management, no profits to be impaired by incompetency. As a matter of fact, a public officer who dares to select his subordinates for fitness alone, so far from gaining reputation, is apt to be looked upon as cold-blooded and selfish, and indifferent to the claims of party. Nor does dishonesty, unless it involves an actual theft of money, produce any apparent deficit. The most common species of dishonesty in public officers,-collusion with defrauders of the revenue, the staying of the penalties of the law against wrong-doers, the corrupt letting of profitable contracts and the like—although resulting in a loss to the Government no less real than an actual theft of money from its vaults, do not like that produce any apparent deficit in its accounts. From the very nature the last year. Compelled as they were by the commissions under which they acted, and by popular expectation, to report some practicable plan for the reformation of the service, it is difficult to see what other conclusion they could have reached. It is true that the plan has been freely criticised, and that objections have been made to it by many whose sincere devotion to the reform cannot be doubted. But it is to be observed that the critics of the plan adopted have failed to suggest any other in lieu of it, although they seem to be haunted by the notion that the best men can be chosen by some unexplained mode of selection, without any formal examination. The idea, so far as it has assumed any tangible shape, seems to be that public servants shall be chosen in the same manner that Mr. Alexander T. Stewart chooses his of the case, no such tests can be applied to the clerks. But wherein does this plan differ from choosing of public officials as to the selection the old one? Every appointing officer is un- of servants in private business. But this arder a moral, often indeed a legal, obligation gument, it may be said, applies only to the to select the best men that can be got for his selection of fit persons by the appointing subordinates, but how ineffectual this obliga- power, may not an independent and imtion is to prevent unfit appointments, the partial board select good men for public country knows. Personal and political in- places, without examination? Most emphatfluences, which have no force in private busi- | ically, no! Why should it? If the officers ness, intervene to prevent the selection of the who are responsible for the proper transaction best. The case of a public officer is alto- of the public business, and who must theregether different from that of Mr. Stewart. In fore require some degree of fitness in at least the latter's case, his profits are directly depend- a portion of their subordinates, are faithless ent upon the fidelity and efficiency of his ser- to their trust, when considerations so weighty vants. His object in conducting his business require fidelity, why should an irresponsible is not the benevolent one of providing places board, governed by no such considerations, for personal and political friends, but the be faithful? The appointing officers, unless more practical one of making money. Every entirely callous to public censure and indifworthless clerk who secures a place under ferent to their own success, have some degree him diminishes his profits to the amount of of pride and interest in the right performance the salary paid, while dishonesty would ruin of the public business for which they are rehim. The competition of trade is so sharp, sponsible, although that pride and interest that he who disregards fitness in his servants may be largely neutralized by other influences. in business must go to the wall. But boards, unless tied down to a rigid mode interest, the motive power in trade, forbids of procedure, as are those acting under the the employment of slothful or incompetent present Civil Service Rules, would have no men. The eye of the master must be such feeling. The failure to select good men ever on the watch if he hopes to hold his would affect them but remotely, and their interest in reform would be likely to be overcome by the desire to secure their own personal or political advantage by conciliating the politicians. Boards, for whatever purpose constituted, from the fact that the responsibility for their action is divided among their individual members, are proverbially careless, and often corrupt in their action. Boards for the selection of persons for the Civil Service according to their arbitrary notions of the fitness of the candidates, without any prescribed method of examination for testing that fitness, would degenerate into the worst own. Self These incentives to vigilance and economy not only do not exist in public offices, but they are replaced by quite opposite motives. The appointment of a number of incompetent men in the public service does not necessarily produce a loss which appears in the accounts of the Government. It is impossible for any one to say how much of the expense of conducting any office would have been saved, had competency been the only claim recognized in selecting its clerks and officers. There are no dividends dependent on proper instruments of partisanship and patronage that could be devised. How easy it would be for them to see merits in the friends of influential Congressmen and defects in those destitute of orthodox political recommendations! If any question should be raised as to the justice of their action in any case, there would be no inconvenient examination papers to refer to, but the questioner could be silenced by the bland assurance, that in the opinion of the Board the person recommended was the fittest. For these conclusive reasons the Boards should be bound down to rigidly prescribed methods of procedure, the competition should be open to all showing a reasonable degree of capacity and fitness, the examinations should be written and open to inspection, the standards