trait whenever he is represented. Gustave Doré can hardly be comprised in the Parisian gallery of delineators. His talent is of a higher order; he ranks amongst the painters. His illustrated Bible, Don Quixote, and other books, the world is familiar with. The delineators previously mentioned offer few or no points of comparison with those of Doré. It would be like comparing a tragedian with comedians; whatever humor he has shown is of a grotesque character, different from that of Gavarni and the others. The drawing in Doré's designs is occasionally faulty, but he is pretty sure of his wonderful effects, although they are somewhat monotonous. His severest critics aver that the secret of these effects is a trick, and that it is not true art-albeit none have succeeded in doing the trick as he does it. In his straining after the sublime, he occasionally overreaches himself and produces something bordering on the burlesque; this is also a vulnerable point which draws the fire of critics.

The historian of the French of the nineteenth century will possess much greater advantages than his predecessors. With expanded, every-hour literature, these delinea

tions of daily, actual, routine life will throw a stream of light into the most remote corners. The Gavarni Collection alone furnishes an approximate picture of the nation during the present age. In it are caught the salient traits of French character; courtesy without servility, gastronomy without gluttony, wine-drinking without drunkenness, gayety without roistering-no knocking down of policemen and wrenching of door-bells for amusement; liveliness without buffoonery; politeness the key-stone in the social arch, and from it, naturally, polish, vivacity, and a desire to be serviceable; mercurial and inconstant in what concerns the heart, measured and orderly in the affairs of material life; fond of theatrical effects-acting as if on exhibition throughout life; and, from our point of view, lacking in simplicity and religious faith; these are some of the principal features of Gavarni's typical Frenchman, and around them are grouped those minor ones always found in their neighborhood. Gavarni may be regarded, in an artistic sense, as one of the most complete representative men of his day, for in him were reflected the manners, customs, vices and virtues of the French nation.

Up to the commencement of the present century, no colony was more loyal to its mother country than Cuba to Spain, and the Spanish residents and Creoles vied with each other in patriotism and allegiance.

The political changes that occurred in Spain in the years 1812 and 1820 were followed by corresponding changes in the Island, and liberties unsurpassed under the most complete democracy were granted to the people, accustomed to the absolute sway of their rulers, and influenced by that debased public sentiment which is its usual concomitant. A degree of lawlessness and disorder naturally followed, and, when the reaction came, they were made the pretext for inflicting upon them a military despotism which has continued for more than forty-five years.

By royal order of May 28, 1825, Cuba was placed under martial law-the CaptainGeneral being invested with the power granted to the governors of besieged towns, and this power has been continued up to the pres

ent. Doubtless this was at first intended to be only temporary, and for the purpose of controlling certain alleged servile insurrections existing or threatening; but with the loss of her colonies upon the American continent and her constantly accumulating needs, Spain each year turned more eagerly to the rapidly developing resources of Cuba, and naturally realized the convenience of one-man power in drawing them into her coffers.

At this time (1825) the Island was in a most flourishing condition. The Count de Villanueva was at the head of the treasury, and we have proof of the high esteem in which he was held by the people. We refer to his administration because under it commenced that series of encroachments on the rights of the people which ultimately resulted in the despotism of to-day. A man honest and capable, having in view the good of both the mother country and the colony, he acquired such popularity that he presumed. to tax the rapidly increasing products of

agriculture without the consent of those affected, and so many were the abuses he reformed that the planters willingly submitted. Thus he was enabled to draw abundant supplies from the Island for Spain, thereby establishing two precedents, viz., taxation without representation, and contributions to the finances of the home country from the treasury of the colony, which measures, carried out by subsequent and more exacting officials, have caused nearly all the troubles which have since affected Cuba.

After the royal order of 1825, the Spaniards began to entertain the idea that a difference existed between their political rights and those of the Cubans. They cane to look upon the Island as their own by right of conquest, and upon the Creoles as their sub

only were the Cubans thus deprived of every honorable position, but they were systematically encouraged in every frivolous, licentious, and debasing pleasure. As the cannibals in fable fed their victims with a noxious herb, which destroyed their reason and led them to eat like mere beasts, and so become fitter subjects for the spit, so the Spanish government provided for the natives of Cuba all of those light and degrading pleasures, the ef fect of which is to destroy every manly sentiment and render them fit subjects for tyranny and oppression.

