circuit shook the fortress with the thun- federate Congress. "I cannot refrain," says he, in that document, "from a well deserved tribute to the noble State, the eminent soldierly qualities of whose people were so conspicuously displayed in the port of Charleston. For months they had been irritated by the spectacle of a fortress held within their principal harbor, as a standing menace against their peace and independence. Built in part with their own money, its custody confided with their own consent to an agent who held no power over them, other than such as they had themselves delegated for their own benefit, intended to be used by that agent for their own protection against foreign attack, they saw it held with persistent tenacity as a means of offence against them by the very government which they had established for their protection. They had beleagured it for months-felt entire confidence in their power to capture it—yet yielded to the requirements of discipline, curbed their impatience, submitted without complaint to the unaccustomed hardships, labors and privations of a protracted siege; and when at length their patience was rewarded by the signal for attack, and success had crowned their steady and gallant conduct-even in the very moment of triumph-they evinced a chivalrous regard for the feelings of the brave but unfortunate officer who had been compelled to lower his flag. All manifestations of exultation were checked in his presence. Their commanding general, with their cordial approval and the consent of his Government, refrained from imposing any terms that could wound the sensibilites of the commander of the fort. He was permitted to retire with the honors of war-to salute his flag, to depart freely with all his ders of their salutation, the feeling that the victory was indeed complete; that the triumph was a fact accomplished; that liberty had indeed been vindicated, and that the State had established her claim to the skill and courage necessary to the cause she had the intellectual intrepidity to avow, thrilled in the breast of every one of Carolina's sons, as seldom has such feeling thrilled in the breasts of any men before. Shortly after the arrival, the garrison marched out, and were received on board the Isabel; which, however, from the condition of the tide was unable to move off, and it was a somewhat unpleasant circumstance that Major Anderson and his command should have been made unwilling spectators of the exultations inspired by their defeat." We may indeed, severely as all patriots must censure the fatal policy of the attack upon Fort Sumter, and the wicked counsels of the conspirators against the peace and happiness of the nation which inspired it, allow the authorities at Charleston credit for a certain generosity in their manner of proceeding after the work was taken though it would have added to their claims to respect, if the firing had not been so ruthlessly continued, and even augmented, when the fort was in flames. The leaders appear to have been touched by the gallantry of the defenders. In their own view of the matter, they doubtless thought they were making considerable concessions to a fallen foe in the easy and honorable terms of surrender. What that point of view was, and how the capitulation was represented at the South, we may learn from an extraordinary passage in the Message at the close of the month, of President Jefferson Davis to his Con MAJOR ANDERSON'S DESPATCH. 109 flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private property and saluting my flag with fifty guns."* command, and was escorted to the vessel prior to the commencement of hostilities, in which he embarked with the highest and marched out of the fort Sunday marks of respect from those against afternoon, the 14th inst., with colors whom his guns had been so recently directed. Not only does every event connected with the siege reflect the highest honor on South Carolina, but the forbearance of her people, and of this government, of making any harsh use of a victory obtained under circumstances of such peculiar provocation, attest to the fullest extent the absence of any purpose beyond securing their own tranquility, and the sincere desire to avoid the calamities of war." Major Anderson, with his command, remained Sunday night in the harbor on board the Isabel. On Monday morning they were transported to the steamer Baltic, and sailed immediately for the north. When the men were all embarked, the flag of Sumter was raised to the mast head and saluted by the guns of the Baltic, the Pocahontas, the Pawnee and Harriet Lane. As the ship entered the bay of New York, on the morning of the 18th, the flag was again elevated and greeted with the salutes of the forts and the cheers of enthusiastic spectators. On his approach to the harbor, while off Sandy Hook, Major Anderson addressed this brief despatch to the Secretary of War:-" Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge wall seriously injured, the magazine surrounded by flames and its doors closed from the effects of the heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no provisions but pork remaining, I accepted terms of evacuation offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the 11th inst., Captain Foster's Engineer journal of the bombardment, published with the Annual Report of the War Department, presents us with many interesting particulars of the defence in an authentic form. It appears from this that for a few days preceding the attack, when the enemy's batteries were first unmasked on Sullivan's Island, there was great activity in the fort in providing additional security for the working of the heavy guns on the parapet, which were