of acquirement should be accurately defined and the whole plan of action should be set forth with precision. By these means only can impartiality be secured. All of these indispensable guarantees are secured by the present system. The distinguishing features of that system are: the division of offices into groups graded upward from the lowest grade of clerks to the chief clerk or assistant of the head of the office; admission to the service at the lowest grades of groups only; the confinement of promotions to grades above the lowest to persons already in the group, provided they pass a certain minimum standard; open written competitive examinations of all applicants showing a reasonable degree of fitness, and furnishing the required evidence as to citizenship, age, health, habits, character, knowlege of the English language, and fidelity to the Union and Constitution, for original entry into the service; similar competition among all the members of the group of whatever grade for promotion to grades above the lowest; the certification of three names, of which the appointing power may take his choice, for each place; the appointment of persons entering the service for probationary terms of six months, during which their conduct and capacity are tested; and the confinement of examinations for admission to the elementary branches of an English education and to practical tests of capacity for the place to be filled, and for promotion to the same subjects, with the addition of questions pertaining to the duties of the office. Heads of bureaus, and all higher officers in Washington, assistant treasurers, and foreign ministers, are excepted from the operation of the rules, while the more important offices in the customs service are brought within them only so far as to ARY make it the duty of the President to appoint subordinates, if it appears on inquiry that they are competent. The operation of the system, it thus appears, is substantially confined to clerks and other minor ministerial officers, all of the principal administrative offices being excepted. This is prudent in the beginning of the system. Although the operation of the rules may doubtless be further extended hereafter with advantage, there are certain great public offices at which it should stop. The opponents of civil service reform argue, that the principle which requires that an examination be held to test the qualifications of a clerk should demand, in order to be consistent with itself, the application of the same test to a cabinet officer. It is to be feared that some of the friends of the measure have been misled by the same reasoning. Although the application of the distinction in some cases may be difficult and somewhat arbitrary, the line should be drawn between the positions which are purely ministerial or routine and those which are administrative, or by which the policy of the Government is shaped. The position of head of bureau in the department at Washington, for instance, is one which seems to fall partly within and partly without the line, but there can be no doubt that the office of cabinet minister does not fall within the principle. It must be unhesitatingly admitted that examinations are entirely inadequate to test the judicial mind, the comprehensive judgment and foresight, the masterly executive power required for such a position. The triumph of a political party means that the people have decreed that the principles and the policy of which that party is the exponent shall be carried out in the administration of the Government. So far as it is necessary that appointments should be political in order to execute the popular will, they must be left to the discretion of the President, who is the representative of that will. The members of the cabinet and some other high offices are of this class. A cabinet officer, in order to successfully aid in carrying out the principles of the dominant party, should be selected from its leaders and should be in full accord with them. A fit man for such a purpose could not be chosen by any examination that could be devised. There is usually a strong popular sentiment that points to certain leading statesmen as justly entitled to such positions-a sentiment more unerring in its operation than any other mode of selection. The triumph of a party means, for instance, that a certain financial policy, which has been one of the issues of the campaign, shall be carried out. To secure that end it is unquestionably necessary that an advocate of that policy should be Secretary of the Treasury. No matter how excellent an executive officer a candidate for the place may be, how thorough his knowledge of political economy, how statesman-like his views on other subjects, if he be not in accord with the majority on this point he cannot be a successful officer. But whether the subordinate officers or clerks of the department share his views is a matter of the profoundest indifference. Their usefulness is no more impaired by not sharing them than that of a clerk in the New York Custom House would be diminished by his being a free-trader, or that of a clerk of a bank-note company by his being a bullionist. General Grant, in the selection of his cabinet officers, has too often ignored this distinction. He has chosen men on account of their executive capacity or because of his personal likings, rather than for their high standing before the country or fitness to represent the views of the people on public questions. Although this plan has made his cabinet much more harmonious than that of Mr. Lincoln, who made the mistake of filling his cabinet with his political rivals; and although he has usually been fortunate in securing efficient executive officers, there rarely has been a time when so little heed was given by Congress to the recommendations of the cabinet officers of a President so strong with the people. This unfortunate result