iar form of mental blindness. Perhaps the point will be more comprehensible if we call it "department paralysis." Our vision seems to be strictly limited to our own departments or spheres of action. In this way every department on a railroad is loyal to itself and more or less forgetful of the other departments. For example, the operating department is responsible for the care and prompt movement of trains. In a general way it is taken for granted that these movements must be made with safety as well as dispatch. And yet, looking into the matter closely, we are able to discover that dispatch and not safety is the main feature and business. Unfortunately there is no safety department on a railroad, or rather safety takes pot-luck in all the departments. Altogether, safety finds it no easy matter to secure recognition, and city governments, railroad commissioners, and railroad officials all seem to suffer from department paralysis upon occasions when loyalty to the interests of the traveling public would seem to demand a much clearer and wider vision. To all appearances it is impossible for these departments to see beyond the precincts of their own particular hobby or vocation. Let us take a very pertinent illustration:

The other day in the vicinity of Boston several teams were smashed and two persons were killed at a well-known and very dangerous crossing. It being Christmas time, there had been an almost continuous procession of vehicles all day long over the crossing. At a moment when perhaps the crush was greatest, the gong in the gate-house gave warning that an express train was approaching. Immediately there ensued a wild scramble to hustle the stream of humanity over the crossing and out of the way of the train. It was no easy task for the gateman. Regardless of the descending gates, a number of teams, unable to turn aside, made a final dash to get to the other side. To drop the gates on the backs of the horses was out of the question, and as a last resort, frantic yet useless attempts were made to

flag the approaching train. In the midst of the excitement the flyer dashed upon the scene with disastrous results.

The following day the accident was thoroughly and fearlessly discussed in the newspapers. There was no difference of opinion on the subject. Practically speaking, everyone representing the state, the city, the railroad, and the newspapers, agreed to concentrate their minds on the grade-crossing problem. It should be abolished. This is the universal "hobby and a good one, no doubt, but apparently no one can see an inch farther. The questions why and how people are killed almost every day at these crossings received no attention whatever. Public opinion, not unreasonably perhaps, is satisfied with the assurance that everything humanly and reasonably possible under the circumstances was done by the railroad men concerned in it to get the teams out of the way of the trains. But it did not occur to any one that the whole system of keeping teams out of the way of trains is inherently and inexcusably wrong. The list of victims who are sacrifices to this popular mistake is being added to daily. If the public has any right at all on these crossings it goes without question that, while they are making use of their rights and in the act of crossing, their safety should depend, not upon their efforts to scramble out of the way of the trains, but upon the moral and legal obligation of the railroads to keep the trains out of the way of the vehicles.

This view, of course, is based on the supposition that the safety of the public is of more importance than the speed of the trains over these crossings. In the case we are now considering, if an empty coal car had been on the crossing it would have been amply protected from the passenger train. Not only is this true, but the tracks of another railroad cross this highway diagonally at this point, and while trains are crossing they are doubly protected by semaphore targets and derailing switches. Teams, however, and passengers on foot have to depend on emergency arrange

ments which, as we all know, are practically useless. If railroads can afford to protect their rolling-stock in the way described, the interests and property of the public might reasonably be expected to receive equal consideration. In plain language, the pressing of a button in crossing-houses, in connection with proper signals, would give the public the protection so urgently called for. Altogether the foregoing may be taken as a very good object lesson on the safety problem on our railroads.

For the rest, the interest and significance of this article will be sadly misunderstood if the impression is in any way derived from it that the railroad employee is singled out and must stand alone as an object of adverse criticism. As a matter of fact, a volume can be written in our defense. Only too many of us can remember the time when a deserving employee could be, and frequently was, discharged on the flimsiest pretext. His breakfast disagreed with a yard-master or he happened to have domestic troubles on his mind: for less reason than this good men were sent packing. Not ten years ago the service on New England railroads swarmed with favorites and brothers-inlaw. Faithful old employees were sent adrift without a moment's warning or sympathy, to make room for youngsters with a "pull." Many an honest old servitor, not so very long ago either, with

service." But we have changed all that. Nevertheless, these things rankle. They say history repeats itself. Justice certainly does, and as for injustice it reacts and rebounds, and perhaps, after many days, it returns and demands a settlement at compound interest. The situation to-day between labor and capital is but a chapter in the natural history of the instinct of self-defense.

Finally, in regard to the lack of loyalty to the world at large, the railroad employee is far from being the only offender. While it may be said to be strictly unintentional, this lack of loyalty covers our railroads as with a blanket. The illustrations given above have been chosen with strict impartiality, and regardless of the personality of the offenders. With the panorama of railroad life before us, as I have endeavored to sketch it, we railroad men should be able to contemplate the conditions and our conduct in relation to them, as in a looking-glass. While the writer's sincere desire from beginning to end has been to avoid giving unnecessary offense to any one, yet it should not be forgotten that to take away life, either needlessly or heedlessly, on a railroad is an offense against society that calls for the utmost rigor of treatment.

