have been embarrassed rather than relieved by the attention they have engaged in Europe.

This return of normal ideas is very observable in this country. The efforts to substitute anarchical proceedings for the constitutional operation of the Federal government have at last been submitted to the test of popular election in the loyal states, with all the advantage to be gained by indirection of manner as well as by the discontents which a fearful civil war, so long conducted without decisive results, could afford. The result is, that the national habit of reliance upon the constitutional administration is restored, even at the cost of the social and political changes which it is foreseen must result from the removal of the dominating institution of slavery.

Apprehensions that the aggrandizement of the United States as a commercial power can bring any practical inconvenience or danger to European states can disturb none but visionary minds. We can never be dangerous, unless we are armed. We were never so great, and yet never so completely unarmed, as we were when this civil war broke out. We were never before so shorn of national prestige as we are now, through the operation of domestic faction; yet we have never before been so strongly armed as we are at this moment, upon land and water. If we have ever been aggressive, it was the interest of slavery that made us belligerent abroad, as it was the same interest that has now afflicted ourselves with civil war. We can be only a peaceful nation if we are left to enjoy our independence in the way that our destiny leads us. We can only become a disturber of the world's peace by being called into the world to defend that independence.

I do not know in what way Great Britain and France may think it expedient to reverse the injurious policy they have hitherto pursued in regard to us, but I think that in order to direct their attention with more earnestness to European affairs, they must soon come to the conclusion that it is wise to remit American affairs exclusively to the government of the United States.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

January 15, 1864. — I thank you for calling my attention to the significant declaration, in a leading British journal, that, as for Great Britain, in regard to the two greatest risks and largest fields of danger, her securities are of a very opposite character that she

depends upon peace in Europe, and war in America: upon war in America, because it is only too probable that a restoration of the national authority here, upon any terms, would be immediately followed by what are described as "most preposterous " demands upon Great Britain.

That the policy which her Majesty's government have thought proper to pursue in regard to the insurrection existing in this country has resulted in producing many grave claims on behalf of our citizens is a fact which manifestly appears in the diplomatic records of both countries. That these claims are sustained here by a deep and pervading popular conviction of their justice is apparent to all who weigh, however carelessly, the daily utterances of the organs of public opinion. It is, indeed, a question of deep interest to both countries, whether this condition of things will generate, when our domestic peace shall have been restored, a policy of unreasonable and litigious exactions upon the British government. We may safely refer to our correspondence with her Majesty's government to prove that the government of the United States does not desire such disturbed relations as a consequence of our war, while, if it be not disrespectful, I may add, that we are satisfied that her Majesty's government sincerely deprecates it. I do not apprehend, therefore, that the British government will take or pursue the policy indicated in the quarter to which I have alluded, with a view to a prolongation of our civil war. That war has its evils and dangers for Great Britain, and for Europe, as well as for the United States, and for the American continent. Whatever errors or misconceptions may have heretofore prevailed in Europe in regard to the causes of the insurrection, and the freedom of this government from responsibility to the country and to mankind for its existence, and even for its duration, those errors and misapprehensions are now speedily clearing away, and it is daily becoming more apparent that the insurrection has derived its main support from European sympathies, and rests all its future hopes upon European aid and recognition. I may even go further, and say that the British realm and British provinces already are seen to be the basis of the naval war which the insurgents affect to wage against our country; and that British capital and British seamen are seen to constitute the chief resource and strength of the pretended belligerent. I should not distrust the ultimate judgment of the British nation in our favor,

and against its own government, if that government should pursue henceforth a policy calculated to protract the unhappy contest. Nor will I do the government any more than the nation so great a wrong as to believe that it could deliberately lend itself to any system of administration that would be calculated to injure or endanger the safety, peace, and welfare of a kindred and friendly

nation.

The President has never failed to forecast the dangers of alienation between Great Britain and the United States, arising out of their civil war and surviving it; hence the earnestness of his increasing remonstrances against the concession of belligerent rights, and the continuance of that concession; hence his willingness to hear, and his promptness in seeking to adjust, the reasonable claims of British subjects, and meet the just expectations of her Majesty's government; hence the cheerfulness with which he has hastened to negotiate treaties designed to settle even difficulties which existed before the war, and to change early policies that favored discord between the two countries. It is his purpose to pursue this course to the end of his administration, and so far as it shall be possible, to impress upon the habitual policy of the government a friendly and even fraternal disposition towards Great Britain, so that the two nations may go on harmoniously together, favoring everywhere the development of just principles of free, responsible government, and the progress of a humane civilization, especially in Central and Southern America, and in the portions of the Eastern world now being reopened to Western commerce.

