CHAPTER XVII.

ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE.

HARPER'S FERRY CAPTURED.-ANTIETAM.-MCCLELLAN'S DELAY.— RELIEVED OF COMMAND.-BURNSIDE APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR. -FREDERICKsburg.—BURNSIDE RESIGNS.-HOOKER SUCCEEDS

HIM.-LINCOLN'S LETTER TO HOOKER.-CHANCELLOrsville.

LINCOLN now magnanimously gave General McClellan another and a splendid opportunity to achieve success. His command embraced the army of the Potomac, the remains of the army of Pope, and the troops of Burnside, while to these were added the large number of recruits and volunteers which poured in from the loyal states, so that he had, before November, more than two hundred thousand soldiers under his command.

If he had possessed to any extent the elements of a hero, if he could have led a rapid and brilliant campaign, he had now the opportunity, and the people would have eagerly crowned him with the laurels of victory. But as soon as he was settled in his command, he continued to make the old complaints and calls for more troops. He wished those engaged in the defense of Washington sent to him, even if the capital should fall into the hands of the enemy.'

Colonel Miles and General Julius White, in September, 1862, occupied the picturesque village of Harper's Ferry, with some twelve thousand soldiers. On the 11th, McClellan asked that these troops be directed to join his army. That order was not given, but it was suggested to him that

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1. He wished the troops sent to him, "even if Washington should be taken." "That would not bear comparison with a single defeat of this army." Report on Conduct of the War, Pt. 1, p. 39.

he open communication with Harper's Ferry, and that then these troops would be under his command. On the 13th, he knew that Lee's army was divided, and that Jackson had been detached from the main army for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry. McClellan by promptness could have saved Harper's Ferry. Swinton, who excuses him when he can, says: "If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson * * * he could have relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender until the 15th." Palfrey, in his "Antietam and Fredericksburg," says: "He was not equal to the occasion. He threw away his chance, and a precious opportunity of making a great name passed away."

On the 17th, was fought the bloody battle of Antietam. Of this battle, alluding to McClellan's delay in attacking while Lee's forces were divided, Palfrey says: "He fought his battle one day too late, if not two." "He did very little in the way of compelling the execution of his orders." Α very large portion of his army did not participate in the battle, and Palfrey adds: “It is probable, almost to a point of certainty, that if a great part of the Second and Fifth corps, and all the Sixth, animated by the personal presence of McClellan, had attacked vigorously in the center, and Burnside on the Federal left, the result would have been the practical annihilation of Lee's army!" A

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McClellan, against the advice of Burnside and others, decided not to renew the attack on the 18th. "It is," says Palfrey, "hardly worth while to state his reasons." Two divisions had joined him. "The fault was in the man. There was force enough at his command either day had he seen fit to use it."5 By the time that McClellan got ready to renew the attack Lee was gone. On the 18th, the enemy

1. Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 202.

2. Palfrey's Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 41.

3. Palfrey's" Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 119.

4. Palfrey's Antietam and Fredericksburg," pp. 121-122.

5. Palfrey's" Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 127.

were permitted to retire across the Potomac. The Union army slowly followed, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d of September. On the 7th of October, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan that "the army must move. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity of your army, and we must push it on."

The President was also impatient at these slow movements of McClellan, and to a friend of the General's who called at the White House, he said, doubtless with the expectation that it would be repeated: "McClellan's tardiness reminds me of a man in Illinois, whose attorney was not sufficiently aggressive. The client knew a few law phrases, and finally, after waiting until his patience was exhausted by the non-action of his counsel, he sprang to his feet and exclaimed: 'Why don't you go at him with a Fi Fa, demurrer, a capias, a surrebutter, or a ne exeat, or something; and not stand there like a nudum pactum, or a non est ?'"'

By the 6th of October, the President's impatience of McClellan's long delay induced him to telegraph the General: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South." McClellan did not obey. On the roth, Stewart, a rebel cavalry officer, crossed the Potomac, went as far as Chambersburgh in Pennsylvania, made the circuit of the Federal army, and re-crossed the Potomac without serious loss. This was the second time Confederate cavalry had been permitted to ride entirely around McClellan's army. On the 13th of October, the. President made one more effort to induce McClellan to act, by writing him a long and kindly personal letter.'

1. The letter was as follows:

"My Dear Sir: -You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation, as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court House, which is just

Near the end of October McClellan started, and on the 2d of November his army crossed the Potomac. Thus the autumn had gone by, from the battle of Antietam on the 17th of September until the 2d of November, before McClellan crossed the Potomac. The President had written, begged, and entreated McClellan to act. In his letter of October 13th, he says: "I say try. If we never try, we shall never succeed." "We should not operate so as to

about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but It wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time which cannot and must not be ignored.

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communication to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do, but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind, all the easier.

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by the route that you can, and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march. His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.

"You know I desired, but did not order you, to cross the Potomac below, instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. The idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize, if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move towards Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say try; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

If we

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility for supplying from the side away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the hub towards the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket, and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge, I

merely to drive him (the enemy) away." In a dispatch on the 27th day of October, the President says: "I now ask a distinct answer to the question: "Is it your purpose not to go into action again until the men now being drafted are incorporated in the old regiments?" The patience of Mr. Lincoln was finally exhausted, and, on the 5th of November, he issued an order relieving McClellan, and directing him to turn over the command to General Burnside. Thus ends the military career of George B. McClellan.

The judgment of General Palfrey, who served under him, is certainly not too severe. He sums up his military history in these words: "His interminable and inexcusable delays upon the Peninsula afforded great ground for dissatisfaction, and they seemed-to say no more-to be followed by similar delays upon the Potomac." "He never made his personal presence felt on a battle-field."

McClellan retired to New Jersey, to emerge no more except as the candidate for the Presidency, in 1864, of the party who declared "the war a failure." He contributed to this failure, in so far as it was one-considering the means at his command to make it a success-more than almost any other man. But he himself was the most conspicuous failure of the war. After all his disasters and delays upon the Peninsula, the President generously re-instated him in mand, and at Antietam and afterwards, he had golden opportunities to redeem his failure. He was retained long after

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understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to-wit: Vestala, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five; and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When at length, running for Richmond ahead of him, enable him to move his way; if he does so, turn and attack him in rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

Yours truly,

1. Report on Conduct of the War, pt. 1, p. 525.

2. Palfrey's "Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 133-134.

A. LINCOLN."