It is of course manifest that no system of banking or currency that was ever devised can afford a sure protection against financial crises and panics. Bank runs happen everywhere. If it suddenly came out, in England, France, Germany, Canada, that an important bank was in trouble, the news accompanied by a crashing of prices in the stock markets, and followed in two or three days by the unexpected stoppage of a large deposit-holding institution, believed to be sound and solid, it is pretty certain that runs on banks would develop, and that panicky conditions would prevail.

It is said of some of the ablest stockmarket operators that they like at times, when conducting important campaigns, to go away a little distance from Wall Street, where they can shake themselves free from the thousand and one rumors and factors which often serve to obscure and confuse the judgment of those on the spot.

In the same way, when it comes to the matter of determining the causes and development of the panic of 1907, there is something to be said in favor of a viewpoint a little removed from the turmoil and strife of the battleground. Such a view-point exists in the head offices, in Montreal and Toronto, of the big Canadian banks that have agencies in Wall Street. As these banks habitually employ a large part of their available reserves in New York call loans, as they take a respectable share of the dealings in foreign exchange in New York, and invest part of their surplus funds, when they have them, in American railroad bonds, the men in charge of them make it their business at all times to inform themselves pretty thoroughly about United States conditions. They have no axes to grind in the

United States; they have no direct interest in American politics or finance, except that they wish the latter to be sound and stable. The opinions and conclusions they form are therefore apt to be based strictly on the merits of the questions considered. They have a further advantage. The Canadian people are not radically different from the people of the States. General conditions in the Dominion and in the northern half of the Republic are not at all dissimilar. It is an advantage, when studying American conditions, to have knowledge of what effects are produced when a different system of banking is applied to people and to conditions resembling the American people and American conditions.

Ask any Canadian general manager what is the real trouble in the States, and he will probably say, "the banking system." From his view-point he can see clearly that the fact of the banking business being in the hands of six thousand odd institutions, each one with its president, directors, and complete organization, and many of the officers having little real knowledge of the science of banking, is the prime financial disability under which the great Republic staggers. Compared with this defect the currency question is of minor importance. If the defect of the banking system were removed, the currency problem would be easy of solution. It is seen clearly enough in Canada that this doctrine gets but short shrift with United States bankers. The six thousand bank presidents, the six thousand boards of directors and their friends can see no good in the inauguration of branch banks because it would mean that they would be superseded by the branch manager. Therefore branch banks are "politically impossible." If the American people –

the discounters and depositors, that is, not the bankers ever got anything like

a fair idea of the benefits that would be theirs if they possessed a system of strong branch banks owned and operated as such banks are in other highly civilized countries, they would never tolerate the present system. They would fare better not only in times of panic and in times of special stress, such as crop-moving, but every day in every year. It will be well worth while to sketch briefly the kind of banks from which the most benefit might be expected, and to explain the chief points in which they would be superior to the isolated banks.

This can best be done perhaps by supposing that instead of the thousands of independent banking offices there were one hundred and fifty or two hundred banks, each one having from fifty to five hundred branches. (The Report of the Comptroller of the Currency shows that on June 18, 1906, there were in the United States 6053 national banks, and 11,852 state banks of various kinds; in all 17,905. This total is now exceeded. Lloyd's Bank, one of the great English banks, has five hundred branches.)

These large banks, instead of having names of purely local significance, such as First National Bank of Albany, or Poughkeepsie National Bank, would be called after the great cities, states, and sections, or after important industries. Among them probably would be the Bank of New York, Bank of Philadelphia, of Chicago, of Boston, Bank of Massachusetts, of Pennsylvania, of Virginia, Northwestern Bank, Bank of the Pacific Coast, Merchants' Bank of America, and others. Though taking their names from certain cities and states, their operations would not be confined in narrow limits. Each one of the more important institutions would have its branch office in every big centre, with scores of other branch offices in the respective districts tributary thereto.

The first thing to strike an observer about such a system would be the enor

mous economy of administration that would result. The branch manager would replace the president, board, and organization in over twelve thousand banking offices. It may be assumed also that he would do the work better than they now do it. He would be a trained banker, having come up from the bottom, and having served in various districts and localities. Besides, he would be controlled and guided by the best banking talent in the whole country. Another inevitable result would be the pushing of branch offices into thousands of places not now possessing banking facilities (because of the greater economy of working). A banking office would pay on a much smaller volume of business. In Canada there is hardly a hamlet, in the east or west, with three hundred people, that does not possess its branch office of a strong chartered bank, which will accept deposits of from one dollar upwards, allowing interest thereon, and lend to every worthy borrower, small and big, who can furnish proper bankable security.

Constitution of the Banks

The constitution of these big branch banks would be an important matter.They would stand the better chance of gaining and keeping the confidence of the general public if they were constituted similarly to the Canadian banks. The stock of each bank in the Dominion is widely distributed all over the country, a large part of it in odd lots of less than ten shares. The presidents and directors would be chiefly merchants and business men following callings apart from promotions, stock speculations, and the like. The banks would be devoted to commercial banking, that is to say they would employ their resources mainly in discounting commercial paper. There would be also a few banks specializing in financial business. These, however, would not extend their branches into the small places; their offices would be found only in the large cities.

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