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PURSUIT OF JACKSON.

papers. Burning railway trains at Bristow, the enemy moved up to Manassas Junction, Ewell's division bringing up the rear. Destroying here, Quarter-Masters' and Commissary stores, and sutlers' depots, the ragged, famished soldiers, rioted, for a while, in luxury and drinking, and satiated themselves with the finest wines. But Jackson was now in a perilous position, being between Alexandria and Warrenton, and between Pope's army and that of McClellan. Turning night into day by the immense conflagrations he kindled

here, the enemy moved off to Centreville, and crossed the famous Bull Run, pursued by Pope. Jackson would hardly have dared to make this audacious movement, had he not entertained a thorough contempt for his adversary. Pope thought he had him in a trap, and telegraphed to Washington that he could not escape. In fact, he had him secure two or three times, yet the latter always managed to get off, but in every case, through somebody's criminal neglect, or almost equally criminal blunders. The misfortune at Bristow, was owing to the refusal, on the part of Porter, to obey orders, and the dilatoriness of Sigel, who commanded McDowell's advance. So too, if McDowell had "moved forward as directed, and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat towards Centreville," and cut him up badly. But, after all these mishaps, Jackson was still in his toils, as he believed. Surrounded by an overwhelming force, his only way of escape was through Thorough Fare Gap, or north to Leesburgh. But McDowell, with twentyfive thousand men, was between him and the Gap, while Kearney was pressing him so closely, that the latter alternative would be impracticable. This was the state of things on the night of the 28th. From Pope's point of view, it did seem a desperate case for Jackson. Gap, lay twenty-five thousand men fall on him in the morning, were

Between him and the behind him, ready to twenty-five thousand

A BAYONET CHARGE.

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more, while the rebel leader could not have had more than twenty thousand men all told. But here again, "some one blundered." Ricketts, according to Pope, made a false movement, causing King to withdraw his troops, leaving Thorough Fare Gap open, towards which Jackson was steadily falling back, and through which Longstreet was about to pour his division to succor him Of course, a new disposition of the forces became necessary. Sigel was directed to attack the enemy at daylight, and bring him to bay. He did so and the battle of Groveton followed. It was a bloody action, and at first, seemed doubtful, but the arrival of Hooker and Kearney soon changed the aspect of affairs. The battle raged all day, and the fields and woods were thickly strewn with the dead; but, at five o'clock, Heintzelman and Reno made a furious charge on the enemy's left, which doubled it up, and forced it back, so that, when darkness put an end to the strife, we were masters of the field, but nothing more. In the attack on the enemy's left, Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, greatly distinguished itself by a bayonet charge, which shivered the first and second lines of the enemy, and was checked only by the third.

But while Jackson was compelled to fall back, Longstreet's troops were seen pouring through Thorough Fare Gap to his relief.

Our loss in this engagement was estimated at nearly eight thousand. Again, Pope saw his enemy elude his grasp, but this time, Porter was to blame; for, if he had come up in season, Pope "would have crushed or captured" (he said) "the larger portion of Jackson's force."

The next morning, Pope again gave battle, in the last desperate hope of breaking the enemy's left. The conflict was long and sanguinary, extending on into the night. As in the battle of the day before, no decisive advantage seemed

to have been gained by the enemy, yet, at its close, Pope ordered the whole army to fall back to the fortifications around Washington, for protection. He had ridiculed the idea of securing lines of retreat, and the country had scoffed at the veteran Scott, and afterwards at McClellan, for building those elaborate works before venturing an advance movement; but now, the former was glad to take advantage of the refuge he had affected to despise, and the latter heaved a sigh of relief, that military science had not yielded to popular ignorance and conceit. Halleck, at last, discovered the bold plan of Lee, which, the constant fighting, and even the last two days' battles, had not for a moment arrested. Steadily sweeping on towards the Shenandoah Valley, all the battles he had fought, were for the purpose of clearing his line of communications, and forcing our army back into its fortifications, exhausted, bleeding, humbled, so that he could cross the Potomac into Maryland, and threaten the national Capital from the rear.

All this time, McClellan, stripped of his command, was in camp near Alexandria, a prey to the keenest anxiety. The army that he had created, and which had become endeared to him by common perils and a common destiny, was struggling in mortal combat near him-the sound of cannon constantly borne to his ears, and the earth trembling under the heavy explosions, and yet, he was not allowed to be with it. His brave troops were being mowed down, as he believed, a sacrifice to incompetency, yet he could do nothing, but send on fresh men as fast as they arrived, till he had nothing left, but the guard around his camp, and this, at last, was ordered forward also. Never was a Commander placed in a more painful position. Stripped of all command, he walked his solitary camp, borne down with grief. At last he could bear it no longer, and just before midnight, on the last day of the battle, he telegraphed to Gen. Halleck, at Washing

MCCLELLAN RESTORED.

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ton: "I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day, in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask, that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my Staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more. They will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night." To this he received no answer.

Such an appeal was enough to move a heart of stone. Though disgraced from his high command, he did not yield to resentment, and stand aloof in scornful anger, but, from a heart wrung with anguish for his brave troops, he prayed simply that he might fly to the battle-field and share their fate. If, however, he had wished for revenge, he would have been satisfied the next day, when the terrified Generalin-Chief, whose treatment of him had been so extraordinary, sent to him the following telegram: "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis, with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out." Cæsar was, at length, compelled to cry, "Help me, Cassius, or I sink." The President, too, who had hoped to the last for success, at length yielded to alarm, for he was suddenly aroused at the sight of the Capital in imminent peril, and sending for McClellan, placed him once more at the head of the army. The country, at last, awoke to the humiliating fact, that Pope's campaign had been a lamentable failure. A few friends, however, endeavored to break his fall, by asserting that he failed through the willful neglect of some of the commanders, to aid himchief among whom was Porter. Certainly, if Pope's statements are to be received as true, he was the most injured and abused Commander of his time. In the first place, at the

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CAUSES OF FAILURE.

outset, General Hatch failed to obey orders and take Gordonsville. Afterwards, he neglected to march to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad between that place and Lynchburg, for which he was removed from the command of the cavalry of General Banks' Corps. On the top of this misfortune, came the calamitous battle of Cedar Mountain, which Pope declares was fought contrary to his orders. In the third place, when Jackson was retreating from Manassas Junction towards Centreville, Pope says, "if the whole force under General McDowell, had moved forward as directed, and at the time specified, they would have intercepted Jackson's retreat;" and he adds, "I do not believe it would have been possible for him to cross Bull Run without heavy loss." Again, directly after, when he "felt sure there was no escape for Jackson, to his great disappointment the plan all fell through," because "King's division had fallen back, leaving open the road to Thorough Fare Gap." Again, on the 29th, he would have achieved a signal victory over Jackson, but for the "strange failure" of Gen. Porter to move as he was directed. And finally, on the 30th, he says "he began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue " to his operations, on account of a letter he received from General McClellan, informing him that "rations and forage were at Alexandria, waiting a cavalry escort. Beginning with a commander of cavalry, and being kept up by three corps commanders, two of whom were in the regular army, this constant disobedience to orders worked the disastrous issues over which the country mourned. If all this was true, he certainly was an injured man, and the wrongs done him received their climax, when the Administration virtually withdrew him from the field, and sent him to the Northwest, to conduct a campaign against the Sioux Indians, who had risen and massacred several hundred of the inhabitants of Minnesota.

The cam