fire. The heaviest fire of the enemy's artillery was directed against our left, and, under cover of it, a large force of infantry attacked Gen. Jackson. This heroic commander held the strongest part of a line which extended over four miles. The advance of the enemy was met by his troops with the utmost resolution, and for several hours the conflict raged with great fury and alternate success. Hood's two brigades were moved to the support of Jackson. The enemy's lines were broken and forced back; but fresh numbers advanced to their support, and the Federals began to gain ground. The desperate resistance they encountered, however, delayed their progress until the troops of Gen. McLaws arrived, and those of Gen. Walker could be brought from the right. With these timely reinforcements the tide changed; the Confederates again advanced, and the enemy were driven back in confusion, closely followed by our troops, beyond the position occupied at the beginning of the engagement. The enemy renewed the assault on our left several times, but was repulsed with loss. He finally ceased to advance his infantry, and for several hours kept up a furious fire from his numerous batteries, under which our troops held their position with great coolness and courage.

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The attack on our left was speedily followed by one in heavy force on the centre. This was met by part of Walker's division, and the brigades of G. B. Anderson and Rodes, of D. H. Hill's command, assisted by a few pieces of artillery. The enemy was repulsed, and retired behind the crest of a hill, from which they kept up a desultory fire.

Gen. R. H. Anderson's division came to Hill's support, and formed in rear of his line. At this time, by a mistake of orders, Gen. Rodes' brigade was withdrawn from its position. The enemy immediately pressed through the gap thus created, and G. B. Anderson's brigade was broken, and retired. The heavy masses of the enemy again moved forward, being opposed only by four pieces of artillery, supported by a few hundreds of men, belonging to different brigades. The firm front presented by this small force, and the well directed fire of the artillery, under Captain Miller, of the Washington Artillery, and Captain Boyce's South Carolina battery, checked the progress of the enemy, and in about an hour and a half he retired.

While the attack on the centre and left was in progress, the enemy made repeated efforts to force the passage of the bridge over the Antietam, opposite the right wing of Gen. Longstreet, commanded by Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones. This bridge was defended by Gen. Toombs with two regiments of his brigade. Gen. Toombs' small command repulsed five different assaults, made by a greatly superiour force, and maintained its position with distinguished gallantry.

In the afternoon, the enemy began to extend his line, as if to cross the Antietam below the bridge, and at four, P. M., Toombs' regiments retired

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

317

from the position they had so bravely held. The enemy immediately crossed the bridge in large numbers, and advanced against Gen. Jones, who held the crest with less than two thousand men. After a determined and brave resistance, he was forced to give way, and the enemy gained the summit.

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Gen. A. P. Hill had arrived from Harper's Ferry, having left that place at half-past seven, A. M. He was now ordered to reinforce Gen. Jones. Hill's batteries were thrown forward, and united their fire with those of Gen. Jones. The progress of the enemy was immediately arrested, and his line began to waver. At this moment Gen. Jones ordered Toombs to charge the flank, while Archer, supported by Branch and Gregg, moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resist ance, then broke, and retreated in confusion towards the Antietam, pursued by the troops of Hill and Jones, until he reached the protection of the batteries on the opposite side of the river.

It was now nearly dark, and the enemy had massed a number of batteries to sweep the approaches to the Antietam, on the opposite side of which the corps of Gen. Porter, which had not been engaged, now appeared, to dispute our advance. Our troops were much exhausted, and greatly reduced in numbers by fatigue and the casualties of battle. Under these circumstances, it was deemed injudicious to push our advantage further, in the face of fresh troops of the enemy much exceeding the number of our own. They were accordingly recalled.

This repulse of the enemy ended the engagement. The sum of the day's work was, that every effort of the enemy to dislodge us from our position had been defeated with severe loss. The conflict had been protracted and sanguinary. The spoils of the victory were not great. A few prisoners and guns were taken. As for our loss, it had indeed been heavy, amounting to not less than two thousand killed and six thousand wounded; including among the former, two general officers, Gens. Branch and Starke. The Federals, having been the assailants, their loss was yet more severe, reaching the terrible aggregate of twelve thousand dead or disabled men. Their sacrifice of officers had been serious. Gens. Mansfield and Reno were killed, and twelve other Generals were among the wounded.