intended to operate upon Fort Moultrie and Cummings' Point, and in preparing means for quickly unloading any vessel which might run in with supplies for the garrison. In the absence of sand-bags a heavy double curb of boards and scantling, to serve as a traverse or screen for the protection of the gunners, was raised by night to the parapet and filled with earth, which had been hoisted from the parade. Ladders and runaways were provided to take in reinforcements and provisions at the embrasures, one of which was enlarged to the size of a barrel. On the 9th of Apri. the quantity of bread is reported as "very small," and only half-rations of it were allowed to the men. The next day it failed entirely, and its place was supplied by "picking over some damaged rice, which, while spread out during the day in one of the quarters had been filled with pieces of glass from the window panes shattered by the concussion of guns fired in practice." It being found * Major Anderson to the Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary (1 War, steamship Baltic, off Sandy Hook, April 18, 1861. that there were few cartridges on hand, the surplus blankets and extra company clothing were cut up to make bags for an additional supply. The manufacture, however, proceeded slowly, for there were but six needles to work with in the fort. At the commencement of the action the entire armament consisted of twenty-seven guns mounted en barbette, of which two were 10-inch columbiads, six 8-inch columbiads, six 42-pounders, three 32's, six 24's, and four 8-inch seacoast howitzers; of twenty-one guns, four 42-pounders and the rest 32pounders in the lower casemate tier-the embrasures of the upper were filled with brick and stone and earth-while on the parade one 10-inch columbiad was arranged to throw shells into Charleston, and four 8-inch columbiads to throw shells into the batteries on Cummings' Point. Of all these, the casemate guns were the only ones used. The supply of cartridges, seven hundred in number, with which the action commenced, became so much reduced by the middle of the first day that "although the six needles were kept steadily employed" the firing was of necessity confined to six guns. The effect of the fire Captain Foster admits was not very good, which he attributes to the insufficient calibre of the guns for the long range. Not much damage, he says, "appeared to be done to any of the batteries except those of Fort Moultrie where our two 42-pounders appeared to have silenced one gun for a time, to have injured the embrasures considerably, riddled the barracks and quarters, and torn three holes through their flag. The so-called 'floating battery' was struck very frequently by our shot, one of them penetrating at the angle between the front and roof, entirely The through the iron covering and woodwork beneath, and wounding one man. rest of the 32-pounder balls failed to penetrate the front or the roof, but were deflected from their surfaces, which were arranged at a suitable angle for this purpose. We could not strike below the water-line on account of the sea-wall behind which the battery had been grounded, and which was just high enough to allow their guns to fire over it and to intercept all our ricochet shots. The columbiad battery and Dahlgren battery near the floating battery did not appear to be much injured by the few shots that were fired at them. Only one or two shots were fired at Fort Johnson, and none at Castle Pinckney or the city. Our fire towards Morris' Island was mainly directed at the iron-clad battery, but the small calibre of our shot failed to penetrate the covering when struck fairly. The aim was therefore taken at the embrasures, which were struck at least twice, disabling the guns for a time." In regard to the fire from the enemy and its effect upon the fort, Captain Foster states that "the vertical fire was so well directed and so well sustained that from the seventeen mortars engaged in firing 10-inch shells, one half of the shells came within or exploded above the parapet of the fort and only about ten buried themselves in the soft earth of the parade without exploding. In consequence of this precision of vertical fire Major Anderson decided not to man the upper tier of guns, as by doing so the loss of men, notwithstanding the traverses and bomb-proof shelters that I had constructed, must have been great. These guns were therefore fired only once or twice by some men who ven CAPTAIN FOSTER'S REPORT 111 tured upon the parapet for this purpose. able three barbette guns, knock off large In doing this they managed without much portions of the chimneys and brick walls care, producing little or no effect upon projecting above the parapet, and to set the enemy, besides doing injury to the the quarters on fire with hot shot.' guns. At the third fire of the 10-inch columbiad at the right gorge angle it was omitted to throw the friction wheels out of bearing, and consequently, in the recoil, the gun ran entirely off its chassiz, overturning itself, and in its fall dismounting the 8-inch sea coast howitzer next to it. The direction of the enemy's shells being from the north-east, north, southwest and south-east, sought every part of the work, and the fuses being well graduated, exploded, in most instances, just within the line of parapet. To this kind of fire no return was made from the columbiads arranged to fire shell, nor were the hot shot furnaces used or opened. The effect of the direct fire of the enemy was not so marked as the vertical. For several hours from the commencement a large proportion of their shot missed the fort. An 8-inch columbiad of the upper tier was dismounted, and another struck on its side and