"Therefore he ought not to live.

"Now the force of this argument lies in the major or first proposition, which Cicero refutes by proving that the Roman people had already determined contrary to what is there asserted: 'In what city,' says he, 'do these men dispute after this weak manner? In that wherein the first capital trial was in the case of the brave Horatius, who, before the city enjoyed perfect freedom, was saved by the suffrages of the Roman people, tho' he confessed that he killed his sister with his own hand.''

In this case the advocate who was prosecuting Milo assumed the truth of a general proposition, which included the particular proposition he sought to establish. He assumed that every man who has killed another ought to die, when it was admitted that Milo had killed Clodius. Cicero refuted the argument by pointing out the fallacy and showing that the general assumption was false, because the Roman people had in the past pardoned a man who had killed another.

(3) More common than either of the two foregoing is the fallacy called "arguing in a circle." It is one of the frequent errors of careless arguers and a common trick for confusing a sluggish thinker. The fallacy consists in taking two propositions and using them each in turn to prove the other.

For instance, the counsel for the plaintiff in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders argued in a circle, and was exposed by Mr. Webster:

"The plaintiff in error argues in a complete circle. He supposes the parties (in the making of a contract) to have

had reference to it (the statute law) because it was a binding law, and yet he proves it to be a binding law only upon the ground that such reference was made to it."

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his "Introduction to the Indian Evidence Act," Ch. II, gives the following illustration:

“A ship is cast away under such circumstances that her loss may be accounted for either by fraud or by accident. The captain is tried for making away with her. A variety of circumstances exist which would indicate preparation and expectation on his part if the ship really was made away with, but which would justify no suspicion at all if she was not. It is manifestly illogical, first, to regard the antecedent circumstances as suspicious, because the loss of the ship is assumed to be fraudulent, and, next, to infer that the ship was fraudulently destroyed from the suspicious character of the antecedent circumstances."

These are not, by any means, all the fallacies men commit in their reasonings, but they are the ones most frequently encountered in public writing and speaking. The ability to detect such mistakes as these explained above, either in the proof of an opponent or in his own proof, is a power which the arguer can hardly overestimate. In testing his own work it will, at least, guard against drawing inferences that will not bear even superficial scrutiny; and in testing the arguments of an opponent, though he may not be able entirely to discredit them, he may, unless the inferences are logically drawn, be able to raise a serious. question as to their accuracy.

BOOK III. ARRANGEMENT

CHAPTER I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARRANGEMENT

We have now analyzed our question, found out what we want to prove, and chosen the materials to use in making the proof. We have chosen our recruits and gathered them together; but that is all. Our army is only half made; it is but a confused and straggling mob. To tempt the fortunes of battle with such an array would mean defeat. The forces must be organized into companies, regiments, divisions; they must be officered with captains, colonels, and generals, and at their head must be placed a commander, the master spirit of all; they must be drilled and disciplined and taught to know their rights and their duties. Organization is no more necessary in an army than is arrangement in an argument: every master of the art of war knows how to organize his forces; every master of the art of debate knows how to arrange his proofs. The results from lack of organization are the same in both, — discord, wasted strength, and weakness. It is only by careful ar

rangement that ideas and evidence can be kept from self-contradiction and confusion, that their strength can be saved and directed to accomplish anything.

To secure an effective arrangement of materials in argumentation, the qualities to be sought are three in number: —

I. Unity.

II. Coherence.
III. Emphasis.

I. Unity

It is essential to the success of any piece of argumentation that the ultimate effect produced by it upon the audience shall be a single impression. The judges in a college debate may accept many of the ideas of the affirmative and appreciate much of its evidence; but the affirmative will not win unless the judges are dominated by the single impression that their whole case is stronger than that of the negative. A jury may accept much of the testimony and argument of a plaintiff, yet give the case to the defendant, having greater confidence in the defendant's case as a whole; for to them it may seem that the defendant's testimony "hangs together" better, his arguments may seem more cumulative and coöperative. In any deliberative body it is the measure that seems wisest from the greatest number of viewpoints that is made into law.

To achieve an impression that will bring belief or action, our materials must be so arranged as to be a single unit of force. Little facts and great ideas must work together, each enforcing the other. Each fact must corroborate its fellows, and inconsistency must

K

never appear. Everything must work for the single ultimate purpose of proving, not this idea or that, but the proposition. Such unity as this can be obtained only by the most painstaking efforts and the most careful tact.

In any piece of argumentation the most vital force is obviously the proof itself, the evidence and the arguments. It would, however, be a very defective effort which contained nothing else besides the giving of testimony and the manufacture of it into proof. These materials must be introduced in such a manner as will clear the way before them and place them in the field advantageously for action. This is the work of the divisions of the oration called variously by different writers the introduction, the narration, the partition. By whatever name we call it, some preparation is needed before the work of the discussion can be well done. The audience must know what the dispute is about, what are the issues to be decided, and what are the points of fact that decide them. Then, too, our work is never complete till we have gathered together evidence and arguments at the end of the discussion, to show how we have made good the fair promises and claims of the beginning; no work of composition is finished without a conclusion, or peroration. From the viewpoint of unity the introduction and conclusion are indispensable. It is practically impossible to bind together evidence, arguments, and ideas of all kinds. and degrees of importance, and make them work in