Gen. Lee had especial reasons for not renewing the battle the next day. The arduous service in which his troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches, without shoes, over mountain roads, had greatly reduced their ranks before the action began; and they had been seriously diminished in the terrible action they had just fought. Although too weak to assume the offensive, Gen. Lee awaited without apprehension a renewal of the attack. The day passed without any demonstration on the part of the enemy, who, from the reports received, was expecting the arrival of reinforcements. As Gen. Lee could

not look for a material increase of strength, and the enemy's numbers could be largely and rapidly augmented, it was not thought to be prudent to wait until he should be ready again to offer battle. During the night of the 18th September, his army was accordingly withdrawn to the south side of the Potomac, crossing near Shepherdstown without loss or molestation.

It is curious to observe by what successive steps the North constructed the pretence of a victory at Sharpsburg. McClellan never claimed a victory until assured of Lee's retreat into Virginia. On the 19th, he telegraphed to Washington: "I do not know if the enemy is falling back to an interiour position, or recrossing the river. We may safely claim the victory as ours." He did not assert this until more than thirty hours had elapsed subsequent to the engagement at Sharpsburg! Some few hours after the above telegram, he consoled the authorities at Washington by saying: "Our victory is complete! The enemy is driven back into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe!"

If McClellan was under the impression that he had won a victory, he showed but little disposition to improve it, or to gather its fruits. He attempted no pursuit; and when, some days later, a force he had thrown across the Potomac was dislodged by an attack of A. P. Hill's division, he wrote to Washington asking for reinforcements; and on the 27th September renewed the application, stating his purpose to be to hold the army where it was, and to attack Lee, should he attempt to recross into Maryland. Meanwhile the Confederate army moved leisurely towards Martinsburg, and remained in the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Winchester, to recruit after a campaign which has few parallels in history for active ope ration and brilliant results.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE WAR.-VALLEY OF THE MISSISSIPPI.—EVACUATION OF
CORINTH.-IMPORTANT OBJECTS OF THE MOVEMENT.-ITS SUCCESS.--THE HALLECK-POPE
DISPATCH.—AN ENORMOUS FALSEHOOD.-GEN. BEAUREGARD'S COMMENTS ON IT.-CAPTURE
OF MEMPHIS.-AN UNEQUAL FIGHT ON THE RIVER.-BOMBARDMENT OF VICKSBURG.—
GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS POINT.-PREPARATIONS FOR ITS DEFENCE BY VAN DORN.
THE IRON-CLAD ARKANSAS.-SHE RUNS THE GAUNTLET OF THE ENEMY'S FLEET.-THRILL-
ING SCENE OF THE ADVENTURE.-FAILURE OF THE FIRST ATTEMPT OF THE ENEMY UPON
VICKSBURG.—ENGAGEMENT AT BATON ROUGE.-SUCCESS OF BRECKINRIDGE'S ATTACK.—-
HE WAITS FOR THE IRON-CLAD ARKANSAS.-SHE BECOMES UNMANAGEABLE AND IS FIRED
BY HER CREW.-WITHDRAWAL OF BRECKINRIDGE FROM BATON ROUGE.-CONFEDERATE
OCCUPATION OF PORT HUDSON.—THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN.-GEN. BRAGG IN COMMAND
OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN THE WEST.-HOW GEN. BEAUREGARD WAS RETIRED.---
BRAGG'S PLAN OF OPERATIONS AGAINST KENTUCKY.—MORGAN'S RAID.-—DISPOSITION OF
THE FEDERAL FORCES WEST OF THE ALLEGHANY MOUNTAINS.-CO-OPERATION OF KIRBY
SMITH WITH BRAGG'S COLUMN.-BATTLE OF RICHMOND.-KIRBY SMITH IN A POSITION
TO THREATEN BOTH CINCINNATI AND LOUISVILLE.—BRAGG'S MOVEMENT TO INTERCEPT
BUELL.—THE LATTER CONCENTRATING AT BOWLING GREEN.-GREAT SUCCESS OF Bragg's
MOVEMENT SO FAR-HIS
-HIS BOASTFUL DISPATCH TO RICHMOND.-HIS POLITICAL OBJECT
IN INVADING KENTUCKY.-HIS PROCLAMATION AT GLASGOW.-SURRENDER OF THE
FEDERAL GARRISON AT MUMFORDSVILLE.—BRAGG'S WHOLE
-BRAGG'S WHOLE ARMY BETWEEN NASH-
VILLE AND LOUISVILLE.—HIS SPLENDID OPPORTUNITY.-HE DOES NOT USE IT.-HE
PERMITS BUELL TO PASS TO LOUISVILLE WITHOUT A BATTLE.-HIS WEAK EXCUSE FOR
A FATAL ERROUR.THE FEDERALS NOW ABLE TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE IN KENTUCKY.
—BRAGG'S UNCERTAIN MOVEMENTS. HIS DISARRANGED PLAN OF. BATTLE.—GEN. POLK'S
DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS.-BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.—BRAGG'S UNFORTUNATE DISTRIBU-
TION OF FORCES.-MISAPPREHENSION OF KIRBY SMITH.-WITHERS' DIVISION NOT IN
THE FIGHT.-THE ENEMY DRIVEN.-ARRIVAL OF ANOTHER OF HIS CORPS UPON THE
FIELD. BRAGG RETIRES UPON BRYANTSVILLE.—HE DETERMINES TO EVACUATE KENTUCKY.
-RETREAT THROUGH CUMBERLAND GAP.-DISAPPOINTMENT AT RICHMOND.—ERROURS
OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN.-HOW FAR IT WAS A CONFEDERATE SUCCESS.-ITS LARGE
CAPTURES.-NORTH ALABAMA AND MIDDLE TENNESSEE REDEEMED.—BRAGG IN FRONT
OF NASHVILLE.-OPERATIONS IN THE
-OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST.
SOUTHWEST.-BATTLE OF CORINTH.-MOVEMENTS
OF VAN DORN AND PRICE.—THE AFFAIR OF IUKA.—VAN DORN'S REASONS FOR ATTACK-
ING CORINTH.-GALLANT AND IMPETUOUS CHARGE OF PRICE'S TROOPS. THE SECOND
DAY'S FIGHT.—MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S WORKS.—TERRIBLE

