T CHAPTER XXI GRANT IS MADE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF § 1 HE Federal army, under the command of General and the Confederates, under General Braxton Bragg, sat on the encircling hills waiting for the Federals to starve down to the level of mule meat, hard tack and white flags. All the railroads that entered Chattanooga were held by Bragg. The Tennessee river is navigable up to the town, but a Confederate battery, and a swarm of sharp-shooters, posted near the foot of Lookout Mountain, prevented any steamboats with food or reënforcements from coming up. The only line of supply still open was over a wagon road sixty miles long that ran across desperately steep hills to Bridgeport, Alabama. But this route was hopelessly impracticable as a means of supplying the 40,000 soldiers of Rosecrans' army. The horses sank in the semi-liquid mud up to their bellies; the loads had to be light; and sometimes it took a wagon train four days to make the trip from Bridgeport. Besides these natural obstacles the wagon trains were raided frequently by Confederate cavalry. Rosecrans was a competent general who had become mentally paralyzed by defeat. On September 19 and 20, 1863, he had been badly beaten at the battle of Chickamauga and driven into his works around Chattanooga. Thereafter he seems to have lost every trace of initiative, and settled down quietly to await starvation. The Union army was pinched by famine. Charles A. Dana wrote that when he reached Chattanooga, after a ride Food Inspires Army 303 from Bridgeport, his supper consisted of one square of fried hard-tack with a tiny piece of salted pork and a cup of coffee without sugar or milk. Guards were posted daily at feeding time over the horse troughs to keep the soldiers from stealing the horses' corn. Now, Grant-with the aura of victory around him-arrived. He was still on crutches, and had to be helped off his horse. He and his staff rode over from Bridgeport in a drizzling rain, along a trail of wretchedness that was marked by the bodies of more than ten thousand dead horses and mules. This was on October 22, 1863. Before leaving Louisville he had relieved Rosecrans from command by a telegram, and had put Major-General George H. Thomas, the next officer in rank, in his place. Of course, Grant intended to take full command himself as soon as he reached Chattanooga. The food supply was the most pressing problem—but it was one that was already in the course of solution when Grant arrived. A few days before Rosecrans had been relieved from command both he and General Thomas had approved a plan which seemed likely to open the navigation of the river, and when Grant reached Thomas' headquarters the plan was about to be carried out. This incident is a striking illustration of the vagaries of luck. Rosecrans was deposed because his army was starving on its feet. But if he had been left in command for ten days longer a continuous stream of food, clothing and ammunition would have been pouring into Chattanooga. As it was, Grant got the credit with the public-and even with the rank and file of the army-for having opened up a line of supply as soon as he reached his new post. But the fact is that if he had remained on the Mississippi the army in Chattanooga would have been supplied with food just the same. He had nothing to do with it, except that he let the relief plan work out as it had been already conceived. The author of the plan was Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief of engineers of the Army of the Cumberland, and the procedure was as simple as the alphabet. Smith made a reconnaissance down the river and he saw that a single Confederate battery was the key to the situation. If this battery could be taken, and the position held, then steamers would be able to come up the Tennessee either to Brown's Ferry, about three miles (by land) below Chattanooga, or to Kelly's Ferry, some miles further down the river. From these points supplies might be safely brought in wagons over a fairly good road. On the night of October 26th, four days after Grant's arrival, fifty-two pontoons loaded with men, drifted silently down the river from Chattanooga. Just at daybreak this expeditionary force landed on the Confederate side at Brown's Ferry and took the battery and its infantry supports by surprise. Before the position was fairly taken Union engineers were turning the fifty-two pontoons into a bridge. Later in the day several regiments and a battery of artillery that had marched overland from Chattanooga came across the bridge and entrenched. The Confederates made an effort to drive out the invaders and destroy the pontoon bridge, but without success. Thus the siege was raised. Bragg's army remained on its hill-tops overlooking the town-at a distance-but it was no longer a siege. Large bodies of troops, Sherman's army among them, as well as food and supplies, came in. The siege of Chattanooga was over, but the armies still faced each other. The Confederate position was very strong. Missionary Ridge, which the main body of Bragg's army occupied, stands about four hundred feet above the Chattanooga plain. This Ridge constituted the right of Bragg's position. His left rested on Lookout Mountain, and between the ridge and the mountain there is a valley. At the southern end of |