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and attack with vigour on our right. Gen. Hebert, who commanded a division on the left, was to lead in the attack. Daylight came, and there was no attack on the left. Of this failure to execute his orders, Gen. Van Dorn says, in his official report: "A staff officer was sent to Hebert to inquire the cause. That officer could not be found. Another messenger was sent, and a third; and about seven o'clock Gen. Hebert came to my headquarters, and reported sick." Gen. Price then put Brig.-Gen. Green in command of the left wing; and it was eight o'clock before the proper dispositions for the attack at this point were made. In the mean time, the centre, held by Maury's division, became engaged with the enemy's sharpshooters, and the battle was brought on, and extended along the whole centre and left wing. One brigade after another went gallantly into the action, and, pushing forward through direct and cross-fire, over every obstacle, reached Corinth, and planted their colours on the last stronghold of the enemy. A hand to hand contest was being enacted in the very yard of Gen. Rosecrans' headquarters, and in the streets of the town. The enemy was followed and driven from house to house with great slaughter. In the town were batteries in mask, supported by heavy reserves, behind which the retreating enemy took shelter, and which opened upon our troops a most destructive fire at short range. The heavy guns of College Hill-the enemy's most important work—were for a moment silenced, and all seemed about to be ended, when a heavy fire from fresh troops from Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi, that had succeeded in reaching Corinth in time, poured into our thinned ranks.

Our troops gave way. They were pushed down College Hill, and followed by the enemy through the woods and over the ground they had gained by such desperate courage. At the very time the day was lost, Lovell's division was advancing, and was on the point of assaulting the enemy's works, when he received orders to throw one of his brigades (Villepigues') rapidly to the centre, to cover the broken ranks thrown back from Corinth. The movement was well executed, and the enemy did not dare to press his success.

The next day it was determined by Van Dorn to fall back towards Ripley and Oxford, and thus again take position behind the lagoons and swamps of Mississippi. The movement was accomplished with but little molestation from the enemy, beyond an affair in crossing the Hatchie, in which Gen. Ord, who commanded the enemy's advance, was held in check and punished. The following was found to be our loss in the severest conflicts with the enemy, and on the march to and from Corinth, viz.: killed, 594; wounded, 2,162; prisoners and missing, 2,102. One piece of artillery was driven in the night by a mistake into the enemy's lines, and captured. Four pieces were taken at the Hatchie bridge, the horses being shot. Two pieces of artillery were captured from the enemy at Corinth

RESULTS OF THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGNS OF 1862.

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by Gen. Lovell's division, one of which was brought off. Five pieces were also taken by Gen. Price's corps, two of which were brought off-thus resulting in a loss to us of only two pieces. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded, by his own account, was 2,127. We took over three hundred prisoners.

The retreat from Corinth was not a rout. But the engagement there was a serious disaster to the Confederates, and cost Van Dorn his command; censured as he was for having carried his men against works, the strength of which he had underrated, and then having failed to make proper combinations in the attack. This event may be said to have closed for some time the campaign in the West. It had not completed all the expectations of the Southern public. It is true that the country between Nashville and Chattanooga was re-occupied by the Confederate forces; but the decisive event of the campaign was the retreat from Kentucky, and as public expectation in the South had been disappointed when Lee retired across the Potomac, so did it experience a similar feeling when it was known that Bragg had retreated through the Cumberland Mountains. These were the two turning-points of the autumn campaigns of 1862. Whatever the territorial results of these campaigns, their moral effect was great, and the position of the Confederates was now very different from what it had been in the early part of the year. The glory of their arms now attracted the attention of the world. They had carried their arms from Chattanooga to Louisville, and, although forced to retire, had proved that the subjugation of the West was a task which the enemy had only commenced. They had raised the siege of Richmond, threatened Washington, and beaten the enemy back in that quarter to what had been the threshold of the war. The London Times declared that the history of these campaigns comprised a list of military achievements almost without parallel, and added: "Whatever may be the fate of the new nationality, or its subsequent claims to the respect of mankind, it will assuredly begin its career with a reputation for genius and valour which the most famous nations may envy."

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CHAPTER XX.