SLAUGHTER AT COLLEGE HILL.—THE CONFEDERATES REPULSED.-AFFAIR ON THE HATCHIF RIVER.—VAN DORN'S RETREAT.—REVIEW OF THE SUMMER AND AUTUMN CAMPAIGNS OF 1862.-GLORY OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMS.-REFLECTION OF THE LONDON TIMES ON THE NEW NATIONALITY."

WHILE the events we have related in the two preceding chapters were taking place in Virginia and on its borders, an important campaign was occurring in the country west of the Alleghany Mountains, and in the valley of the Mississippi River; and while Lee entered Maryland, Bragg invaded Kentucky, threatening the line of the Ohio, thus in every direction bringing the front of the war to the enemy's own territory. But before reaching that period wherein the Confederate arms in the West were carried to the frontier, as by a parallel movement with the operations in Virginia, it is necessary to recount a number of preceding events in the Western theatres of the war, in which the lights of victory and shadows of defeat were strangely mingled.

EVACUATION OF CORINTH.

At the last point of our narrative of operations in the West, Gen. Beauregard was holding Corinth; an important strategic position, protecting his communications by the two railroads intersecting there. The trans-Mississippi campaign being considered closed for some time, Price and Van Dorn, with a division of Missourians and some Arkansas troops, had crossed the Mississippi and joined Beauregard, with a view of operating on the east bank of the river. It was soon ascertained that the immense forces of Grant and Buell, combined under command of Halleck, were slowly advancing. The movement of the enemy threatened Beauregard's left, along the Mobile and Ohio railroad, while he had already pushed along the Memphis and Charleston road, camping about three miles from Corinth. To foil the design of the enemy; to protect his most important line of Southern communication; to obtain a better position to fortify; and to secure the health of his troops, Gen. Beauregard decided to evacuate Corinth. The objects of the movement were all important. Our main railroad communication with Richmond via Chattanooga, was in the enemy's possession, and the only line of coinmunication we now had with the Confederate capital was the devious one, by way of Mobile, Alabama, and Georgia. Corinth was indefensible. It was a wretched site for a camp, utterly destitute of water, good or bad, and what little could be obtained, was scooped up from the sand, or from pools fed by occasional rains.

The evacuation was commenced on the 30th of May. Remaining in