measures proposed by Congress, and the representations made to the Crown had failed to attain the intended results, that the colonies determined to dissolve all political connection with the mother country.

In their celebrated Declaration of Independence the colonists proclaimed that to their inalienable rights belong life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.' Because these rights had been violated, the colonies threw off their allegiance to the crown.

When, however, England decided to force the colonies to obedience, they united, thirteen in number, for their common defence, to offer resistance; and thus commenced the first war of independence in America.

Authority for conducting the war, and for providing for the general welfare of the colonies, was delegated to the Congress of Philadelphia, known in American history as the Old Continental Congress.' Conformably to these powers, certain Articles of Confederation' were framed and adopted by Congress, which were intended to serve as the conditions of a permanent union of the colonies. The 'Articles of Confederation' which had been adopted on November 15, 1777, by Congress, would never

FIRST RECOGNITION OF STATE-SOVEREIGNTY.

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have obtained any legal validity or binding authority whatever, without the ratification of the individual colonies, as was expressly declared at that time. For in pursuance of a resolution of Congress the 'Articles of Confederation' were sent to the different* colonies, now styled States, for ratification, and were, at different times during the period between 1777 and 1781, successively ratified by the conventions of the several States. In this act we perceive the first open recognition of the sovereignty claimed by the individual States. That no doubt whatever may remain as to the existence of the claim of sovereignty by the States, and of their mutual recognition of their respective claims, it may be well to consider the provisions of the Articles of Confederation.' We read as follows:

'Art. II. Each State retains its sovereignty; freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.'

No room is here left for doubt. Not only was the sovereignty of each State acknowledged by all the others, but, by the unequivocal terms of this league, this sovereignty was emphatically reserved to the States.

In the meantime, between 1776 and 1780, each of

* Tucker, vol. i. p. 225.

the thirteen States, with the exception of New Jersey and Connecticut, which still retained the charters granted by Charles II. in 1662, had framed a new constitution. And, with the exception of Massachusetts alone, every State had adopted its new constitution before the framing of the Articles of Confederation' by the Old Congress. We know, in fact, that the constitutions of the States served in a measure as a model for the Articles of Confederation.' And as the States asserted their sovereignty, in their constitutions, prior to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation,' it cannot be maintained that the States derived their sovereignty from the Union.

A clear notion of the nature of this league may be gained by a further examination of the provisions of the 'Articles of Confederation.' The objects of the league are stated as follows:-‘Art. III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each. other against all force offered to or attacks made upon them or any of them.'

Is it not evident from this language that, at least here, there was no idea of a consolidated government ignoring the sovereignty of the single States?

For the better management of the general interests of the United States, a Congress is provided by

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.

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Art. V. whose powers are subsequently enumerated with the greatest care.

Finally, it is provided by Art. XIII. that 'Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, in all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual: nor shall alterations at any any time hereafter be made in them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.'

The most convincing evidence of the weakness of the Federal Government under the Articles of Confederation' is the total absence of any provision for enforcing the execution of its own laws. Not one word occurs with reference to this subject in that instrument. Nor can it be assumed that this power was to be inferred, for the Federal Government possessed no powers but such as were 'expressly delegated to it,' as we have seen in Art. II. We agree entirely with the distinguished statesman who asserts that the Federal Government was 'destitute of even the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws.' The reason of this seems

*

* See No. xxi. of the Federalist'— a collection of essays written in favour of the new constitution. New York 1788. No better authority for the interpretation of the constitution is to be found than the 'Federalist.'

obvious. It was the intention of the States, in uniting under the Articles of Confederation,' to secure themselves against external attacks. No doubt was entertained that in the presence of a common danger they would be induced to cooperate with accord for self-defence. This being then the chief object of the league, it was held to be unnecessary to grant any special power to the Federal Government for that purpose; particularly when such power might tend to restrict the exercise of certain rights based upon the sovereignty of the States. In fact, nothing was more natural than that in attempting to make themselves independent of the English Government, the States should have been chary of constituting a government at home, with powers which might be used for oppressing themselves. We shall see, however, that the provisions of this league were for the most part continued in the Constitution' which was framed to replace it.

6

Experience soon demonstrated that the Articles of Confederation' were sufficient neither for the administration of the general interests, nor for promoting the general welfare of the States, owing to their conflicting interests. In a word, the means were not adequate to the accomplishment of the object proposed; consequently, the Government soon fell into decay, no one seemed to take any interest in its success. To remedy these glaring