speeding up and slowing down would take place, what short stops and long stops would be made, in this catching of the passengers ! And what sort of service would the public in the end enjoy? Yet this manifest absurdity on railways is being tolerated on roadways, only because its consequences are not yet sufficiently realised. It is hardly too much to say that, for a variety of unavoidable reasons, the position in London has become such that road traffic demands, so far as the traffic agencies are concerned, almost as strict a control as is demanded and exercised in the case of railways.

Good service also calls for constant development and progress. Some improvement, some extension, is constantly wanted, and uncontrolled competition, by attenuating the prosperity of the traffic companies, will inevitably prevent the future needs of London from being met, much less anticipated.

From whatever standpoint it be looked at, the competition of one vehicle with another of the same class upon a common route can only be regarded as expensive, injurious, and useless; and just in so far as it removes or moderates this kind of competition, traffic control can and should ensure both reasonable fares and adequate services. Further, although traffic control must mean control of competition if it is to be effective, it need not necessarily entail entire abolition of competition. On the contrary, the door should be left open for the new-comer in case the party in possession fails to do his duty, whatever form the failure may take, but unless and until there is a failure disturbance would be detrimental, and not beneficial, to the public interest.

Although for many years past there has been a consensus of opinion that some kind of traffic authority ought to be established, there has never been agreement as to the form which it should take. One reason for this is that there has always been a tendency to look too much to the constitution of the authority itself, and too little to the nature and extent of the duties to be discharged. Taking these duties first, it would seem that what we need is an authority which will not unduly interfere with the conduct of the business of the transport agencies, or attempt to prescribe the method of their operations, but will co-ordinate and improve the facilities that are there, and deal with traffic in its broadest sense. Its object should be to bring together, for the purpose of a common solution, those whose interests may conflict or diverge, and those without whose support and goodwill a common solution cannot be carried out. For instance, it must, on the one hand, have regard to the interests of the passengers, who naturally think most of cheap fares and abundant services, and, on the other, to those of the transport agencies, who regard the matter mainly in terms of passengers and dividends. It must also have in mind the requirements and conveniences of dock traffic, market traffic, and main

line railway goods, to name the three most important forms of commercial traffic. The economic waste in the distribution of goods throughout Greater London is reflected in the higher cost of living there as compared with the smaller cities and towns. With the superior resources of London and the advantages of its position and trade, commodities should be cheaper within its borders than outside. That this is not so is due, in no small measure, to lack of traffic control. The traffic authority must, moreover, constantly be looking forward, so as to keep its plans for transport extensions well ahead of the developments of the areas to be served; it must see to the improvement of streets and roads, and establish unified action amongst all those who deal with them.

As to the constitution of the traffic authority required to cope with these duties, the Royal Commission of 1905 recommended setting up a 'Traffic Board,' which was to be directly responsible to Parliament; the Select Committee of 1913 was content with a 'Traffic Branch'in the Board of Trade; one of 1919 went to the other extreme and wanted a ' Supreme Traffic Board' responsible to the Home Secretary; one of 1921 preferred a 'London Traffic Authority' to advise the Minister of Transport; the recent 'Royal Commission on London Government' wanted a 'London and Home Counties Advisory Committee' of twenty representatives of the local authorities to advise the appropriate' Minister; while in a minority report it was recommended that a 'Central Authority,' elected by the people, should be set up. These proposals may be said to amount to-first, a small permanent expert tribunal; second, a large nominated board of representatives of local authorities; third, an elected authority exercising authority over traffic, house planning, and various other duties. The first may be described as a super-management which would inevitably lead to friction with the local authorities and to the usurpation of powers which ought to be left to the transport undertakings. The second, the board of representatives of local authorities, would be government by a committee, and a large one at that if it was to be representative of the 122 authorities concerned. Its action would be cumbrous, and would largely be founded on compromise. The grandiose Central Authority would also seem to be undesirable, for London has grown to be a fifth part of the realm, and a local authority of this magnitude becomes a State authority.

In the absence of a provincial government for London as a whole, the most practical system would seem to be to vest responsibility for traffic affairs in the Ministry of Transport. This department is now under sentence of death, and if there is any real intention of executing the sentence it might well be deferred until the traffic question has been adjusted, for there is no other depart

ment which can so appropriately deal with it. The proposal sometimes made that responsibility should rest with the Home Office, and that the present difficulties could be overcome by giving extended powers to the Commissioners of Police, cannot be regarded as sound. The duty of the police is, not to make traffic regulations, but to see that they are obeyed, and any departure from this principle would endanger the good relations which have always, happily, subsisted between the police and the public.

