guided the foreign policy of the United States from 1861 to 1865 as closely as he directed its military campaigns until 1864, when he yielded the responsibility to General Grant; and, although the public gave the credit to Seward, the members of the Cabinet, the foreign committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and others intimately associated with that branch of the administration recognized his genius in all the larger attributes of diplomacy. The untrained lawyer from the prairies without hesitation assumed the responsibility of conducting the foreign policy of the government in the most critical period of its existence, and revised the diplomatic correspondence of his Secretary of State, who had the reputation of being one of the most subtle and far-sighted statesmen of his age. But the developments showed that Lincoln alone had a complete grasp of a situation unprecedented in our history.

He was a diplomatist by nature, and developed the talent early. When a boy, he was selected as umpire at wrestling-matches, cock-fights, horse- and foot-races, and other rude sports of the neighborhood because his associates had confidence in his judgment and honesty. Because he had tact, in addition to those qualities, he was the peacemaker and court of appeals in quarrels; the referee in disputes; the arbiter in controversies concerning literature, theology, woodcraft, and morals. His decisions were rarely, if ever, questioned. He had a rule for evading difficulties which was expressed in a homely remark to Mr. Seward, who jokingly remarked at a Cabinet meeting one day,

"Mr. President, I hear that you turned out for a colored woman on a muddy crossing the other day."

"I don't remember," answered Lincoln, musingly; "but I think it very likely, for I have always made it a rule that if people won't turn out for me I will for them. If I didn't there would be a collision."

And he always avoided collisions. It was not because

he lacked courage or confidence. Obstinacy is often mistaken for courage, and, as one of Lincoln's advisers remarked, "Political graveyards are filled with buried ambitions and crushed hopes because of that mistake, which Mr. Lincoln never made." He never allowed an antagonist to fathom his thoughts or to see the line along which he was working. He gave way in matters of small importance to secure a firmer position to fight a more important battle. He overcame obstacles and escaped entanglements by the exercise of this faculty called diplomacy, without surrendering a principle or making an important concession.

General Fry, who was Provost-Marshal of the War Department and received daily instructions from the President in regard to the draft for troops, which was one of the most embarrassing and perplexing questions that arose during the war, illustrates this peculiar trait by an anecdote. He says,―

"Upon one occasion the Governor of a State came to my office bristling with complaints in relation to the number of troops required from his State, the details for drafting the men, and the plan of compulsory service in general. I found it impossible to satisfy his demands, and accompanied him to the Secretary of War's office, whence, after a stormy interview with Stanton, he went alone to press his ultimatum upon the highest authority. After I had waited anxiously for some hours, expecting important orders or decisions from the President, or at least a summons to the White House for explanation, the Governor returned, and said, with a pleasant smile, that he was going home by the next train, and merely dropped in en route to say good-by. Neither the business he came upon nor his interview with the President was alluded to.

"As soon as I could see Lincoln, I said, 'Mr. President, I am very anxious to learn how you disposed of Governor He went to your office from the War

Department in a towering rage. I suppose you found it necessary to make large concessions to him, as he returned from you entirely satisfied.'

“Oh, no,' he replied, 'I did not concede anything. You know how that Illinois farmer managed the big log that lay in the middle of his field? To the inquiries of his neighbors, one Sunday, he announced that he had got rid of the big log. "Got rid of it!" said they," how did you do it? It was too big to haul out, too knotty to split, and too wet and soggy to burn; what did you do?" "Well, now, boys,” replied the farmer, “if you won't divulge the secret, I'll tell you how I got rid of it. I ploughed around it." Now,' said Lincoln, ' don't tell anybody, but that's the way I got rid of Governor I ploughed around him, but it took me three mortal hours to do it, and I was afraid every moment he'd see what I was at.'

Those who were associated with Lincoln noticed the rapid development of his diplomatic talent. In meeting emergencies he constantly surprised them by the manifestation of a capacity to grapple with hidden and unknown difficulties that could have been possessed only by so strong and deep a nature. His secretaries testify that he could receive any kind of tidings without emotion or variation in face and manner. He never seemed to hear anything with reference to itself," one of them described it, "but solely with a quick forward grasping for the consequences; for what must be done next. The announcement of a defeat or disaster did not bring to him the blow only, but rather the consideration of a counter-stroke. With a calm, sublime reliance upon God and the everlasting principles of right, he was able to conduct the nation through the most tremendous civil war ever waged and never committed a serious mistake."

Lincoln was pre-eminently a Democrat because he believed in a government of the people by the people

for the people. His early training, his contact with " the plain people," as he loved to call them, his knowledge of their prejudices and preferences, their habits of thought and methods of judgment, enabled him to judge accurately of public opinion, and his deep sympathy with them gave him confidence that whatever met their approval was right and just. That explains his loyal obedience to the will of the majority, his refusal to adopt radical measures, and his strength of purpose when he believed that his plans would be approved by them. His critics asserted that his procrastination with McClellan, his postponement of the emancipation of the slaves, and his apparent reluctance to act upon measures which were considered necessary to the salvation of the country were signs of weakness and cowardice; but no man éver showed greater courage when he felt that he was right.

When Lincoln came to Washington he had no experience in diplomacy or statesmanship; as an attorney, he had dealt only with local and State statutes; as a legislator, his experience was limited to provincial affairs; his only knowledge of the operations of the general government was acquired during the two years he was in Congress and from books that he read. He had never argued a case before the Supreme Court, he had never studied international law, he knew nothing of the organization of armies, and he was unfamiliar with the relations between the Chief Executive and his Cabinet; but we have seen in Chapter V. how promptly, firmly, and conclusively, and at the same time with what tact and diplomacy, he rebuked Seward's suggestion that he should surrender the prerogatives of his office to the Secretary of State, how positive yet how gentle was his treatment of Frémont, and how thorough his knowledge of the laws of nations is disclosed by his correspondence concerning the movement of troops through Maryland and Virginia, regarding the suspension of the writ of

habeas corpus, the arrest of Vallandigham, and especially in connection with the Emancipation Proclamation.

President Lincoln made it a rule never to deny or explain any charge against himself, nor to reply to an attack, except when the fortunes of his country seemed to be involved; and when he did make reply it was always complete and satisfactory.

Almost the very moment that he crossed the threshold of the White House Lincoln was confronted with the gravest diplomatic problem of his experience, and its solution required not only knowledge of precedent but skill in argument. The claim of the Confederacy to be recognized as a nation by the powers of Europe had practically been waived by President Buchanan when he admitted that the Federal government had no authority to keep a State in the Union if it desired to secede. This admission had been confirmed by the apparent acquiescence in the withdrawal of South Carolina and other States; by the organization of the Confederacy at Montgomery without interference or protest; by the failure to reinforce Fort Sumter; and by Buchanan's practical abdication of executive power when, in hist message of January 8, 1861, he threw the entire responsibility of the situation upon Congress.

All through these rapid and radical changes the foreign powers received no official explanation or information from the Department of State at Washington, and were left to draw their own inferences from the news which appeared in the public press, until February 28, when Jeremiah S. Black, for a few weeks Secretary of State, issued a circular instructing our representatives at foreign capitals that the government of the United States had not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction anywhere within its territory and did not intend to do so. In the same circular he gave instructions that a recognition of the Confederacy must not be allowed.