McClellan removed? He was popular with his army. His subordinates were generally his friends. He was the head, and expected candidate of the democratic party for the Presidency. It had been the earnest endeavor of Mr. Lincoln to unite and combine with the republican party all of the democrats who were loyal to the Union; the removal of McClellan would be regarded by many as a political movement, and for these and other political reasons, his removal was considered unwise.

Meanwhile Pope was being driven towards Washington, by Jackson, Longstreet, and Lee himself, and neither Porter, nor Franklin, nor any of McClellan's subordinates, came to his aid. Porter, although within the sound of Pope's artillery and the rebel guns, and conscious of his critical position, did not go to his support. He was tried for his disobedience to orders, found guilty, and dismissed from the army. This judgment the President approved.

It is not intended to review the trial of Porter.1 His

1. At 12 o'clock, on the 27th of August, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan : "Telegrams from Porter to Burnside." "Porter is marching on Warrenton to reenforce Pope." "Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's

corps should move out by forced marches," etc.

On the 25th Halleck telegraphed to McClellan :

"Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." See Report on the Conduct of War, Pt. 1, pp. 459, 461.

On the same day he telegraphed again :

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas ; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious, without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 3 P. M., on the 29th, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan, in reply to his dispatch of 12 M.:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further, otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses." At 2:40, the President, in his intense anxiety to know the fate of the army fighting against odds, telegraphed to McClellan to know: "What news from direction of Manassas Junction ? What generally ?"

At 2:45, General McClellan replied:

"The last news I received from the direction of Manassas, was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville, and retiring towards Thor

conduct has been much discussed. He was found guilty by a court of general officers, composed of men of the highest character. There does not seem to be any room for doubt that he did not give Pope his loyal and hearty support. Some of his apologists have said that this ought not to have been expected; that it was not in human nature. This depends on the sort of human nature. A true patriot and soldier would have forgotten his grievances, and those of his chief; would have been at the front in the battle. His duty clearly was to do his utmost to relieve Pope. Few candid men will believe he did this. Suppose McClellan had been in the position of Pope-are there any who believe Fitz-John Porter would have left him alone "to get out of his scrape?" Or suppose Porter had been fighting Lee and his whole army, as Pope was, would it have taken McClellan an entire month to come up the Potomac to his relief? No, McClellan would have joined his favorite lieutenant long before the arrival of Longstreet, and Lee would have had to meet the combined armies. If McClellan had been exposed as Pope was, the guns of Porter would have been playing upon the enemy, and not at rest in sullen silence in his camp.

On the 2d of September, Pope fell back to the fortifications of Washington. The situation was critical. As Pope retired to Washington, Lee advanced towards Maryland,

oughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second, To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer

General Halleck telegraphed the following peremptory order, at 7:30, on the

29th:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair the railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening at Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward as I directed, to protect the railroad, and open communication with Manassas."

threatening the capital. The defeat of Pope might have been prevented by the union and co-operation with him of McClellan. Two courses of action were discussed in the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln. One, urged by the friends of McClellan, was to place him in command of all the forces, including the remnants of the army of Virginia; the other, to arrest him and some of his subordinates, and try them for disobedience and insubordination. General Halleck, the Secretary of War, and others, charged him with being responsible for the defeat of Pope, and many in high positions declared that he ought to be shot for his military offences. It was one of the most critical periods of the war. Party spirit was a violent faction in Congress, and as represented by the press, was intemperate. The army was split by cabals, jealousies, and quarrels. This, with defeat and disaster in the field, made the prospect gloomy and perilous, but the President's fortitude and courage did not desert him. Unselfish and firm, he trusted in the people and in God. That firm belief in an overruling Providence, which some called superstition, sustained him in this the darkest hour.

McClellan was the representative man of the so-called war democrats. He had the confidence of his officers, and was personally popular with the soldiers. The President yielded to the military necessity, or supposed military necessity, and placed him again in command of all the troops, and McClellan assumed the responsibility of defending the capital, and defeating Lee. Indeed, it seems the wisest thing he could have done. The army of the Potomac was demoralized, some of it on the verge of mutiny, and the conduct of Franklin and Fitz-John Porter indicates the spirit in which McClellan's lieutenants would have supported any other chief. With Lee and his victorious troops menacing Washington, it was a military necessity; Lincoln, with his usual good sense, saw and yielded to it.

CHAPTER XVII.

ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE.

HARPER'S FERRY CAPTURED.-Antietam.-MCCLELLAN'S DELAY.— RELIEVED Of Command.-Burnside APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR. -FREDERICKSBURG.-BURNSIDE RESIGNS.-HOOKER SUCCEEDS

HIM.-LINCOLN'S LETTER TO HOOKER.-CHANCELLORSVILLE.

LINCOLN now magnanimously gave General McClellan another and a splendid opportunity to achieve success. His command embraced the army of the Potomac, the remains of the army of Pope, and the troops of Burnside, while to these were added the large number of recruits and volunteers which poured in from the loyal states, so that he had, before November, more than two hundred thousand soldiers under his command.

If he had possessed to any extent the elements of a hero, if he could have led a rapid and brilliant campaign, he had now the opportunity, and the people would have eagerly crowned him with the laurels of victory. But as soon as he was settled in his command, he continued to make the old complaints and calls for more troops. He wished those engaged in the defense of Washington sent to him, even if the capital should fall into the hands of the enemy.'

Colonel Miles and General Julius White, in September, 1862, occupied the picturesque village of Harper's Ferry, with some twelve thousand soldiers. On the 11th, McClellan asked that these troops be directed to join his army. That order was not given, but it was suggested to him that 1. He wished the troops sent to him, "even if Washington should be taken." "That would not bear comparison with a single defeat of this army." Report on Conduct of the War, Pt. 1, p. 39.

he open communication with Harper's Ferry, and that then these troops would be under his command. On the 13th, he knew that Lee's army was divided, and that Jackson had been detached from the main army for the purpose of capturing Harper's Ferry. McClellan by promptness could have saved Harper's Ferry. Swinton, who excuses him when he can, says: "If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson * * * he could have relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender until the 15th." Palfrey, in his "Antietam and Fredericksburg," says: "He was not equal to the occasion. He threw away his chance, and a precious opportunity of making a great name passed away."

On the 17th, was fought the bloody battle of Antietam. Of this battle, alluding to McClellan's delay in attacking while Lee's forces were divided, Palfrey says: "He fought his battle one day too late, if not two." "He did very little in the way of compelling the execution of his orders." A very large portion of his army did not participate in the battle, and Palfrey adds: "It is probable, almost to a point of certainty, that if a great part of the Second and Fifth corps, and all the Sixth, animated by the personal presence of McClellan, had attacked vigorously in the center, and Burnside on the Federal left, * the result would have been the practical annihilation of Lee's army!"▲ McClellan, against the advice of Burnside and others, decided not to renew the attack on the 18th. "It is," says Palfrey, "hardly worth while to state his reasons." Two divisions had joined him. "The fault was in the man. There was force enough at his command either day had he seen fit to use it." By the time that McClellan got ready to renew the attack Lee was gone. On the 18th, the enemy

1. Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 202.

* *

2. Palfrey's Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 41.

3. Palfrey's" Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 119.

4. Palfrey's "Antietam and Fredericksburg," pp. 121-122.

5. Palfrey's" Antietam and Fredericksburg," p. 127.