This policy would doubtless have been effective had it not been for the proximity of the Great Republic. Notwithstanding the restrictions of the government, Cubans could not be kept at home. The more intel

jects. The government, too, acted in this spirit. The Cubans were denied all representation in the Cortes; and although it had been promised that they should be governed by special laws, these laws were never enacted, and they were left to the tender mercies of the Captain-General acting under instructions from the Spanish ministry. With careful malignity every Cuban was shut out from all but the most subordinate official positions, and even these were watched with a most jealous eye, and soon made vacant if any capacity likely to become dangerous was displayed by the incumbent. As the result, Cuba swarmed with employés from Spain, who filled every position under government of whatsoever character, from the Captain-General in his double capacity of civil and military ruler to the merest tide-waiter. And not

ligent and wealthy among them were in the habit of passing a portion of the year in the United States, and sending their sons to be educated there, and so they became acquainted with the habits and modes of thought of a great and free people. They soon learned to comprehend the policy of the Spanish government and their own debased condition, and this leaven spreading through the Island gradually excited a bitter feeling against Spain and a longing to be free from her rule. Cubans began to say, "We are Americans, not Europeans," and to long for the day when the natural right of self-government should be accorded to them.

But the system under which they had so long lived had prevented the development of practical qualities among them; they knew little of adapting means to ends, and the re

LERSUNDI.

sult was that the few efforts made for independence were quickly suppressed. The feeling of antagonism to Spain continued to increase until few Cubans remained loyal at heart to Spain, and instead of loyalty there had grown up a bitter, burning hatred, a hatred so intense as to prevent sensible practical action. Of this passion the insurrection of Yara was the offspring. In its inception it was regarded as scarce worthy of a paragraph in the newspaper. It was styled "an outbreak of a few misguided men," and indeed it seemed little more. A successful revolution based upon liberal ideas had just occurred in Spain. Everything that the provinces of which Cuba was declared onecould ask had been granted; the Cubans were without arms, there was little more organization among them than what resulted from a community of hatred, and they were divided upon the question of the proper time to strike. Certainly, then, nothing could promise less chance of success than an outbreak under such circumstances.

A correct appreciation of the situation and the combatants at its inception requires a glance at the Spanish Revolution of 1868, as it was regarded by the Cubans. In the revolution and its promises of reforms Cuba had no faith whatever. Spain had been for years divided into a number of political parties, the Absolutist and Conservative parties, between which there was a fine line of distinction and whose names denote their character; the Union Liberal party, composed principally of generals and other high officials, civil and military; the Progressists, who were the true liberals, and the Democrats, who were radi

cals in the full acceptance of that term. Among these there was a constant struggle for place and power, and the changes in the political administration were as numerous and varied as those of a kaleidoscope, and among them all, Cuba suffered. True, each one signalized its advent to position by promising her reforms, but it was well understood that without a radical change in her political and economic administration, Spain could not afford to grant those reforms to Cuba which she had a right to demand. Cuba had become the chief prop of Spanish nationality, enabling her to maintain her position among

the nations.

Notwithstanding the disastrous results of their efforts, the most important of which was the Lopez affair in 1851, the Cubans continued to conspire, awaiting a favorable opportunity for an outbreak. The right of public meeting was under the law denied them, and therefore advantage was taken of the order of Freemasonry (which in defiance of the authorities had been established in the Island, and which held its sessions secretly) to prepare the way for the projected revolution. The Central Junta-as it was styled-was in Havana, and lodges existed in St Jago de Cuba, Sancti Spiritus, Puerto Principe, and a number of smaller places.

In 1867 the Spanish government instituted a new and onerous system of taxation, which created so great dissatisfaction among both Cubans and Spaniards in the central and eastern departments, that some of the more sanguine revolutionary leaders believed that a combination could be formed between the two classes, by which the representatives of Spain could be easily driven out and the autonomy established. Among these were Carlos Manuel Cespedes and Francisco Aguilera, residing in Bayamo, who in June, 1868, wrote to the Junta in Puerto Principe announcing their determination to inaugurate the revolution on the day of St. James, the 25th of July. In reply the Junta insisted that the outbreak be postponed for one year, to which Cespedes, after making certain conditions, consented. Matters were however precipitated by the march of events. The government became aware that conspiracies existed, and that the native Cubans throughout the Island were being instructed in military drill, and began to take measures accordingly. At the same time numerous letters were received from prominent Creoles, temporarily residing in the Peninsula, announcing the near approach of the revolution there, and exhorting their brothers at home

to take advantage of the opportunity to throw off the Spanish yoke.

The governor of Bayamo was on terms of great personal intimacy with Cespedes and Aguilera, and upon receipt of an order from Havana for their arrest, privately notified them of the fact before taking any action in the premises. Immediately thereafter, on the 10th of October, Cespedes collected together some two hundred of his followers and took possession of the small village of Yara, proclaiming the Republic. He freed his slaves at once, as did his constant companion and coadjutor Aguilera, and sent out messengers to the various lodges, exhorting the members to rally to his standard.

He soon found himself at the

head of two thousand men, a motley crowd armed with rifles, machetes, fowling-pieces, muskets of a past age, and other antiquated arms, and yet as fierce and determined a band of warriors as ever shouted the battle

cry of Freedom. He quickly advanced on Bayamo, which place was garrisoned by only a few Spanish soldiers, and the town surrendering without resistance, he established there his capital and provisional government. It is perhaps needless to add that his friend the governor was treated with every consideration.

