a division of Confederate cavalry, burned two schooners in the Pamunkey River, tore up the railroad track leading to White House,

June 13. fired upon a train, captured supplies and the sick in one of the hospitals, trotted around the Union army, and afterwards returned to Richmond.

The information was received with incredulity and disgust by the people. It foreshadowed failure, if not disaster. Members of Congress who visited the peninsula said they found soldiers guarding the property of an officer who was in the Confederate army. Surgeons were not allowed to pitch their hospital tents beneath the trees near the house of a Confederate, but were compelled to set them up in the blazing sunshine. Senator Wade and a party sought shelter from a shower beneath the portico of a house, and were rudely driven from it. General Sumner was informed regarding the indignity.

"You must not hold me responsible, gentlemen. I am not generalin-chief. I must enforce the order of my superior," the reply. (")

Reports came to the President that officers who were in sympathy with McClellan would send in their resignations if negroes were employed to aid in putting down the Rebellion.

June 23.

At the yearly meeting of the Progressive Friends, a society of Quakers, William Lloyd Garrison drew up a memorial to the President, asking him to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation. Oliver Johnson, Thomas Garrett, and several others visited Washington to present it to Mr. Lincoln. Although the news from the army was discouraging, though he had passed a sleepless night, he patiently listened to the reading of the address. It intimated that he had not done what the people expected him to do when they elected him. It set forth the blessings that would immediately follow were he to issue a proclamation. "If it is not done," read the memorial, "blood will continue to flow and fierce dissensions abound, calamities increase and fiery judgments be poured out, until the work of national destruction is consummated beyond hope of recovery."

"You cannot," said Mr. Lincoln, "expect me to make any extended reply to your address, as I have not been provided with a copy in advance. Slavery is the most troublesome question we have to deal with. My view in regard to the way of getting rid of it may not be your view. We all agree that it is wrong. You want me to issue a Proclamation of Emancipation; but were I to do so, how can I enforce it? I feel the magnitude of the task before me, and wish to be rightly directed."

"Mr. President," said William Barnard, "you will remember that Queen Esther, when she was going before Ahasuerus, relied upon divine assistance."

"Yes; and I, too, feel the need of divine assistance. I have sometimes thought I might be an instrument in the hands of God for accomplishing a great work, and I certainly am not unwilling to be. Perhaps, however, God's way of accomplishing the end may not be your way. It will be my endeavor, with a firm reliance upon the divine arm, to do my duty in the place to which I am called." (")

The President knew the people were beginning to distrust him. Charles Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts, was receiving letters from his friends, who said the President was not meeting the expectations of those who had elected him. He knew how true Mr. Lincoln was to his convictions. "If you are disposed to be impatient,” wrote Mr. Sumner to a friend, "at any seeming shortcoming, think, I pray you, of what he has done in a brief period, and from the past discern the promise of the future." ("3)

General Lee prepared to move against McClellan. The Union army was divided. He determined to fall upon the portion north of the Chickahominy and sever its railroad connections with York June 26, River. A series of battles followed-the first at Gaines's Mill

1862.

and Cold Harbor, the last at Malvern Hill, on the banks of the James. (See "Drum-beat of the Nation.")

A heart - sickening, irritating despatch came (June 28th) from General McClellan to the Secretary of War:

"I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this the Government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

"In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result.

"I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost.

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

Three days later (July 1st) McClellan telegraphed :

"I need fifty thousand more men. With them we will retrieve our fortunes."

Mr. Lincoln sent the following reply:

"It is impossible to reinforce you for present emergency. If we had a million men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair."

The President, anticipating disaster, and believing the people would sustain him, sent Secretary Seward to New York to arrange for calling out several hundred thousand men.

Messages went over the wires to the Governors of all the loyal States. Quick and encouraging responses came from John A. Andrew, of Massachusetts; William A. Buckingham, of Connecticut; (") Edwin D. Morgan, of New York;(") Andrew G. Curtin, of Pennsylvania; (1) William Dennison, of Ohio; (") and other chief magistrates. Each replied by telegraph that his State would cheerfully respond to the call of the President. The people had not lost faith in the Administration.

The President was greatly encouraged by the replies of the Governors. following despatch to McClellan:

On July 2d he sent the

"The idea of sending you fifty thousand, or any considerable force promptly, is absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you have the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me. If you think you are not strong Save the army enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."

The thought that so large a force was to be raised stimulated McClellan to ask that 100,000 be sent to him:

"To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond and putting an end to the Rebellion, reinforcements should be sent me, rather much over than much less than one hundred thousand men. I beg that you will be fully impressed by the magnitude of the crisis in which we are placed."

The army was at Harrison's Landing, protected by gunboats. The campaign for the capture of Richmond was over. It had been undertaken against the judgment of the President, who had seen that the Confederate army would be stronger at Richmond than at Centreville. It would have been easier for McClellan to strike a blow near Washington than in the enemy's country. No blow had been given; the Confederates had done the striking. The army still numbered more than 100,000. It was inactive and dispirited. There were rivalries and jealousies among the officers and a decline in discipline.

General McClellan, forgetting he was only commander of an army, and the President his commander-in-chief, wrote a long letter, instructing Mr. Lincoln as to what ought and ought not to be done in July 7. political affairs. "Let neither military disorder," it read, "political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State."

The communication was offensive by its dictatorial tone. It informed Mr. Lincoln that a declaration of radical views in relation to slavery would rapidly disintegrate the army.

The President knew his powers and responsibilities under the Constitution, and did not need instruction from any general. No notice was taken of the letter. He visited the army, and was affectionately received by the soldiers. General McClellan had no plan. With a heavy heart Mr. Lincoln returned to Washington. Shall we wonder that July 8. he was depressed in spirit? The people had expected great things from the Army of the Potomac, but it had accomplished nothing. The tide of success which marked the opening of the campaign in the West was offset by the failure in the East. The "Copperheads," as they were called the men who opposed the war-rejoiced over the state of affairs. "You never can conquer the South," they said. Many who had supported Mr. Lincoln began to question whether he had any serious intention of interfering with slavery. He had taken no notice of the action of McClellan when in West Virginia, or of Halleck in Missouri, excluding slaves from the lines of the Union armies. On the other hand, he had set aside the proclamations of Fremont and that of Hunter, giving freedom to the slaves in their military departments. Very

few people comprehended the President's position. He had appealed to the members of Congress from the border Slave States to take action towards abolishing slavery in their respective States. Their indifference cut him to the heart. He would make one more effort. would invite them to the White House and address them personally. Very earnest his appeal:

He

"The incidents of war cannot be avoided. If it continues, as it must if the object is not soon attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. . . . How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats! . . .