was a subject within her power to regulate by royal charter. It was recognized as being the function of the King to grant charters of incorporation to inhabitants of the Realm, to grant by charter the lands belonging to the State, and to wield the external power of the State in pursuance of treaty or for redress of wrong done by foreign States. In the Charter which Elizabeth granted to Sir Walter Raleigh for Carolina in 1584, she recognized the supremacy of the statutes of the Realm, but she regarded herself as having the exclusive power over the whole subject of the disposition of the lands and populations in America which might by discovery or conquest be brought within the power of England. The Charter gave Raleigh the title to the lands he should discover and occupy and the power of governing them. The provisions having reference to the political relationship between England and the countries so discovered and occupied were as follows:

And for uniting in more perfect league and amity such countries, lands and territories, so to be possessed and inhabited as aforesaid, with our Realms of England and Ireland we do by these presents grant and declare that all such countries, so hereafter to be possessed and inhabited as aforesaid, shall henceforth be of the allegiance of us, our heirs and successors.

We, for us, our heirs and successors, are likewise pleased and contented, and by these presents do give and grant to the said Walter Raleigh, his heirs and assigns forever, that he and they, and every of them, shall and may from time to time forever after, within the said remote lands, and countries in the way by the seas thither and from thence, have full and mere power and authority to correct, punish, pardon, govern and rule by their and every of their good discretions and policies, as well in causes capital or criminal as civil, both marine and other, all such our subjects as shall . . . at any time inhabit any such lands, countries or territories as aforesaid

according to such statutes, laws and ordinances, as shall be by him, the said Walter Raleigh, his heirs and assigns, and every or any of them, devised or established for the better government of the said people as aforesaid, so always as the said statutes, laws and ordinances may be, as near as conveniently may be, agreeable to the form of the laws, statutes, government or policy of England, and also so as they be not against the true Christian faith, now professed in the Church of England, nor in anywise withdraw any of the subjects or people of those lands or places from their allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, as their immediate Sovereign under God.

This Charter made Carolina a Province of England, under Raleigh as Lord Proprietor. The method of colonization thus employed was evidently an application of the method of disposition of the public lands which had been employed in England for centuries, according to which the King granted to those who had deserved well of the State such portions of the public lands as he thought proper, with certain rights of lordship, and the inhabitants of the land became tenants of the Lord Proprietor, who was himself a tenant of the King—that is, of the State. The very full powers of government granted to Raleigh over the inhabitants of Carolina were evidently an extension of the powers (almost entirely judicial or military) of Lords Proprietors in England over their tenants, and were evidently given, from the necessity of the case, on account of the remoteness of the lands.

According to the theory of this Charter, the regions in America to be discovered and occupied were external to the State of England-"remote lands and countries "— related to that State by a contractual and constitutional bond-a "union.' The power of both King and Parliament over the countries was taken for granted. The provision that Raleigh and his successors should make their statutes, laws, and ordinances "as near as con

veniently may be, agreeable to the form of the laws, statutes, government or policy of England" implied that the remote lands and countries were political entities distinct from the State of England, whose government was to be made as nearly as practicable like that of England. It was implied that England would not interfere with the inner life of these countries unless Raleigh and his successors failed to preserve a sufficient degree of uniformity. The power of England over the external life of these countries was regarded as based on the allegiance (that is, the contract) between the King and the individual inhabitants of the countries.

The question of the character and extent of the power which England might justly exercise over its various kinds of dependencies was much discussed between 1603 and 1607, when King James, as King of both England and Scotland, was trying to unite the two Kingdoms. The hostility among the common people of England to the Scotch was so great that the House of Commons would not agree to the Scotch having any more rights in England than the existing common law gave them. It was agreed that the common law gave no rights in England to any one born in Scotland before King James came to the throne of England-that they were aliens until naturalized by Act of Parliament. The question, therefore, concerned only those born after King James came to the throne, who were hence called the postnati. A great hearing was had in Parliament in 1603, the eleven highest judges of England sitting as a tribunal, and members of the House of Commons arguing the case before them, some presenting the case from the standpoint of the law of nature and of nations, some from the standpoint of historical precedent, some from the standpoint of civil law, and some from that of the common law.

While the case was, of course, one of mere personal union through a common Chief Executive, as we should

say now, that situation was not so apparent in those days, when the principles of the general public law were yet in process of formation; and in the arguments and opinions, the powers of the English Government over the dependencies were fully discussed, and it was agreed, both by the judges and the members of the House who acted as counsel, that the power of Parliament over the dependencies was the same as its power in England. In 1607, a test case was made up, known as Calvin's Case, in which the same issues were raised. It was heard before all the high judges of England, under a practice which permitted all to sit in cases deemed of exceptional public importance, and the same ground covered in the argument and opinions, and the same conclusions reached.

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While the Case of the Postnati and Calvin's Case did not, as has been seen, necessarily involve the question whether Parliament had power over the dependencies, yet, on account of the solemnity of the hearings, and the unanimity between court and counsel on that point, the matter was then finally settled as a part of the Constitution of England. Dependencies were defined to be parcel of the Realm in tenure" which, after being merged in the Realm by union and incorporation, became "parcel of England in possession" or parcel of the body of the Realm." Parliament," it was said, might" make a statute to bind in [a dependency], if [the dependency] were specially named, but without special naming, it does not bind." In this statement, the Court recognized that a dependency, from its nature, demanded a special treatment by the State in the interests of the State itself; and a corollary from this was, of course, that Parliament might make special laws for the government of particular dependencies.

This statement was made with especial reference to Ireland, and with full consideration of the facts, which

were mentioned by the Court, that Ireland did not send representatives to the English Parliament, and that it had its own Lords and Commons which constituted a Parliament with the King of England or his Deputy," whereat they have made divers particular laws concerning that Dominion." The real point of the decision, though it is not very clearly expressed and can only be made out by inference, is that Scotland was either a petty kingdom subordinate to England, and subject to the will of Parliament, or was merely a foreign friendly State, and that no community external to England could ever be constitutionally related to England through the King except as a dependency,-that equal or even unequal union with another state could be accomplished only by express and unmistakable Act of Parliament.

The power of Parliament over all the petty kingdoms and dominions belonging to England having been thus declared, by dictum of the highest judges of England, the power of the King was, by their dictum, declared to be as follows:

In the case of any Christian country under the dominion of England, to which the laws of England had been given by the King or by Parliament, the King could not

alter the laws" any more than he could" alter" the laws of England, in England. This merely meant that the King could not legislate contrary to the laws of England so given, but that he could legislate in any way not inconsistent with them.

In the case of countries (necessarily Christian) coming to the King by inheritance, the King could not "change" the laws of the country. "Change," in this connection, meant the same as alter "-that he could not legislate contrary to them, but that he could legislate in any way not inconsistent with them.

In the case of a conquered Christian country, the laws of the conquered country remained until the King