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vital. The only source of opposition would be the private interests of the breeding states; but private interests in the history of the South have always yielded to the demands of public policy, and would probably do so in this case. In the event, however, of the breeding states proving refractory, the leaders of the extreme party would have the remedy in their own hands. The protest of a narrow minority would be wholly powerless to stem the tide of popular feeling which they have it in their power at any moment to evoke.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

WHAT is the duty of European nations towards North America in the present crisis of its history? I answer-to observe a strict neutrality between the contending parties, giving their moral support to that settlement of the question which is most in accordance with the general interest of the world. What ground is there for European interference in the quarrel? In the present aspect of affairs absolutely none-none, that is to say, which would not equally justify interference in every war which ever occurred. I say, in the present aspect of affairs, for in a different aspect of affairs I can well imagine that a different course would be justifiable, and might even become a duty. Supposing free society in North America in danger of being overborne by the Slave Power, would not the threatened predominance in the new world of a confederacy resting on slavery as its corner stone, and proclaiming the propagandism of slavery as its mission, be an occasion for the interference of civilized nations? If there be reason that civilized nations should combine to resist the aggressions of Russia-a country containing the germs of a vigorous and progressive civilization -would there be none for opposing the establishment of "a barbarous and barbarizing Power"-a Power of whose existence slavery is the final cause? But that contingency is happily not now probable; and in the present position of the American contest there is not even a plausible pretext for intervention. It is unhappily true that our trade is suffering, that much distress prevails in our manufacturing districts, and that we are threatened with even more serious consequences than have yet been felt. But is this a plausible pretext for interfering in a foreign war? How can a great war be carried on without dis

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turbing the commerce of the world? For what purpose are blockades instituted and permitted? To say that, because we are injuriously affected by a blockade we will not recognize it, is simply to say that we do not choose to be bound by laws longer than it suits our convenience-is to throw away even the pretence of justice. But interference in the present case would be not merely immoral, it would be futile-nay, if the relief of distress be really the object of those who urge it, it would, we can scarce doubt, aggravate a hundred-fold the evils. it was intended to cure. For, supposing the blockade of the Southern ports to be raised, to what purpose would be this result if the war continued? It would, doubtless, carry comfort to the Slave Confederacy; it might possibly bring a few hundred thousand bales of cotton to Europe; but, in the present condition of the South, with Northern armies encamped on its soil, it would not cause cotton to be grown, and still less would it open Northern markets to our manufactures. A fleet may raise a blockade, but it cannot compel people to buy goods who do not want them. Intervention in America would, therefore, fail to restore trade to its normal channels; and it is admittedly to a disturbance in the normal channels of trade far more than to scarcity of any single commodity-to a cessation of Northern demand far more than to an interruption of Southern supplythat the distress now experienced in England is due.* Now the cessation of Northern demand will continue as long as the war continues; so that the effect of intervention on manufacturing distress would depend on its effect on the duration of the war. And what would be this effect? On such a subject it would be absurd to speak with confidence; but there is one historical parallel which comes so close to the present case that we should do well to ponder it. In 1792 an armed intervention of European Powers took place in France. The allied sovereigns were not less confident of their ability to impose conditions on the French people, than are those who now urge intervention in America of the ability of France and England to settle the affairs of that continent. But we know how the intervention of 1792 ended. The spirit of democracy, allying itself with the spirit of patriotism, kindled in the people of France an energy which not merely drove back the invaders from their soil, but which carried the invaded people as conquerors over the length and breadth of continental Europe. Such was the effect of a policy of intervention in the affairs of a great European nation. nation. What reason have we to expect a different result from a similar policy pursued in America? Has democracy in

* See the Economist, 26th April, 1862.

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America shown less energy than in Europe? Is its organization less effective? Is the spirit of its patriotism less powerful? Are the resources which it commands for war less extensive? Or will the adversaries of democracy fight it with greater advantage across the reach of the Atlantic? I am assuming that an intervention, if attempted, would be resolutely carried out that a mere interference by our navies would only exacerbate and prolong the quarrel is so obvious as to disentitle such a proposition to a moment's serious regard. The duty of neutrality is, therefore, in the present case as plainly marked out by the dictates of selfish policy as by the maxims of morality and law. While intervention would fail to alleviate the evils under which we suffer, it would almost certainly add to those evils the calamity of a great war—a war which would bequeath to the posterity of the combatants a legacy of mutual hatred, destined to embitter their relations for centuries to come.

But the duty of neutrality is not incompatible with the rendering of moral support. We may be required to abstain from giving effect to our convictions by force, but we can never be justly required to abstain from advancing them by moral means. Nay, so long as the conflict between good and evil lasts, the obligation to sustain the right cause by sympathy and counsel is one from which we cannot relieve ourselves. It becomes, therefore, of extreme importance to consider what is that settlement of the American contest which deserves the moral support of Europe.

