States; it was the apprehension that this party, passing soon from words to deeds, would attempt to execute their unconstitutional intentions with respect to slavery, when it would have been too late to think about withdrawing from the Union. Secession had long been viewed in the South as the last means at command to prevent the destruction of constitutional liberty and justice in America. And now, And now, when Lincoln was elected, the South realized that the long anticipated time had arrived, and that it was necessary to act before its independence and liberty were for ever lost. But indeed, what importance was to be attached to the election of Mr. Lincoln? Lincoln was the victorious candidate of a purely sectional party. Nothing similar to this had ever before occurred. A President elected against the unanimous protest of every State in the South, and elected solely by the votes of its declared enemies. This was not the cause of secession, but only the occasion of it. Had the necessary guarantees asked for by the South always been accorded, and had the North always given sufficient grounds for confidence in the conscientious observation of the constitution, as very rightly demanded by the South, the Southern States would have acquiesced in the election of Lincoln, and there would have been no cause for secession. Had the North been less abusive in its relations with SECESSION COULD NOT BE DELAYED. 65 the South, it is not impossible that for a number of years to come the South would have remained passive, and suffered itself to be plundered, as had already been the case for a long time. Can any unprejudiced mind now doubt that the time had come when the South, standing alone, without any guarantees for the observation of the constitution, was obliged to act? On the contrary, an examination of the numerous social, economic, and political causes already recorded, all contributing in a greater or less degree, perhaps unequally, to jeopardise the existence of the Union, must establish the conviction that the moment had really arrived, when the liberty, the rights, the welfare, and the honour of the South must compel it to dissolve those now only external bonds, which united it to a Union that had long since ceased to exist in the spirit of the constitution. F CHAPTER III. THE WAR. I. Unconstitutionality of the War. By the constitution it is expressly provided that Congress alone shall have the right to declare war and to raise and support armies. The power is also given to Congress 'to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and rebel invasions.'* We have already cited the authority of Rawle, † to show that it is only in the event that a faction should attempt to subvert the government of a State that the case provided for (by this clause of the constitution) will have arisen, and the Union is bound to employ its power to prevent it.' It has been attempted to prove that the withdrawal of a State, secession, from the Union is not only the legitimate exercise of State sovereignty, but also a constitutional right; it is therefore neither opposition to the laws of the Union nor * Constitution, Art. I. Sect. 8. COERCION UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 67 rebellion. Hence it follows, that not even Congress itself, least of all the President, had the right to oppose to the secession of the Southern States armed force. We direct attention here to the fact, that in the debates of the Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 Madison observed: 'The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment; and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed.' This motion was agreed to unanimously.* And never since that time has there been a question of coercion. In recent times, also, has this principle been confirmed. Even President Buchanan has supported it. He says:† 'The question fairly stated is - Has the constitution delegated to Congress the power to coerce a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn, from the confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and make war against a State. * Madison Papers, vol. ii. p. 761. † President Buchanan's Message to Congress, December 3, 1860. After much serious reflection, I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to Congress or to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the constitution, that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not " necessary and proper for carrying into execution" any one of these powers. So far from this power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by the convention which framed the constitution. "Without descending to particulars it may be safely asserted, that the power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State, how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province, and govern it by despotic force? In the nature of things we could not, by physical force, control the will of the people, and compel them to elect senators and representatives to Congress, and to perform all the other duties depending on their own volition, and required from the free citizens of a free State as a constituent member of the confederacy. 'But if we possessed the power, would it be wise to exercise it under the circumstances? The object would, doubtless, be to preserve the Union. War would not only present the most effectual means of |