can be ascribed only to the lack of sympathy between them and the leaders of the party in Congress. Certainly, had the recommendations of Mr. Chase or Mr. Seward been so lightly treated as those of some of the members of the present cabinet, they would have thrown up their portfolios in indignation. officer considers himself the servant, not of a party, but of the government. Civil service reform seeks to make the civil service as honorable and as trustworthy as the military or naval, by admitting only worthy persons to it, by confining promotions, as in the army or navy, to members of the service, and by securing permanency of tenure during good behavior. The false theory that under a Republican form of government the civil offices are the legitimate spoils of the successful party might be applied with as much propriety to the army or the navy, and doubtless long since would have been, had it not been apparent that the extension to them of the system of rotation in office would have been fatal to their efficiency, integrity, and pride, and would have made even the conquest of Mexico impossible. Much unnecessary fear has been expressed, that if the doors of the service were thrown open to persons of all shades of politics, the secrets of the Government might be divulged to the opposite party, and be made the occasion of partisan attacks upon the administration. Such a fear can be justified only by the mistaken notion that the public business is the concern not of the whole people, but of the dominant party for the time being. But in truth, members of all parties are equally concerned in the proper transaction of the public business, and an opponent of the party in power has quite as much right to know how the public affairs are managed as its most unflinching supporter. If they are properly managed, no harm can result from making known their condition; if improperly, the sooner the fact is made known the better. The argument, if it has any weight, makes rather in favor of the representation of all political parties in the civil service, so that the fear of exposure may prevent wrong-doing in the interest of the ruling party. The same noThe necessity for such harmony, however, tion, logically carried out, would exclude no more extends to the mere routine or min-members of the minority from the committees isterial officers than to the rank and file of an of Congress lest party secrets should be diarmy. Once esprit de corps is infused into the vulged. civil service by making admission to it a guarantee of integrity and talent, so that it will be considered an honor to be a member of it, and there will be no more reason why a clerk or subordinate officer should be in accord with the ruling party in order to be trustworthy than that a sergeant or lieutenant of the army should be. No distrust was expressed concerning the fidelity of an officer of the army in enforcing the Ku Klux acts because he was a Democrat, for the simple reason that it is well understood that every Civil Service Reform demands that the public business shall be conducted on the same basis as private business; that is to say, that the best men that the salaries command shall be chosen for the Government service. A party triumph, rightly construed, means simply that the majority of the people has decreed that a certain line of public policy shall be pursued; and changes in the public service should be made only so far as is necessary to accomplish that result. So far as the rank and file of the service are concerned, it is a Thanks to the restless opposition of General Butler, who, unable to understand how men intrusted with duties so responsible could be honest, and, hopeful of unearthing some evidence of trickery or chicanery, persuaded the House of Representatives to call for copies of all the questions used in the civil service examinations, the Boards have been enabled to place their examinationpapers before the public, and so to vindicate the wisdom and fairness of the examinations. Unlike the English examiners, who seem concerned to secure for the civil service persons of the requisite social standing rather than practical business capacity, and who have therefore set up so high a standard that only University men or others of equally high training can hope to pass it, the Boards appear to have been careful to so shape their examinations as to test actual present capacity for the public service rather than mere scholastic or literary attainments. The candidate is seated at a desk, and confronted with a day's work, in the shape of an examination quite equal in difficulty to that of any place to which he is likely to be assigned. If he passes the ordeal he cannot fail to be equal to the duties required of him in the department. matter of absolute indifference, in considering their capacity and efficiency, whether they belong to the dominant party or not. The business of most subordinates is as purely mechanical as that of a day laborer upon the public works, and there is no greater reason in the one case than in the other why the person employed should be a good Republican in order to serve a Republican administration efficiently. It is plain that if the debasing system of rotation and patronage is to be overthrown, partisanship must be ignored in making appointments to the minor places in the civil service. To look for its permanent overthrow otherwise, would be to expect that upon a change of parties in the administration of the Government, the incoming party would be content to leave undisturbed in public place the partisan appointees of its predecessor, and to claim for itself the privilege of filling with its own adherents only such vacancies as might casually occur; in other words, that the incoming party would be willing to extend the privilege of holding all the offices for the time being to an opposing party which had refused to open even the