TH

CHAPTER XXII.

EVENTS OF 1863. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH-WEST.

HE federal government, after the great successes in the east and west, was anxious to strike an effectual blow in Tennessee. For several months after the battle of Murfreesboro', Rosecrans made no important movement. Detachments of his troops. had several skirmishes and sharp fights, but the army of the West played the part of a spectator until summer. In June, the government thought that Rosecrans ought to take steps to drive Bragg into Georgia, so as to secure eastern Tennessee. It was believed that the confederate commander had weakened his army by sending re-enforcements to Johnston in the neighborhood of Vicksburg.

Rosecrans differed with his government. He said his army was not prepared for a forward movement, and that his officers thought it better to wait until the fate of Vicksburg was decided. Halleck, the commander-in-chief, did not order Rosecrans to fight, but he told him very plainly that the government was dissatisfied with his inactivity.

Rosecrans acted on the hint, and on the 24th of June began a series of movements from Murfreesboro', intended to force Bragg to retreat from his position on Duck River. They succeeded perfectly. Bragg, finding himself in danger of being outflanked, retired to Chattanooga on the south side of the Tennessee, where he intrenched himself. This was about the 4th of July.

In order to give Rosecrans all necessary help, Burnside was ordered to march from the Ohio into eastern Tennessee. Violent rains hindered the movements of the feder als, so that it was not until the 16th of August that Rosecrans advanced against Chattanooga, and when Burnside left Camp Nelson in Kentucky, Rosecrans found a great deal to do in the way of making roads across the Cumberland Mountains. Burnside met with little resistance, the small bodies of confederates falling back before him and joining the army of Bragg.

Among the confederate officers who fell back toward Chattanooga was General Buckner, who, you will remember, surrendered Fort Donelson to General Grant. Two of his brigades were detached from the main body, and one held Cumberland's Gap. On the 9th of September, this brigade surrendered Cumberland Gap, without firing a shot in its defense. The Gap commands one of the chief roads from Kentucky into Tennessee. You will see, therefore, that its surrender exposed eastern Tennessee and south-western Virginia to federal invasion, besides breaking the line of communication between Richmond and Bragg.

The turning aside of Burnside to capture Cumberland Gap delayed the advance of Rosecrans, and gave Bragg powerful re-enforcements from Virginia, the army of the Mississippi and from other sources. Indeed he became more powerful than Rosecrans

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ADVANCE OF ROSECRANS.

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expected. The latter, on the 20th of August, reached the northern bank of the Tennessee, opposite Chattanooga, and on the 4th of September, a large part of the army crossed. Bragg, finding his communications threatened, withdrew to Lafayette in Georgia, and Chattanooga was occupied by a federal corps.

Rosecrans now divided his army into three columns, widely separated by mount

ains, and advanced in loose order against the foe, who, as I have told you, he thought much weaker than was the fact. Bragg made ready to overcome the three columns in detail, and felt certain of complete success. General D. H. Hill, however, bitterly opposed a movement against General Thomas, who was encamped at the foot of Lookout Mountain, to the left of the federal advance. Bragg, therefore, assigned the duty

to Buckner and General Hindman. The movement was a failure. Thomas escaped them by withdrawing into the mountain passes, and soon after effected a junction with two other corps.

It was arranged that at the time of the attack on Thomas, General Polk should fall on Crittenden's corps, which was the center of the three advancing columns; but he too failed, and on the 18th of September, the whole union army stood on the western bank of the Chickamauga—“ the Dead River"-twelve miles from Chattanooga. Bragg had been largely re-enforced, and knowing that Longstreet's corps from Virginia was not far away, he decided on an effort to recover Chattanooga.

Rosecrans knew that his line was weak toward the left, and he was afraid of being cut off from Chattanooga. On the evening of the 18th, he moved some of his divisions. from the right to the left, and the next morning the two armies faced each other in a narrow valley formed by two lines of hills-Mission Ridge and Pigeon Mount. Between them flowed the Chickamauga, which the confederates crossed in quest of the enemy.

On the morning of September 19, Rosecrans opened the battle by moving forward a brigade of Thomas' corps, which attacked the confederate right wing. The fighting soon became general and continued all day, the advantage being with the confederates. They had been checked in several quarters and compelled to give up some of their positions, but they had gained possession of the road to Chattanooga, and had driven the federals almost to the foot of Mission Ridge.

It was near midnight following the battle that Longstreet reached Bragg's headquarters, bringing an additional division of veterans. He was placed in command of the left wing. A new disposition of the forces was made, and it was ordered that the action should recommence at day-break on the morrow, which was Sunday.

It was an anxious night, as you can well understand, to Rosecrans. By the advice of General Thomas, he moved some more of his troops from the right to the left: the dread of the union commander was that his communications with Chattanooga would be cut.

While this movement was under way, the confederates attacked. It was about ten o'clock, the assault from some cause having been delayed. The delay gave the federals time to throw up breastworks and to increase their defenses. Bragg hurled his right wing against these intrenchments again and again without success.

Thomas, who handled the union left, repelled a sharp attack by Polk, but on the right, where Rosecrans commanded in person, he was completely outgeneraled and defeated by Longstreet. This able confederate leader, like Stonewall Jackson, had the faculty of getting every achievement possible out of his men. His soldiers followed him with impetuosity, wedging themselves between the two wings of the union army, where a gap had been created by the removal of the center to strengthen the left. Operating in both directions at the same time, under the direct leadership of Longstreet, the confederates threw several divisions in disorder and caused such confusion that Rosecrans galloped to Chattanooga and telegraphed to Washington that his whole army had been beaten. His object in riding back was to secure his supply train and his pontoon bridges over the Tennessee.