There are two modes of terminating the present war, either of which must, it seems to me, be almost equally deprecated by every friend of freedom and of the American people :—such a triumph of the Southern party as would give to it the command of the unsettled districts to the south and west; and such a reconstruction of the Union as would restore slavery to its former footing in the Republic. It is, I think, difficult to say which of these results would be the more extensively disastrous. The one would establish, amid all the éclat of victory, a slave empire, commanding the resources of half a continent, fired with an ardent ambition, and cherishing vast designs of aggression and conquest. The other would once more commit a moral and freedom-loving people-the main hope of civilization in the New World--to complicity with the damning guilt of slavery. The Union, restored on the principle of restricting slavery, would not indeed be the same Union as that in which the Slave Power was predominant. But fortune is capricious. in politics as in war. A few years might bring a change in the position of parties; and a revolution of the wheel might once

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RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION.

again commit the central government to the propagandists of slavery. Even should this worst result not happen, the corrupting influence of the alliance would remain; the continued connivance at the perpetration of a great wrong would again force the Republic into degrading compliances, and the progress of political degeneracy, arrested for a moment by the shock of a violent reaction, would proceed as before. Between the evils of such a termination of the contest and the absolute triumph of the Slave Power, it would, perhaps, not be easy to decide.

A year ago either of these results, almost equally to be deplored, seemed almost equally probable. The Northern people, taken by surprise, its leaders unaccustomed to power, its arsenals in the hands of its enemies, with traitors in its public offices, divided into parties holding discordant views and recommending different courses, unanimous only in one strong wish -a desire at all events to uphold the Union-seemed for a time. prepared to make almost any concession which promised to secure this end. On the other hand, no vacillation marked the South. With the directness of men, who, fixed in their ends, have little scruple in their choice of means, its leaders were urgent to precipitate the catastrophe. Their skilfully contrived treason had secured for them the principal forts and almost the whole military stores of the Republic. The most experienced officers in the United States army were their trusted agents, and were rapidly passing over to their side. Elated by success and confident in their resources, it seemed, at the outset of the contest, that they had all but accomplished their daring schemethat little remained for them but to seize upon Washington, and dictate from the capitol the terms of separation.

Such was the position of affairs when the contest opened. A year has passed, and contingencies which then appeared imminent seem no longer within the range of possible events. In presence of the searching test which real danger applies to political theories, and amid the enthusiasm kindled by war, the political education of the North has made rapid progress. The true source of disaffection to the Union, so long concealed by the arts of temporizing politicians, has been laid bare, and is no longer doubted. The impossibility of bringing free and slave societies into harmonious co-operation under the same political system begins to be understood. The absolute necessities of, at all hazards, breaking the strength of the Slave Power, as the first step towards re-establishing political society in North America, is rapidly becoming the accepted creed. Meanwhile, the advance of the Northern armies in the field has kept pace with that of opinion in the public assemblies,

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and, by an almost unbroken series of fruitful victories, the military superiority of the North seems now to be definitively established. In this aspect of affairs-with anti-slavery opinions making rapid way in the North, and Northern armies steadily advancing on the Southern States-the reconstruction of the Union, with slavery retained on its former footing, and still more the complete triumph of the Slave Power, may, it seems to me, be fairly discharged from our consideration. Nay, I think, the actual state of facts, taken in connexion with the resources of the contending parties, warrants us in going a step further, and holding that, in the absence of foreign intervention, the South must in the end succumb to its opponent. If this be so, what remains to be decided is this: on what terms shall the submission of the South be made?-shall it return to the Union to be ruled by the North, or secede under conditions to be prescribed by its conqueror? Assuming these to be the practical issues involved in the struggle at the stage to which it has now attained, I shall proceed to consider to what determination of it the moral support of Europe should be given.

It seems impossible to doubt that, at the present time, the prevailing purpose of the Northern people aims at no less than a complete reconstruction of the Union in its original proportions. The project admits of being regarded under several aspects-how far is it justified?-how far is it practicable?— how far is it expedient? On each of these points some remarks suggest themselves.

If,

The forcible imposition on some millions of human beings. of a form of government at variance with their wishes, is an act which undoubtedly demands special grounds for its justification. Whether the South be regarded as a portion of the same nation with the North, or as a distinct people, it seems, on either view of the case, impossible that an attempt to subjugate, for the purpose of ruling it, can be reconciled with the maxims of political morality which we regard in this country as applicable to the ordinary practice of civilized nations. then, these maxims admit of no exception, this branch of the argument is resolved, and the justification of the present views of the North must be given up. But, writing in a nation which holds in subjection under despotic rule two hundred millions of another race, it is scarcely necessary to say that maxims which condemn, without regard to circumstances, the imposition on a people of a foreign and despotic yoke are no portion of the moral code of this country. The people of India may or may not desire to be governed by Great Britain; but assuredly the wishes of the people of India are not the grounds on which