and so numbered it remained until the conclusion

of the war. General Ward returning to the command of the brigade, Colonel Harrison resumed that of the regiment.

It will be perceived by the reader, whether he have been a soldier or not, that by this time Colonel Harrison could not well be any longer called a carpet knight, but rather a seasoned soldier, wanting in but one great remaining experience that of battle. He himself would not dignify the skirmishes and alarms of the camp by night and by day through which he had passed as incidents of that character; they were merely the trials by which he was making ready for general combats. It is always better for the officer that it should be so; for it is as if, during the time, he were sitting face to face with the terrors of the engaged lines that, by much study, they should become familiar to him, and he himself hardened against the day of their coming. This is said, of course, upon the assumption that battle is terrible to every one who goes down into it. And as that experience was now about to befall Colonel Harrison, thorough understanding requires a brief preliminary explanation.

There had been campaigns and battles before the spring of 1864, but they were mere incidents of irregular operations along a front extending, in a general sense, from the Rio Grande to the Atlantic. In that season, however, a real down

right commander went into headquarters at Washington, and the old order of things at once changed. Looking with the discerning eye of genius over the whole field, he devised campaigns in combination. Thus he started General Banks up the Red river southwest, and Sherman against Joe Johnston below Chattanooga; he himself would hunt Lee into Richmond. The idea underlying the scheme was to give occupation to the Confederates on their right, left, and centre, and keep them so busy that there could be no passing of help from one section to another. So the numerical superiority of the North would be really available, and the advantage of the inner line nullified.

Sherman, in whose work we are most directly concerned, had with him three, famous armies: that of the Ohio (General Schofield), that of the Cumberland (General Thomas), and that of the Tennessee (General McPherson). In popular estimation Atlanta was his objective; but he says it was not so; that he was really directed against the army commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, 64,000 strong, then at Dalton, entrenched; that he "was required to follow it up closely, so that in no event could any part of it be detached to assist General Lee in Virginia; General Grant undertaking in like manner to keep Lee so busy that he could not respond to any calls of help by Johnston. Neither Atlanta,

nor Augusta, nor Savannah was the objective, but the army of Joe Johnston,' go where it might." (2 Mem., p. 25.) He says, moreover, that on the 5th of May he rode out to Ringgold from Chattanooga. Thereupon his campaign began.

To Dalton then, or to get a grip upon Johnston, Sherman directed his columns. The attempt drew from him his first bit of strategy.

Perceiving that the town was very strong as a position, he concluded the best way to take it was to get possession of the railroad which was the enemy's line of supply. For that it would be necessary to send part of his force around to the south. Accordingly McPherson was chosen for the enterprise, and to his Army of the Tennessee the 20th Corps, under General Hooker, was joined as a support.

The 20th Corps was constituted of three divisions, Newton's, Williams', and Butterfield's. The brigades of the latter were the 1st, commanded by Brigadier-General Ward, the 2d, Colonel John Coburn, the 3d, Colonel Wood.

All the 7th and 8th of May McPherson was in movement. On the 9th he and Hooker issued silently from Snake Creek Gap on the south. A brigade of Confederate cavalry took to their saddles, and hurried to Johnston with news that Buzzard's Roost and Dalton were turned, and that there was an army in his rear about to take possession of the railroad and Resaca.