CHAPTER XVIII.

EMANCIPATION.

EW ORLEANS was in possession of the Union troops. The peo

NEW

ple of that city did not like General Butler, who was in command; neither what General Phelps was doing-forming a regiment of negro troops. He was at Carrollton, and a great many slaves came into his camp. He thought they would make good soldiers. "I have now," he wrote, "upwards of five hundred Africans organized into five companies, who are willing and ready to show their devotion to our cause in any way that they may be put to the test. They are willing to submit to anything rather than slavery.”

Mr. Reverdy Johnson had been sent to New Orleans on public business, and improved the occasion to write a letter to the President, informing him that the Union people were greatly disturbed by the enlistment of negroes. Mr. Lincoln had not discovered very much Union sentiment in Louisiana. Notwithstanding all the burdens pressing him, he found time to write to Mr. Johnson:

"It seems" [according to what Johnson had written] "the Union feeling in Louisiana is being crushed out by the course of General Phelps. Please pardon me for believing it is a false pretence. The people of Louisiana-all intelligent people everywhere-know full well that I never had a wish to touch the foundation of their society or any right of theirs. With perfect knowledge of this, they forced a necessity upon me to send armies among them, and it is their own fault, not mine, that they are annoyed by the presence of General Phelps. They also know the remedy-how to be cured of General Phelps remove the necessity of his presence. . . . If they can conceive of anything worse than General Phelps within my power, would they not better be looking out for it? . . . I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops, notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States Senator! I am a patient man-always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this Government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course, I will not

do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed."

A private citizen, Mr. Durant, complained that the relations between the masters and their slaves were disturbed by the presence of the Union army. He induced another gentleman, Mr. Bullitt, to write to the President, who replied:

"The rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it, nor permit the Government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. . . . If they will not do this, if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the Government, it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the Government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is, or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can to save the Government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing."

The campaigns had been hap-hazard. There had been no head, and President Lincoln called General Halleck to Washington to direct military movements. He was appointed chief of staff. General Pope was also ordered from the West to command the troops in front of Washington.

It was an unfortunate announcement which Pope made. "I have come," he said, " from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies." The officers and men thought he was making unjust comparison between the soldiers of the East and those of the West. Such was not his intention, but he did not reflect how it would be accepted. An imputation that they were inferior to the Western troops gave great offence. General Halleck directed Pope to concentrate his army of 40,000, and cut the railroads leading west from Richmond. General "Stonewall" Jackson with 36,000 troops hastened to oppose him. General Halleck went to Harrison's Landing to see McClellan, who had asked for 50,000 more men. "I am not authorized to promise you more than 20,000," said Halleck.

July 24.

"I will make the attempt to take Richmond with that number," McClellan replied. Halleck returned to Washington, but upon his arrival found a despatch calling for 35,000.

It was seen that General Lee was intending to hurl a large force on

Pope and annihilate him, and it was decided that the army must be withdrawn from James River. Halleck telegraphed :

"Send away your sick as fast as you can."

Three days later an order was issued for the withdrawal of the entire army, against which McClellan protested. Two weeks passed before the last of the troops left the banks of the James.

The citizens of Washington manifested their patriotic spirit during this period of gloom by assembling in mass-meeting around the eastern portico of the Capitol. It was in the evening, the moon at its Aug. 6. full. The thousands present rent the air with cheers when in response to their calling the President rose to address them:

"Fellow - citizens, I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for your being here on such an occasion. But I offer in justification of myself and of you that I do not know there is anything in the Constitution against it." (Great laughter and applause.) . . . “The only thing I think of now not likely to be said by some one else is a matter in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself. There has been a very unwise attempt to have a quarrel between General McClellan and the Secretary of War. Now I occupy a position that enables me to believe at least these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some presuming to be their friends." (Cries of Good!") "General McClellan's attitude is such that, in the very selfishness of his nature, he cannot but wish to be successful-and I hope he will; and the Secretary of War is in precisely the same situation. If the military commander in the field cannot be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself-for the time being master of them both-cannot but be failures." (Laughter and applause.) "I know General McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it any more than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it." (Applause.) "Sometimes we have a dispute about how many soldiers General McClellan has had. Those who would disparage him say he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that McClellan has had a very small number. The basis of this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion perhaps a wider difference, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things which the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give." (Applause and laughter.) "And I say here, so far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing from him at any time in my power to give him." (Wild applause.) "I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man" (applause), "and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged to the Secretary of War, as withholding from him. I have talked longer than I expected to" ("No! no!" 'Go on!"), "and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more."

The editor of the New York "Tribune," in March, 1861, had said to the seceding States, "Wayward sisters, go in peace;" but after twelve months of conflict Mr. Greeley was advocating extreme measures. published a long letter over his own name in the "Tribune," accusing

He

the President of being unwilling to enforce the laws passed by Congress confiscating the property of rebels, and of being unduly influ enced by counsels and menaces of "certain fossil politicians from the border States." He complained that a large portion of the regular army officers, with many of the volunteer officers, were more ready to uphold slavery than put an end to the Rebellion. The article in the "Tribune" was from one who professed to be friendly to the President. Mr. Lincoln knew it would be read by many thousand people whose sons were in the army. Mr. Greeley had signed his name to the editorial, giving it the weight of his great personal influence. What should

Would not silence. As President of the

the President do? Ought he to remain silent? be regarded as acknowledging the indictment? United States he would not notice it, but as an individual he could with propriety reply. Let us not forget that neither Horace

Aug. 23.

Greeley, nor any one, other than the members of the Cabinet, knew of the proclamation which for a month had been lying in the President's desk, penned by the same hand that wrote this reply to the editor of the "Tribune:"

"DEAR SIR,-I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York Tribune.' If there be in it any statements, or assumptions of fact, which I may know to be erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right. As to the policy I seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored the nearer the Union will be the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modifica tion of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.”

The Confederate cavalry under Stuart gained the rear of Pope's army, and captured his supplies at Manassas. Then came the battle at Groveton, and the second at Bull Run, resulting in the deAug. 26. feat of Pope through the want of co-operation on the part of Fitz-John Porter with his division of the Army of the Potomac. General Franklin's corps was at Alexandria. Halleck directed that it should make a forced march to join Pope, and start as Aug. 27. soon as possible. McClellan thought it would be better for Franklin not to go, and questioned whether Washington was safe. He recommended the troops be held where they were for its defence. Halleck issued an order for Franklin to move at once. ply of McClellan :

This the re