idea of its future prosperity; but reasoning from its increase under the rule of a foreign nation, when commerce and private