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ment rests, not more on political Constitutions, than on those laws which regulate the descent and transmission of property. Governments like ours could not have been maintained, where property was holden according to the principles of the feudal system; nor, on the other hand, could the feudal Constitution possibly exist with us. Our New England ancestors brought hither no great capitals from Europe; and if they had, there was nothing productive, in which they could have been invested. They left behind them the whole feudal policy of the other continent. They broke away, at once, from the system of military service, established in the dark ages, and which continues, down even to the present time, more or less to affect the condition of property all over Europe. They came to a new country. There were, as yet, no lands yielding rent, and no tenants rendering service. The whole soil was unreclaimed from barbarism. They were themselves, either from their original condition, or from the necessity of their common interest, nearly on a general level, in respect to property." Their situation demanded a parcelling out and division of the lands; and it may be fairly said, that this necessary act fixed the future frame and form of their government. The character of their political institutions was determined by the fundamental laws respecting property. The laws rendered es tates divisible among sons and daughters. The right of primogeniture, at first limited and curtailed, was

afterwards abolished. The property was all freehold. The entailment of estates, long trusts, and the other processes for fettering and tying up inheritances, were not applicable to the condition of society, and seldom made use of. On the contrary, alienation of the land was every way facilitated, even to the subjecting of it to every species of debt. The establishment of public registries, and the simplicity of our forms of conveyance, have greatly facilitated the change of real estate, from one proprietor to another. The consequence of all these causes has been, a great subdivision of the soil, and a great equality of condition; the true basis most certainly of a popular government." If the people," says Harrington, hold three parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can neither be any single person nor nobility able to dispute the government with them; in this case therefore, except force be interpos ed, they govern themselves."

The history of other nations may teach us how favourable to public liberty is the division of the soil into small freeholds, and a system of laws, of which the tendency is, without violence or injustice, to produce and to preserve a degree of equality of property. It has been estimated, if I mistake not, that about the time of Henry the VII., four fifths of the land in England, was holden by the great barons and ecclesiastics. The effects of a growing commerce soon afterwards began to break in on this state of things, and before the revolution in 1688 a

vast change had been wrought. It may be thought probable, that, for the last half century, the process of subdivision in England, has been retarded, if not reversed; that the great weight of taxation has compelled many of the lesser freeholders to dispose of their estates, and to seek employment in the army and navy; in the professions of civil life; in commerce or in the colonies. The effect of this on the British Constitution cannot but be most unfavourable. A few large estates grow larger; but the number of those who have no estates also increases; and there may be danger, lest the inequality of property become so great, that those who possess it may be dispossessed by force; in other words that the government may be overturned.

A most interesting experiment of the effect of a subdivision of property on government, is now making in France. It is understood, that the law regulating the transmission of property, in that country, now divides it, real and personal, among all the children, equally, both sons and daughters; and that there is, also, a very great restraint on the power of making dispositions of property by will. It has been supposed, that the effects of this might probably be, in time, to break up the soil into such small subdivisions, that the proprietors would be too poor to resist the encroachments of executive power. I think far otherwise. What is lost in individual wealth, will be more than gained, in numbers, in intelligence, and in a sympathy of sentiment. If in

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deed, only one, or a few landholders were to resist the crown, like the barons of England, they must, of course, be great and powerful dandholders with multitudes of retainers, to promise success. But if the proprietors of a given extent of territory are summoned to resistance, there is no reason to believe that such resistance would be less forcible, or less successful, because the number of such proprietors should be great. Each would perceive his own importance, and his own interest, and would feel that natural elevation of character which the conscious ness of property inspires. A common sentiment would unite all, and numbers would not only add strength, but excite enthusiasm. It is true, thatioFrances possesses a vast military force, under the direction of an hereditary executive government; and military power, it is possible, may overthrow any government. It is, in vain, however, in this period of the world, to look for security against military power, to the arm of the great landholders. That notion is derived from a state of things long since past; a state in which ca feudal baron, with his retainers, might stand against the sovereign, who was himself but the greatest baron, and his retainers. But at present, what could the richest landholder do, against one regiment of disciplined troops? Other securities, therefore, against the prevalence of military power must be provided. Happily for us, we are not so situated as that any purpose of national defence requires, ordinarily and constantly, such a military force as might seriously endanger our liberties.

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jelo respect, however, to the recent law of succes sion in France, to which I have alluded, I would, presumptuously perhaps, hazard a conjecture, that if the government do not change the law, the lawy in half a century, will change the government; and that this change will be not in favour of the power of the crown, as some European writers have supposed;qbut against it. Those writers only reason upomwhat they think correct general principles, in relation to this subject. They acknowledge a want of experience. Here we have had that experience; and we know that a multitude of small proprietors, acting with intelligence, and that enthusiasm which a common cause inspires, constitute not only a formidable, but an invincible power.

རྟེན་ན་

The truesprinciple of a free and popular government would seem to be, so to construct it, as to give to all, or at least to a very great majority, an interest in its preservation: to found it, as other things are founded, on men's interest. The stability of government requires that those who desire its con tinuance should be more powerful than those who desire its dissolution. This power, of course, is not always to be measured by mere numbers. Educa tion, wealth, talents, are all parts and elements of the general aggregate of power; but numbers, nevertheless, constitute ordinarily the most important consideration, unless indeed there be a military force, in the hands of the few, by which they can controul the\ many. In this country we have actually existing

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