inferior ought to be at liberty to act without control or compulsion, depends upon the nature of the dependence and the degree of the subordination; and these being ascertained, the measure of obedience and submission and the extent of the authority and superintendence will be settled.

May not then the line be distinctly and justly drawn between such acts as are necessary or proper for preserving or securing the dependence of the Colonies, and such as are not necessary or proper for that very important purpose?

When credit comes to be given to those great men who were responsible for the clause in the Constitution of the United States relating to the government of dependencies, Dulany must receive his share of honor for having suggested the principle which underlies the phrase "and make all needful rules and regulations."

In 1765, Stephen Hopkins, of Rhode Island, a man of great prominence in that Colony, who had filled its highest offices and had been one of its delegates to the Albany Congress of 1754, in his pamphlet The Grievances of the American Colonies Candidly Examined, supplemented the suggestion of Dulany that the power of Parliament in the Empire was limited by the necessity of its interference in each particular case, by suggesting that its power was also conditional upon an expert investigation as a preliminary to all its action. He said:

Although each of the Colonies hath a Legislature within itself, to take care of its interests and provide for its peace and internal government, yet there are many things of a more general nature, quite out of the reach of these particular Legislatures, which it is necessary should be regulated, ordered and governed. One of this kind is, the commerce of the whole British Empire, taken collectively, and that of each Kingdom and Colony in it, as it makes a part of that whole. Indeed, everything that concerns the proper interest and fit govern

ment of the whole Commonwealth, of keeping the peace, and subordination of all the parts towards the whole, and one among another, must be considered in this light. Amongst these general concerns, perhaps money and paper credit, those grand instruments of all commerce, will be found also to have a place. These, with all other matters of a general nature, it is absolutely necessary should have a general power to direct them; some supreme and overruling authority, with power to make laws and form regulations for the good of all, and to compel their execution and observation. It being necessary some such general power should exist somewhere, every man of the least knowledge of the British Constitution will be naturally led to look for and find it in the Parliament of Great Britain. That grand and august legislative body must from the nature of their authority and the necessity of the thing, be justly vested with this power. Hence it becomes the indispensable duty of every good and loyal subject, cheerfully to obey and patiently submit to all the acts, laws, orders and regulations that may be made and passed by Parliament, for directing and governing all these general matters.

Here it may be urged by many and, indeed, with great appearance of reason, that the equity, justice and beneficence of the British Constitution will require that the separate Kingdoms and distinct Colonies, who are to obey and be governed by these general laws and regulations, ought to be represented, some way or other, in Parliament, at least whilst these matters are under consideration. Whether the Colonies will ever be admitted to have representation in Parliament-whether it be consistent with their distant and dependent state-and whether, if it were admitted, it would be to their advantageare questions we will pass by; and observe, that these Colonies ought in justice, and for the very evident good of the whole Commonwealth, to have notice of every new measure about to be passed, by which their rights, liberties or interests may be affected. They ought to have such notice that they may appear and be heard by their Agents, by counsel, or written. representation, or by some other equitable and effectual way. The Colonies are at so great a distance from England that

the members of Parliament can generally have but little knowledge of their business connections and interests, but what is gained from people who have been there; the most of these have so slight a knowledge themselves that the informations they can give are very little to be depended on, though they may pretend to determine with confidence on matters far above their reach. All such informations are too uncertain to be depended on in the transacting of business of so much consequence, and in which the interests of two millions of free people are so deeply concerned. There is no kind of inconvenience or mischief can arise from the Colonies having such notice and being heard in the manner above mentioned; but on the contrary, very great mischiefs have already happened to the Colonies, and always must be expected, if they are not heard before things of such importance are determined concerning them.

Had the Colonies been fully heard, before the late Act had been passed, no reasonable man can suppose it ever would have passed at all in the manner it now stands. For what good reason can possibly be given for making a law to cramp the trade and ruin the interest of many of the Colonies, and at the same time lessen in a prodigious manner the consumption of the British manufactures in them?

To Hopkins, therefore, must be given the credit for the suggestion of the principle which underlies the expression "to dispose of" in the clause of the Constitution of the United States relating to the administration of dependencies.

The second proposition of the British Governmentthat it was unjust to Great Britain, and unfair on the part of the Colonies, that Great Britain should expend the money for the common defence and welfare and receive nothing for so doing or only so much as the Colonies chose voluntarily to contribute-was answered by John Dickinson, of Philadelphia, the leading lawyer and statesman of Pennsylvania, in a pamphlet published in

1765, entitled The Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies on the Continent of America. In this pamphlet, he discussed the whole economic situation as between Great Britain and the American Colonies, and showed that the Colonies had, by the mercantile restrictions under which they had been placed, been made to contribute to the wealth of Great Britain many times more than Great Britain had ever expended for their benefit in its administration of the British Empire, so that the proposition for taking money by taxation in addition to the wealth which was taken from them and the money which was drained from them and transferred to Great Britain under the existing economic conditions, was so far from being justifiable as a repayment by the Colonies for money expended by it for them, that it was really an adding to the debt which Great Britain already owed to them. Of course, this argument related merely to the particular situation then existing, and while it made a great impression, it plainly did not cover every kind of economic situation which might exist between an Imperial State and its dependencies, and required some general rule to supplement it.

This general rule Dickinson proceeded to lay down, in the resolutions adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature, September 21, 1765, which were drafted by him, by making a distinction between internal and external taxes, -internal taxes being, according to his view, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Colonial Governments, and external taxes exclusively within the jurisdiction of the British Government, acting as the Imperial Government. The second resolution (which followed his draft verbatim), read:

Resolved: That in the opinion of this House, it is inseparably essential to a free constitution of government that all internal taxes be levied upon the people with their consent.

Of course, if Great Britain, as the Imperial State, had the exclusive power of external taxation, it followed, on the principle that the greater includes the less, that it had power to enact all other kinds of legislation relating to the external affairs of the Colonies, and to represent them in their external relations.

When the Stamp Act Congress met in New York on October 7, 1765, to consider the measures to be taken in opposition to the Stamp Act, which, though passed on March 22, 1765, was, by its terms, not to go into effect until November 1, of that year, the thought of the country may be thus summarized: Otis, in Massachusetts, denied that Great Britain was the Imperial State, and sought to remedy the existing evils by changing the character of Parliament to that of a constitutionally conditioned and limited legislature, both in Great Britain and in the Colonies. This would have meant a revolution in Great Britain. In Rhode Island, Hopkins, had recognized that Great Britain was the Imperial State and, without considering whether its powers were limited or not, had claimed that they were conditional, so that the Colonies were entitled to have these powers exercised by an expert tribunal acting on principles of justice, in which the Colonies could be heard by their diplomatic agents, before any legislation affecting them became final. Maryland, Dulany had recognized also that Great Britain was the Imperial State, and had advanced the proposition that its powers were conditioned and limited so that it could exercise only such power as was necessary and proper for securing the dependence of the Colonies, on principles of justice and liberty. In Pennsylvania, Dickinson, also recognizing that Great Britain was the Imperial State, had taken the position that it had, as such, the power to legislate concerning the external affairs of the Colonies, and to represent them in the management of these affairs.

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