cracked by the guns of Fort Moultrie. Three of the iron cisterns over the hall-ways were destroyed by shots during the day, and the quarters below deluged by their contents of water, aiding in preventing the extension of the fires. The enemy's fire on the second day was more rapid and effective. None of the upper tier of guns, however, were dismounted. After the cessation of fire about six hundred shot marks on the face of the scarp wall were counted, but they were so scattered that no breached effect could have been expected from such fire, and probably none was attempted except at the right gorge angle. The only effect of the direct fire during the two days was to dis Nothwithstanding, however, the terrible fire of the descending shells and the conflagration of the quarters, the fort, Captain Foster thinks, might have been held for some time had it not been for other insurmountable difficulties. "We could," he says, "have resumed the firing as soon as the walls cooled sufficient to open the magazines; and then having blown down the wall left projecting above the parapet, so as to get rid of flying bricks, and built up the main gates with stones and rubbish, the fort would actually have been in a more defensible condition than when the action commenced. In fact it would have been better if the chimneys, roofs and upper walls of the quarters and barracks had been removed before the firing began, but the short notice and the small force did not permit anything of this kind after the notice of the attack was received. The weakness of the defence principally lay in the lack of cartridge bags and of the materials to make them, by which the fire of our batteries was all the time rendered slow, and towards the last was nearly suspended. The lack of a sufficient number of men to man the barbette tier of guns, at the risk of losing several by the heavy vertical fire of the enemy, also prevented us making use of the only guns that had the power to smash his iron-clad batteries, or of throwing shells into his open batteries so as to destroy his cannoniers. The want of provisions would soon have caused the surrender of the fort, but with plenty of cartridges the men would have cheerfully fought five or six days, and, if necessary, much longer, on pork alone, of which we had a sufficient supply. I do not think that a breach could have been effected in the gorge at the distance of the battery on Cummings' Point within a week or ten days; and even then, with the small garrison to defend it, and means for obstructing it at our disposal, the operation of assaulting it, with even vastly superior numbers, would have been very doubtful in its results."* Having thus briefly narrated the fortunes of Fort Sumter and its gallant defenders during the bombardment, we may turn to contemplate more particularly the means by which the capture was effected. The well contrived battery at Cummings' Point, where the guns were pointed from a shelving defence constructed of railroad iron, admirably adapted for the protection of those within, by throwing off opposing balls at an angle, was most effective in its discharges against the fort. Its contiguity to the less defended side of the fort also aided its destructiveness. The guns of this battery, which were admitted by Major Anderson to have been well handled, numbered three 8-inch or 64-pound columbiads, from which were fired during the combat one hundred and eighty-three solid shot and sixty shells. The distance was about twelve hundred yards, a short range for these powerful missives. In addition to this Stevens or Iron Battery, worked by a detachment of the Palmetto Guard, there were mounted at the Point on Morris' Island two 42-pound guns, six 10-inch mortars and a 12-pounder imported Blakely rifle cannon, all of which were efficient in sweeping the exposed places of the fort. Nearly four * Engineer Journal of the Bombardment of Fort Sumter, by Captein J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A. New York October 1, 1861. hundred shells and as many solid shot were thrown from these works. Sullivan's Island, on the opposite side, mounted no less than six distinct batteries bearing on Fort Sumter at various distances. The most important of these was the Sumter Battery of Fort Moultrie, commanded by Lieutenant Alfred Rhett. There were in this battery three 64pound columbiads, two 32 and four 24-pounders, from which were discharged six hundred and fifty shots, including two hundred and forty-eight 64-pound balls and forty-one red hot 32-pound balls. The distance is about eighteen hundred yards. Other batteries to the right and left mounted eleven guns of heavy calibre and four 10-inch mortars, discharging more than a thousand solid shot and some two hundred and fifty shells. There were also the Mount Pleasant mortar battery and two others on James Island, mounting altogether six 10-inch mortars. From fourteen batteries, in all, mounting forty-two heavy guns and mortars, well manned and in full action, were thrown more than three thousand balls and shells. The exact number is stated at two thousand three hundred and sixty-one shot and nine hundred and eighty shells." The number of men actively employed in the circuit of the Confederate works, may with moderation be stated as exceeding three thousand. The force in reserve would swell the number to seven or eight thousand. · * Fort Sumter was constructed for three tiers of guns, two in casemated batteries, and the third en barbette. To man its entire armament when complete, of one hundred and forty guns, would require the services of at least six hundred men. The * These details are from an elaborate article published in the Charleston Mercury, May 2, 3. |