The Transport Minister would need the assistance of an advisory committee, representative of the multiple interests and authorities involved; and he should be given legislative powers to make such 'regulations' from time to time as may be needed to amplify existing traffic laws and bring them more into line with modern requirements. It is important that the advisory committee should command respect and be above all suspicion of bias. Hence it should be balanced on representation as between Government, municipal, and private interests, and also be composed in such a way that politics may not intrude into the domain of what is essentially a business and not a political proposition. If transport policies are allowed to be converted into transport politics the effect upon traffic management may be fatal.

A traffic authority of the kind above suggested is admittedly not an ideal one, and it may be considered too weak as an organ of control to initiate and enforce the drastic steps needed to put matters on a proper footing. It can, however, quickly be made available, and, in view of the many complexities with which the problem is beset, it seems desirable to proceed gradually rather than to aim at a more ambitious scheme which might fail, and which would certainly take a long time to set in motion. The chief points to bear in mind are, first, that traffic control necessarily implies some curtailment of freedom on the part of the municipal authorities, the public, and the transport agencies alike, and, second, that, whatever scheme of control may be adopted, its success can only be assured by the whole-hearted co-operation of all concerned in carrying it out.

W. R. ROBERTSON,

F.M.

SINGAPORE

THE question whether we are to have an adequate naval base at Singapore is still in the balance while this article is being written. The Dominions, whose representatives at the recent London conference have already pronounced in favour of the scheme, are again being consulted (upon what new aspect of the problem we have not been informed), and the decision of the new Government may be announced before these words are read. The Navy, for some unexplained reason, has had a 'bad Press' for some time, and, possibly for that reason, the issue was, unfortunately, prejudged in public speeches by several Ministers now in office before they had the facts before them. The issue in the balance is a grave one. The decision thereon will afford a definite indication whether we intend to abandon the policy of strength at sea which has served us for centuries.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century the British Navy was supreme. A two-Power' standard in capital ships was adopted, no limit being imposed upon the building of cruisers for commerce protection, excepting the limit to ensure the safety of British merchant shipping-traders and transports-crossing the seas upon their lawful occasions. The nation trusted the Sea Lords to determine the country's needs. So long as those officers acted together, with collective resignation as the alternative to the acceptance by the Cabinet of their views upon vital issues, there was in those days no question whether or not the estimates based upon their minimum requirements would be voted by the House of Commons. Sea power, by tacit consent, was removed from the arena of party politics. The constituencies were solid in favour of sea security, upon which not only prosperity, but life itself for the majority of the population of these islands, depends. Britain's sovereignty of the seas was referred to freely, and without rancour, in all foreign countries. It was postulated as the first principle of national and of Empire defence, and the peculiar conditions which rendered it essential to the free development of communities under the British flag in a militarist world were recognised in all quarters. It was under such conditions that the opening of the present century found us engaged in the South

African war and unpopular on the continent of Europe, where sympathy with the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State was both felt and freely expressed. The British Navy kept the ring. Foreigners who sympathised with our opponents were impotent in the face of British sea power. That sympathy could not take the form of effective action, and a certain degree of humiliation was experienced.

The German menace to our existence as a sea Power had not yet arisen. On the other hand, there were several outstanding questions of policy which provided sources of friction with France and with Russia. With Anglo-French policy at that time we are not immediately concerned, beyond noting in passing that it led to the mutual adjustment of difficulties and to the Entente, which threw British sea power on the side of France in 1914 with farreaching results. Russia was seeking ice-free ports, especially Port Arthur, in Manchuria, and establishing a powerful squadron in Far Eastern waters. Anxiety was felt about the security of British, Australasian, and Canadian interests in the Pacific and China seas, and there were three courses which might have been adopted. We might perhaps have removed all sources of friction with Russia and have come to an agreement upon outstanding questions which had caused trouble in the past. We might have increased our Navy and have based upon Hong Kong a squadron superior to the Russian sea forces based at Port Arthur and Vladivostock. Or we might have trusted to some other sea power in the Pacific to protect our interests therein in the event of Russian aggression. We chose the third course, and we contracted an alliance with Japan in 1902. That alliance has now been allowed to lapse in deference to American and Australian sentiment. We have therefore reverted to the position which arose at the beginning of the century, with the whole Japanese Navy (based upon well-equipped naval ports) substituted for the old Russian squadron (with inadequately equipped bases) as a possible menace to British, Australasian, and Canadian interests in Far Eastern seas. With those interests we must deal in due course, but first we must take note of misstatements made, and deliberately repeated after they have been corrected, in the course of the unfortunate controversy that has arisen over the question of equipping our naval base at Singapore in accordance with modern requirements. The first of these affects the Washington agreements. Before committing themselves to accepting limitations in building capital ships and aircraft carriers, the Japanese stipulated that we should not maintain naval bases, adequately equipped and defended in accordance with modern requirements, in a certain area deemed to be within striking distance of Japan. Singapore is outside that area, and this point was understood and