casual vacancies to any but its own adherents. When the principles which are to govern the administration of the Government have been settled, the mass of the people has no interest in the distribution of public offices other than that they shall be filled by honest and competent men. So far as a party triumph is perverted to mean anything else in the minds of the people, the perversion is due to the effects of a false and pernicious prac-graphy, and history of the United States, all tice which has been unthinkingly accepted as the natural order of things. Thus far the system of open competition has been applied only to the minor places in the Departments in Washington, and to the offices of the Treasury Department in the city of New York. The information from all sources agrees that it has been as successful as could be hoped, while the salaries of the places are so low, and popular distrust of the sincerity of the reform is so great, and that it is surely winning its way to complete success against the clamors and misrepresentations of prejudice and ignorance, and the active opposition of all grades of politicians who see in the threatened downfall of the old system an end to their political hopes and schemes. That the success of the system has been so great is largely due to the wisdom which has been shown by the Boards of Examiners-composed of practical men selected from the officers of the departments--in conducting their examinations. The examinations for admission to the service are confined to elementary subjects, embracing arithmetic as far as percentage, the elements of book-keeping, orthography, syntax, punctuation, English composition, précis or briefing, and general questions concerning the constitution, geo In embodied, far as possible, in concrete as, filled, it would doubtless be wise to demand it, both because the very best men in every respect should be obtained, thus elevating the tone and character of the service, and because, as all have to enter the service at the lowest point, the examinations for admission are, in one sense, examinations for all the higher grades. But to enforce such a system now is utterly impracticable: first, because the salaries are so low that it is difficult to get men who satisfy the requirements even of the present examinations; and, second, because the mere whisper that the standard for admission was so high that only those possessing a collegiate education could pass it, would excite a storm of popular indignation which would sweep the whole system out of existence. The Boards have done wisely in keeping their examinations upon a simple, practical basis. The general conclusion reached from a consideration of all trustworthy reports concerning it is, that Civil Service Reform is today, in the branches of the service to which its rules have been applied, a real and successful reform. If it can once be put in full operation in all the branches of the Government service, and protected from the assaults of its enemies until it becomes firmly rooted, its merits will be so manifest that it will be able to successfully defy all efforts for its overthrow. THE INSANITY OF CAIN. WHATEVER is startling in the fact of questioning Cain's sanity only goes to prove the simple justice of the doubt. For more than five thousand years humankind has been content to look upon the First Born as a murderer. Each new generation, convicting him as it were without hearing of judge or jury, has felt far more concern that the conviction should be understood as a so-called religious fact than that their remote and defenseless fel. low-creature should have the benefit of human justice. One-tenth of the zeal and candor with which our own Froude has endeavored to make a saint of England's chronic widower might have sufficed to lift a world's weight of obloquy from the shoulders of Cain. But, until to-day, no philosopher has chosen to assume the difficult and delicate task. No jurisprudent has dared to investigate a charge that has been a sort of moral stronghold for ages. So grand a thing is it to be able to point away, far back, deeper and deeper into antiquity, to the very First Families, and say, Behold the fountain-head of our murder record! Doggerel has much to answer for. It has driven many a monstrous wrong into the heart of its century. It has done its worst with Cain, but not the worst. is for Cain, C vitality and power. Generation after generation, taught to loathe his very name, has accepted the statement on general principles. There had to be a first murderer-and why not Cain? Again-why not Abel for the murderee? There was no miasma in that sweet, fresh time; no scope for contagious diseases; there were no pastry-shops, no distilleries, no patent medicines, no blisters, no lancets and no doctors. Consequently, there was no way for a man to die unless somebody killed him. Cain did this thing for Abel. That we do not dispute; nor that he did it gratis and unsolicited. But was he a murderer? Setting aside the possibility that Abel's time had not come, are we to judge Cain by the face of his deed ? May there not have been palliating conditions, temperamental causes? In a word, was he sane? For centuries, ages, the world has overlooked the tremendous considerations involved in this question, placidly branding an unfortunate man with deepest ignominy and taking it for granted that his deed was deliberate, the act of a self-poised, calculating and guilty mind. Let us see. In the first place, Cain, for a time, was the only child on earth! That in itself was enough to disturb the strongest juvenile organism. All the petting, nursing, trotting, coddling, and watching of the whole civilized world falling upon one pair of baby shoulders! Naturally the little fellow soon considered himself a person of consequence-all-absorbing consequence, in fact. Then came Abel, disturbing and upsetting his dearest convic |