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"THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA."

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At this critical juncture, Hood, one of the confederate leaders, was desperately wounded, and the advance was checked during the time required to bring another officer to take his place. This brief delay gave the federals time to rally; re-enforcements were hurried to the weak points and a fresh stand was made.

But the utter overthrow of the army was alone prevented by General George H. Thomas. Commanding on the left, he hurled back the attack of Polk, but was assailed again by superior numbers. Polk attacked his center and left, and Longstreet charged his right with the utmost fury, but Thomas, with every soldier fighting like a hero, stood immovable. His grand courage won for him the name by which he was ever afterward known-"The Rock of Chickamauga."

About four o'clock in the afternoon, Longstreet observed a gap in the hills, almost in the rear of Thomas and began rushing his column through it. Fortunately, General Granger, knowing from the heavy firing that the reserves were needed, hurried them up from Rossville, arriving at this moment. The division had never been in battle before, but they fought like veterans. The onsets of Longstreet were repelled, and Thomas, having held his position, fell slowly back toward Chattanooga with a firm front presented to the enemy. He was ready to fight the next morning, but Bragg did not care to disturb him. Thomas and Longstreet were the respective heroes, while neither of the chief commanders won any credit.

The battle of Chickamauga was a victory for the confederates, for they had driven the federals from the field and kept possession. There were probably about 50,000 men engaged on each side. The federals lost 1,644 killed, 9,622 wounded and 5,085 missing, of whom probably many were killed. They lost thirty-six guns and a large quantity of small arms were left on the field. The confederate loss is not known with certainty, but it was probably nearly as great. Among their killed were three brigadier generals. There was much dissatisfaction on both sides with the conduct of the battle. Rosecrans was soon afterward relieved of his command, and General Thomas appointed his successor. McCook, Crittenden, Negley and VanCleve were suspended until full inquiry could be made.

On the confederate side General Polk was thought to have shown hesitation in the action, and was removed from the scene of the recent operations, though President Davis complimented him for his past services and promised him a speedy appointment to a new command.

Longstreet was eager to follow up the retreating federals, but Bragg countermanded the orders he had given for that purpose. He was greatly blamed for this, but the confederate president was a warm friend of Bragg, and refused to notice the complaints.

Upon reaching Chattanooga, the union forces intrenched themselves. Bragg appeared before the town on the 23d, and finding the defenses too strong to be carried by assault, he laid siege. His effort to cut off the sources of supply partly failed because of the activity of the federal cavalry.

The position of the union army in Chattanooga at best was very grave and caused much anxiety in Washington. Unless relief could reach it there was danger of its being destroyed. In casting about for the best qualified man to grapple with the

problem, the government naturally fixed upon General Grant. He was appointed to the command of the entire west, which was erected into the "Military Division of the Mississippi," and large bodies of troops were put in motion to provide him with the means of acting promptly and with effect. The Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under Hooker, were transferred from the army of the Potomac to that of the Tennessee. These two corps, numbering 23,000 men, were, together with their artillery, baggage and animals, moved from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson, in Alabama—a distance of 1,192 miles-in seven days, during which they twice crossed the Ohio River.

Thus, as the autumn advanced, several columns were converging for the relief of Chattanooga, while Bragg could do little besides watch the beleaguered town. Since the union re-enforcements far outnumbered those of the confederates, it may well be wondered what Bragg hoped to gain by waiting and doing nothing.

Among the union officers pushing toward Chattanooga was General Sherman, who had succeeded Grant in the command of the Tennessee department. It was on the 19th of October that Thomas succeeded Rosecrans. On the same day, he received a dispatch from Grant to hold his position at all hazards. He replied, "I will do so till we starve," and so he would have done, had it been necessary.

Thomas was trying to open a road along the southern bank of the Tennessee, so as to make a connection between the main army and Hooker's force, which at the close of October had reached Bridgport. The base of the union army was at Bridgport and Stevenson, both in Alabama, and the soldiers were supplied from depots at Nashville and Louisville by a single line of rail. The confederates had possession of the southern side of the Tennessee, with the exception of Chattanooga and the surrounding lines, while the road on the northern side was impassable because of the sharpshooters on the other bank. The federals, therefore, were forced to bring all their supplies by a roundabout way, which was useless during severe weather. The army, therefore, was often in danger of starving, and it was of the highest importance to open the river and gain a shorter communication with the base.

The arrival of Hooker at Bridgport relieved the army at Chattanooga from anxiety about their supplies, and you have learned that Sherman was also pushing toward the same point. Thomas ordered General W. F. Smith, his principal officer, to seize the mouth of Lookout Valley and the adjoining heights on the same side of the river with Chattanooga, while Hooker crossed from Bridgport on the opposite bank. Smith descended the river on the night of October 27, accompanied by infantry and engineers, and landed at the mouth of the valley at an early hour the next morning, meeting with little opposition from the enemy.

Securing himself in position, a pontoon bridge nine hundred feet in length was put together in five hours. Hooker crossed the same day at Bridgport and marched east, so as to join the force that had taken possession of Lookout Valley.

Generals Bragg and Longstreet watched this movement from the brow of Lookout Mountain, but they did not attack, because they were not ready for a general battle. That night, however, Longstreet assailed a detachment of Hooker's corps that was separated from the rest, but was repulsed with severe loss.