the want of all the appliances of war, and supposed to be enervated by indolence and vice, accomplish all that could have been expected from a nation with a highly developed industrial and military organization. We have seen an army badly armed and equipped supply itself from its rich, numerous, and boasting enemy. We have seen a nation act as an unit, and find its strength where friends and foes had sought its weakness. In fine, every evidence of unity, vitality, courage, perseverance, and success has been presented to the world; and, upon the whole, the South has gained moral as well as physical victories, and has won the sympathy of all who admire heroic spirit, and abhor treachery, corruption, imbecility, and cruelty. In the meantime, she has invited the most searching scrutiny of her internal condition and institutions, knowing, as she does, that ignorance of these has been the greatest obstacle in her way. It is highly probable that, had the governments of Europe had a clear view of the true state of America at the commencement of the struggle, their policy would have been somewhat different.

Apart from the causes which led to the dissolution, it was best for the world and for America itself that disunion should have taken place; for the idea of future irresistible power, and the absence of all conservative restraints, would soon have rendered peace impossible; and had the warlike enthusiasm of

the combined nation once engaged it in war with a foreign power, it would have been the bloodiest of history. For America it was best, since the political system was fast demoralizing the people; and the only hope was in the formation of two governments, by which a balance of power might be created on that continent, and with it more conservative political tendencies. Besides, the territory of the Union was too large to be longer well-governed; and this of itself would have made dissolution inevitable. War has its evils; but, upon the whole, a long peace has evils perhaps equally great, which can only be remedied by war. In addition to the ill effects of a too-long peace, America had peculiar necessity for internal war, in order that the political and material forces of the continent should be measured, both for the benefit of herself and of Europe, as upon this point the ignorance seemed to be almost universal. Viewed in this light, it appears, then, that disunion was inevitable and desirable; and that war was necessary as a solid foundation for a long peace, undisturbed by those quarrels which take place between neighbours unacquainted with the horrors of a war brought home to themselves, and ignorant of their mutual strength. Great Britain, for obvious reasons, felt the deepest interest in what transpired in America. It was the fall of her great future rival, the peculiarities of whose diplomacy she had learned

to appreciate, and whose cotton-fields would have been so potent for evil in the event of war. She saw that America, under the political guidance of the North, would inaugurate that system under which her own industrial grandeur had been built up, and which she has so recently learned to be a ruinous error. Trembling for her commercial sceptre, her relief must have been more profound than has ever been acknowledged. The question of the blockade came up and lessened somewhat this sense of satisfaction, in itself perfectly justifiable. But Manchester had studied political economy, which teaches that 'supply is regulated by demand.' And there were India, and Egypt, and Turkey, and Brazil, and Australia, and the West Indies, and Central America, and Mexico, and Africa, all ready to take part in this great plan for emancipating British industry from the American monopoly.' Besides, a blockade of the Southern ports, it was seen, would relieve the market of the excess of cotton cloths, and though a slight violation of Manchester philosophy, if not continued too long, might act beneficially as a stimulant for opening new cotton-fields. It has long been the dream of England to become totally independent of foreign countries for the supply of raw material for her manufactures, and it had always been especially galling to see herself dependent on the United States for her chief supply of cotton. This feeling had

extended to the system of labour itself which produced it, and explains, much more than the English themselves are perhaps aware, their special hatred to negro slavery in the South. The South had also imprudently expressed the hope that the necessity for cotton would force England to prevent the blockade of her ports; and it was easy to see, by consulting the expressions of the various organs of public opinion at the time, that the English people felt it to be almost a national insult to suppose that they would be influenced in their political course by interest. It is difficult to conceive that England has been influenced as much by the threats of the Government at Washington as the world has been led to believe.

The idea that England, hating the institutions of each section, calmly awaits the ruin of both, is inconsistent with her character for humanity, and a clear view of her own interests. Though a rival, they have furnished her with the best market in which to buy and sell, and it is impossible to see how their ruin could result in her benefit.

The opinion of those who maintain that action of any kind whatever on the part of Europe, with regard to America, would only tend to lengthen the war and increase its bitterness, are not justified by experience or history, and are contrary to public opinion in America.

The commercial interests have been quieted by the repeated intimation of the danger of a war, a danger existing only in the imagination of the timid, or of those totally unacquainted with the Yankee character. Those engaged in manufactures have been told that no action short of war would relieve their sufferings, while their fears about the destruction of their interests were quieted by the hope that the misfortune would be of short duration.

The Radicals did not desire the termination of the war, their motto being sympathy and alliance with the North.

The war in America means not only the loss of that great political power so necessary to the North for her commercial and industrial schemes, but it means the loss of the very foundation of her naval and industrial greatness. The loss of the West will soon follow that of the South, already accomplished. It is useless for England to seek to make a friend of this people without a nationality; it is impossible. Their interests are diametrically opposed to hers, and of this the Morrill Tariff is a sufficient confirmation. Politically, she will gravitate anywhere else than towards England.

Observed from the point of their geographical relations, climate, productions, stage of industrial developement, origin, character, and political interests, one cannot fail to be struck with the community of

1