Francis Wayland, D.D., Providence, R. I. 66 66 Hon. A. Walker, North Brookfield, Mass. William B. Crosby, Esq., New York. Jos. E. Worcester, LL.D., Cambridge, Mass. Isaac Collins, Esq., Philadelphia, Penn. Andrew P. Peabody, D. D., C. E. Stowe, D. D., Andover, 46 AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY in account with JOHN FIELD, Treasurer. Receipts reported in Advocate for Sept. 1860, $1,005,82; Jan. 1861, $655.19........ 66 66 For postage, stationery, meetings, rent of office, &c.,..... For paper, printing, binding, and other expenses relative to publication.. $208 23 1,661 01 885 50 $2,754,79 $144 74 1,406 17 932 47 197 41 $2,754 79 BOSTON, MAY 28, 1860.-I have this day examined the above account of JOHN FIELD, Esq, Treasurer of the American Peace Society, and find the same correctly cast and vouched. JULIUS A. PALMER, Auditor. Rebellion in America.. What are we fighting for?.. On whom the evils of War fall,. .......317 Premium on l'cace,. Power of War to abolish Slavery,........318 Note to the friends of l'eace,.................. See last page of cover. BOSTON: THE ADVOCATE OF PEACE. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1861. COURSE OF THE PEACE SOCIETY. Every reform has its peculiar sphere and object. That of peace is restricted to the intercourse of nations, and seeks, as its sole aim, to do away their custom of war. Its whole work lies within these well-defined limits; and beyond these it has no right to act or speak in the name of its associates on any other issue. There are three classes of relations among men the relation of individuals to each other, the relation of individuals to society or government, and the relation of one government to another. It is only with this last class of relations that the cause of peace attempts to deal; and, however extensively applicable its principles may be, we aim in this reform at only such an application of them as shall lead nations to abandon their practice of war, and resort to peaceful means alone for the settlement of their disputes, and the regulation of their entire intercourse. Such has been our uniform course from the first. These views we stereotyped in our publications long ago, and with the utmost distinct- ness said, "we do not inquire how murder, or any offences against society, shall be punished; how force shall be used for the suppression of mobs, and other popular outbreaks; by what specific means government shall enforce its laws, and support its rightful and indispensable authority; to what extent an individual may protect himself or his family by violence against murderous assaults; how a people, deprived of their rights, shall regain and preserve them; or in what way any controversy between a government and its own subjects shall be adjusted. With such questions, however important, the cause of Peace is not concerned, but solely with the intercourse of nations, for the single purpose of abolishing their practice of war." Such was our position from the start. But on such questions as these, have peace men no settled principles?' We presume they all have, and doubt not they are quite ready to avow them, each for himself; but they have not authorized the Peace Society to speak for them on any of these side-issues, They may differ in opinion on some of them; but, however this may be, we can claim no right to speak in their name on such questions. In the cause of Peace they are pledged only to efforts for the abolition of war, the custom of nations settling their disputes by the sword. What, then, is War? If two theologians engage in controversy, or the members of a church get into a quarrel, or the head of a family corrects one of his children, or a magistrate arrests a culprit, and brings him to condign punishment, would the act, in any one of these cases, be war? So, if a large body of soldiers, as an armed police, were called out to keep the peace, to quell a riot, or suppress an incip ient insurrection, would anybody deem this anything more than a due, peaceful enforcement of law against its violators? How, then, is this process of simple justice to become, in any strict or proper sense, war? What can make it such? The act, the whole essence of the thing, is confessedly the same; and can it make any essential difference in principle whether two, a hundred, or a hundred thousand are involved jointly in the guilt and its penalty? If the execution of a single murderer or rebel is not strictly war, would the execution of a hundred or a thousand make it so? Is it not still a simple, though wholesale enforcement of law? We recur, then, to our question, what is war? Webster, an acknowledged authority on such points, defines "War a contest between nations or states, carried on by force. It is always implied that such contest is authorized by the monarch, or sovereign power." In all war, then, the parties must be nations, states, governments; nor can any conflict between individuals, or between any number of individuals and a government, be properly called war. It is, in theory and in fact, a riot, a mob, an insurrection, a rebellion, not war. What more do we find in the case now before us? There has been no declaration of war. Our President, finding a wide and formidable combination to resist the laws, merely called for troops, in place of the ordinary posse-comitatus, put them into execution. We are not at war with any nation, but |