The pursuit of this policy is not unattended by many embarrassments. Nothing but military disasters, not now apprehended, could induce the American people to believe themselves incompetent to grapple with all the foreign dangers incident to the fullest assertion of their rights, and a full redress of their wrongs, while, like every other nation, they naturally view these rights and wrongs under the influence of self-esteem, perhaps not altogether free from prejudices disparaging to other nations; nevertheless, the policy is practicable, and may be successfully established. They are only superficial observers who assume that the United States are a litigious and contentious nation, and who reason from that assumption that, when they shall have gained the blessings of internal peace, they will be found impatient for aggressive foreign war. I know

that we have such interpreters in our public press; but they reason from the excitement of the present hour, not from the normal temperament of the American people. We have a continent to bring forward to a higher state of development and civilization than even Europe and the United States have yet attained. We have need to extend throughout the world a foreign commerce, which is an inevitable outgrowth of our internal commerce. We have institutions of self-government to maintain. These are most effectually maintained by commending them to the favorable opinion of mankind, and they can be so commended by showing that, in their practical operation, they do not instigate violence either at home or abroad, but are conservative of law, order, and universal peace.

But it is manifestly needful to the success of the President's policy that a corresponding spirit shall direct the action of the British government during the period which shall intervene before our domestic peace is restored.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Pike.

February 15, 1864. Laborious efforts have been made from time to time, chiefly by British statesmen, to prove that the concession of a belligerent naval character by their government to the insurgents in this country was right, and even that it was necessary. The United States have never conceded either the justice or the necessity of that proceeding, but, on the contrary, they declared at first, and have ever since maintained, that it was as ungenerous and unfriendly as it was exceptional. Having been followed by the concurrence of the other maritime powers, as it is understood in some cases upon considerations of prudence, and in others upon the suggestions of sympathy with Great Britain, that important measure has secured to none of the maritime powers any real advantage, while it has deeply affected the United States. Steadily adhering to the prudent policy which their exposed condition suggested, they are at last surmounting what other states have insisted upon regarding as fatal dangers. But, as they feel more assured of coming out of the revolutionary storm, the people of this country become more and more keenly sensible of the injuries which they received from friendly hands during their peril. European statesmen, on the other hand, are beginning to consider what will be the form and measure of the atonement that the United States will

claim at the hands of states which unnecessarily and unkindly have lent aid and sympathies to the insurgents.

It is to be expected, of course, that the United States, after passing the present crisis, will seek to maintain the position they have hitherto held in the commonwealth of nations, and to improve the resources with which Providence has blessed them. But it is no secret that the President thinks justice and magnanimity are safer and surer guides for a republic than jealousy and aggression. It is, moreover, hardly to be expected of any people that they will be content to practise these virtues towards other nations which persevere in injurious and wantonly offensive courses. Desirous, therefore, that when our domestic war shall cease, the natural controversies that grew out of it may also be brought to an end, I have been authorized, whenever circumstances seemed propitious, to invite the maritime powers to reexamine their attitude and to resume their original relations towards the United States. I know how hard it is for a state to retrace an erroneous course so long as it can be followed without immediate peril; and therefore I am not surprised or discouraged with the failure that has thus far attended the appeals which we have made not more earnestly in the present interest of our national cause than in the ultimate interest of universal peace and harmony. But if we are right in our belief that the American Union is coming safely and purified out of the fire through which, for its early acceptance of human bondage as a political element in its organization, it was doomed to pass, then it is clear that the maritime powers would do wisely in promptly receding from the position which, in a moment of precipitancy, they unwisely adopted in regard to the insurrection. If the United States survive the struggle, all of the maritime powers must, sooner or later, revise their attitude of which we complain. The power that first perceives and performs this duty will be distinguished, and will reap the rewards of wisdom and virtue.

I am obliged to confess that it is not now expected that the treaty in regard to negro emigration will be ratified. The American people have advanced to a new position in regard to slavery and the African class since the President, in obedience to their prevailing wishes, accepted the policy of colonization. Now, not only their free labor but their military service also is appreciated and accepted.