THE TWO MAIN THEATRES OF THE WAR.-OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.-BATTLE OF FREDERICKS-
BURG.—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES.-EXPEDITION OF STUART'S CAV-
ALRY INTO PENNSYLVANIA. REMOVAL OF M'CLELLAN. THE TRUE REASONS FOR IT.—
GEN. BURNSIDE'S " "ON
ON TO RICHMOND."-HIS MOVEMENT TOWARDS FREDERICKSBURG.

EXTREMITY.—EXPECTATIONS

THE SURRENDER OF THE TOWN DEMANDED. IT IS ABANDONED BY THE CITIZEN-POPULA-
TION.-
-SORROWFUL SCENES.—BURNSIDE FORCES THE PASSAGE OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK.
THE CONFEDERATE POSITION.-BURNSIDE'S HOPE TO SURPRISE GEN. LEE.-HOW DISAP-
POINTED.THE CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE. THE ATTACK ON THE CONFEDERATE
RIGHT.-YOUNG PELHAM'S GALLANTRY.--THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT BROKEN. THE BATTLE
RESTORED.—INTEREST OF THE FIELD ON THE LEFT.—THE ATTACK ON MARYE'S AND WIL-
LIS' HILLS.-GALLANTRY OF THE FEDERALS.—THEY MAKE SIX ATTACKS.—A TERRIBLE
SCENE OF CARNAGE.—BURNSIDE'S ARMY DRIVEN INTO FREDERICKSBURG.-HIS APPALLING
EXTREMITY. EXPECTATIONS IN RICHMOND OF THE DESTRUCTION OF HIS ARMY.-HE
ESCAPES ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK.-GEN. LEE'S OWN EXPLANATION OF HIS FAILURE
TO FOLLOW UP HIS VICTORY.-COMPARATIVE LOSSES IN THE BATTLE.-DEATH OF GENS.
GREGG AND COBB.-GEN. LEE'S SENTIMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR.
-OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE.-BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'.-THE SITUATION IN THE
WEST.—THE LINES IN TENNESSEE AND MISSISSIPPI.-ROSECRANS' ADVANCE FROM NASH-
VILLE.—CONFLICTING STATEMENTS OF HIS FORCE.--POSITION OF GEN. BRAGG'S ARMY
AROUND MURFREESBORO'.—BRAGG ANTICIPATES THE FEDERAL ATTACK.-HARDEE COM-
MENCES THE BATTLE.-HE DRIVES THE ENTIRE RIGHT WING OF THE FEDERALS.-DESPE-
RATE SITUATION OF ROSECRANS.-HIS SANG-FROID.-HE DEVELOPES A NEW LINE OF BAT-
TLE. THE CONFEDERATES RENEW THE ATTACK.-HOW BRAGG LOST AN OPPORTUNITY.--
SPLENDID CHARGE OF THE CONFEDERATES.—THE DAY UNDECIDED, BUT THE ADVANTAGE
WITH THE CONFEDERATES.—BRAGG'S "HAPPY NEW YEAR.”—BRECKINRIDGE ATTEMPTS TO
DISLODGE THE ENEMY.- THE BLOODY CROSSING OF STONE RIVER. -REPULSE OF BRECK-
INRIDGE.-WHY BRAGG DETERMINED TO RETREAT.—THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF MUR-
FREESBORO' IN FAVOUR OF THE CONFEDERATES.—A PECULIARITY OF GEN. BRAGG.—HIS
ELOQUENT TRIBUTE TO THE PRIVATE SOLDIER OF THE CONFEDERACY.-OPERATIONS IN THE
TRANS-MISSISSIPPI.-THE CAMPAIGN WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI FEEBLE AND IRREGULAR.-
GEN. HINDMAN'S COMMAND.-HIS EXTRAVAGANT ADDRESS TO HIS SOLDIERS.—BATTLE OF
PRAIRIE GROVE.-HINDMAN'S FIRST SUCCESS AND UNFORTUNATE DELAY.—HIS BLUNDERS
AND EXTRAORDINARY RETREAT.—CONDITION OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI COUNTRY.-HIND-

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MAN'S "GOVERNMENT AD INTERIM. -HIS DESPOTIC ORDERS.-AN EXTRAORDINARY LIST OF OUTRAGES.-VIRTUE AND FIDELITY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

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