There were at this time residing in Puerto Principe, the capital of the central department, a large number of young men, sons of wealthy families, highly educated and traveled, accustomed to all athletic exercises, magnificent horsemen, expert swordsmen, and "dead shots" either with the pistol or rifle. These had encountered in their travels

the fierce, impracticable Red-Republicans of Europe, to whom the French Revolution, with all its accompanying horrors, is a sacred memory,-and had become imbued with the spirit of these men, who have no religion but what is embodied in the elevation of the people; who laugh when you say "this people cannot govern themselves," and ask, "To whom then has the good God given the right to govern, and where is the record of his will ? "--who believe that the end justifies the means, and who allow nothing that is called crime to stand in the way of a great purpose. With the news of the coming revolution in Spain, and a knowledge of the projected outbreak in the Island, these young men held meetings of their so-called Philharmonic Society in the city of Puerto Principe, with scarce an attempt at concealment, in which the great mass eagerly urged an immediate resort to the field. The moment seemed especially favorable. It was confidently announced that the Junta of Habana had completed a plan for securing the autonomy of the Island, backed by Spanish bayonets. It was argued that the revolution would prove .neither difficult nor dangerous, and that its accomplishment would be the work of not more than fifteen days; that the few troops in the Island only desired a release from service, and that, owing to the disturbed condition of affairs in Spain, no more could be sent; that the resident Spaniards devoted to industrial pursuits would make no resistance as long as their persons and property were respected; that the countenance, and, if necessary, the material aid of the United States would be

given to the cause, and that a fleet of privateers, monitors, and other first-class warvessels, under the Peruvian and Chilian flags, would sweep the Spanish navy out of existence and destroy Spanish commerce. The timid ones, who dreaded emancipation and its effects on the agricultural interests, were quieted by the assurance that stringent vagabond laws would still retain the freedmen upon the estates as laborers.

The voices of those who urged a postponement of the outbreak until they were better prepared were unheeded in the whirl of excitement. Messengers from Cespedes began to arrive, bringing news of continued successes, which added to the enthusiasm, and soon the Camagueyans-as the natives of Puerto Principe are called-began to leave the city in groups, and with scarce any preconcert of action found themselves in the field and in opposition to the government. They took possession of the line of railroad with a view of capturing certain arms which— as they were notified from Havana-had been sent by the government to the department; and afterwards, by strategy, succeeded in getting all the locomotives into their hands. Like wild-fire the revolution spread through the eastern and central departments. The petty Spanish garrisons could not stand before the fierce energy of the patriots, and were driven to the coast, or huddled together in a few interior towns, with the enemy all around them, and on the 1st of January, 1869, the Cubans held possession of more than one-half the Island, with numerous small cities such as Bayamo, Guaimaro, Sibanicú Cascorro, and others. Then was realized the fatal want of preparation. The

DULCE

revolutionists were without arms requisite to capture the sea-port towns, and to hold them against the formidable war-vessels of Spain, and so were compelled to be content with the advantages gained, and-to wait.

At the time of the revolution in Spain in 1868 and the subsequent outbreak in Cuba, General Lersundi, a life long supporter of the Bourbons, was Captain-General at Havana. Though opposed to the Spanish revolution, he rightly considered it his first duty to preserve the Island to Spain, and he adopted the best measures in his power for the accomplishment of that end. There were at the time but ten thousand troops scattered over the Island, and these, without the aid of the navy, could not have held the fortified towns on the coast for a day. Indeed it may fairly be stated, that had the Cubans been at all prepared for the struggle upon which they had entered, and been guided by competent leaders, they could easily have seized the fortifications defending the various cities, and obtained such advantages as would have enabled them to dictate terms to the government. The number of able-bodied Spaniards residing in the Island was not far from 200,ooo, who, though engaged in the various branches of industry and intent on accumulating property, were intensely patriotic to the mother country.

Lersundi, with a quick appreciation of the dangers before him, realizing that in the unsettled condition of Spain he could not expect immediate aid from her, immediately organized these Spaniards into battalions and armed them with the most approved weapons. In a few weeks the Cubans found themselves confronted by a large and well-appointed army, which, though it might not be eager to take the field against them, could hold the cities and fortifications for the government.

These Spanish volunteers of Cuba, though they have acquired a reputation by no means enviable, are as fine a body of citizen soldiery as can be found in any country. Their hatred toward the Cubans at the commencement of the insurrection was intensé, incited not only by political antagonism, but also by the contemptuous treatment they habitually received prior to the outbreak. For the most part of very humble origin, a hardworking, thrifty race, they were socially looked down upon by the Creoles with much the same hauteur with which the Cavalier regarded the Roundheads.

The course pursued by the volunteers during the first months of the insurrection and of their organization forced many of the more