do by force of arms. His efforts were calculated, nevertheless, to "fire the Southern heart," but, alas! that heart had been too often fired to be easily fanned into flame by boastful words. Still his presence in Georgia, and his speeches at Augusta and Macon, had the effect to arrest the progress of public sentiment, now strongly tending in that State towards reunion. Some of the public journals had already ventured to hint in favor of giving up the war as useless, and it was understood that the Governor of Georgia was himself exchanging views on the subject with Sherman. It was also well known that many influential citizens were in favor of immediate reconstruction, by State action alone, and without the concurrence of the other Confederate States, thus taking Georgia back to the Union by the same road she had left it. But Davis nipped all such plans in the bud. It was not convenient to abide by his own favorite dogma of State rights under the present circumstances. Sherman, on witnessing the effect of Davis's presence in Georgia, declared, "Jeff. Davis holds the Southern Confederacy in his hands, and wields it like an army. Before he came down here Governor Brown thought he had some State rights, but Davis took that notion out of him quick."

By the last of September, Hood had sufficiently recovered from the stunning blows dealt by Sherman to take the initiative. His plan was, to march to Sherman's rear and break his long line of communication, and by this means compel him to evacuate Atlanta. This, he thought, would undo the work of many months, would force the Union flag back from its proud, advanced position on the ramparts of Atlanta, to where it started from in May. He had recruited his army at Lovejoy's to near forty thousand men, from the Georgia militia, and being all ready, he swiftly threw his whole army upon the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga, breaking it up in sundry places, and taking possession of several of our stations on the road. During the entire month of October our communications were interrupted, and then they were re-established. Our secondary base, however, Allatoona, was heid against French's entire division by the gallant Corse with seventeen hundred The enemy, after five hours' fighting, retreated, leaving two hundred dead on the ouna and four nundred prisoners in our hands. Sherman, with all his force, except the Twentieth Corps, was pursuing Hood, and witnessed the action from the top of a distant mountain, from which he signalled Corse to hold on at all hazards, that he was coming to his relief. The eignal was not recognized. It was repeated again and again. "I am confident," said Sherman, "that Corse is there, and will hold the place." At length the signal was answered, and Sherman hastened on; but the contest had ended, and the enemy gone before his arrival. Sherman's order of thanks declared :

men.

:

"This handsome defence illustrates a most important principle of war-that fortified places should be defended to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked."

Following up the railroad as far as Dalton, where he broke it again, Hood then struck off westerly to Lafayette, and thence southwesterly to Gadsden, Sherman following sharply as far as Gaylesville, Alabama, where he halted.

And now commenced the development of a campaign, originated by Sherman in the exigencies of the moment, and for a specific end, but destined to form the grandest movement of the war, and to exercise a marvellous influence on its destinies. Hood's plan was quickly comprehended by Sherman. It was to gather his forces at Gadsden, increase them by the forces of Dick Taylor and other troops, throw them across the Tennessee at Florence, and march on Nashville. Long before this plan was carried out, Sherman had followed it, and seen its dangerous consequences. It would have thrown him on the defensive, and given his beaten adversary the advantage of the offensive. It would have undone the prospective work of the year, by keeping our troops always busy defending communications and in protecting Tennessee. Any other commander but Sherman would have massed his troops to hurl them against Hood, pursuing him from point to point until he was overtaken. Sherman, however, followed no plan but that dictated by his own genius. Instantly comprehending all the necessities and all the possibilities of the situation, he astonished Europe and America by one of the boldest strokes ever attempted in military history. While Hood and Beauregard, and their corps commanders, S. D. Lee, Cheatham, Cleburne, and Bate, were making windy speeches at Gadsden, promising all sorts of success to their troops, and pledging themselves, as one of them said, " to wipe Sherman from the list of Yankee generals," that General was preparing a scheme that must have suddenly changed their views, and dampened their ardor.

He divided his forces into two parts, and made the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps a nucleus around which his ablest lieutenant, Thomas, should collect troops from the whole Department of the Mississippi, and from re-enforcements on the way, according to directions from Sherman, and with them should resist, check, and finally drive back the advance of Hood into Tennessee. Next he made elaborate dispositions of forces for Bridgeport, Chattanooga, Murfreesboro, and other points to be held, and directed the abandonment of those which could not be well held. Finally, he prepared and mobilized an army of about fifty thousand men for a march across the broad State of Georgia to the sea. Of the admirable manner in which he equipped this column, the perfection of its arrangements-not

only in the disposition of its forces and the entire perfection for practical use of the three arms of the service, but also in the Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Commissary Departments, and in all its transportation-of this we cannot speak. But when it is remembered that not one gun or one wagon of all his immense trains was lost or abandoned during the prolonged march which ensued, the skilful preparation of the expedition can be appreciated.

So rapidly and secretly were all these things effected, that long before Hood was ready to leave Florence, entirely ignorant of the scheme of Sherman- the latter was far away on his march towards Savannah. The main outlines of the plan were by Sherman communicated to the Lieutenant-General, and approved by him.

And now Sherman had every thing ready for the start. All wagons, supplies, and extra baggage not needed and tending to impede the most rapid movements, were sent back to Chattanooga. His trains were all in complete order; sixteen days' rations were in the wagons and five days' rations in haversack; the men had all received their back pay and were in fine spirits, and all entertained an enthusiasm for their leader unequalled since the days of Napoleon. On the 3d of November, Sherman telegraphed to Captain Pennock, United States Navy: "In a few days I will be off for salt water, and hope to meet my old friend D. D. Porter again. Be kind enough to write to him and tell him to look out for me about Christmas from Hilton Head to Savannah." He also wrote home to Mrs. Sherman : "This is my last letter from here, you will only hear from me hereafter through rebel sources." Orders had been given for the destruction of the railroad in his rear, and of all public property in Atlanta, and now the march began a perilous march of three hundred miles through the heart of the Confederacy, from the mountains to the sea. And here we have the order of march and the law of the campaign :

"1. For the purpose of military operations this army is divided into two wings, viz. The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps.

"2. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the Commander-in-Chief.

"3. There will be no general trains of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision train distributed habitually as follows:-Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each army corps should change this order of march by having its advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at seven A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

"The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under