wealth, ease, religion, humanity, patriotism, Union, and universal slavery; all made sure forever, with "the price of negroes at two hundred dollars" a head!

Another idea looms up under all this which certain moralists should ponder, and correct their logic. They have said all along that it was the "Abolitionists" who had bred all the trouble, and finally brought disunion. But let them take a lesson here from their Southern teachers. It was not the Abolitionists at all; not even the more moderate opponents of slavery; but it was opposition to the slave-trade which at the very first threatened to destroy the Union, just as a refusal to reopen it has led to its actual disruption. The Southern oracle says: "Ever since the time that Congress first took action to suppress the slave-trade, at that crisis and moment were sown the seeds of disunion." A truce then to this war upon the Abolitionists. The "seeds of disunion"

were sown before they were out of their teens.

But to look at the matter "calmly," as we are exhorted to do the AMERICAN PEOPLE may here behold the sumptuous repast to which they were sincerely and soberly invited by the leading spirits of the South, the men who controlled public opinion there, and were successful in precipitating the rebellion. Nothing short of consenting to these demands could have satisfied them. If the North had been ready for this humiliation, the Union and the Government could have been saved and peace maintained. But in no possible way could war have been avoided without this, except upon a complete abandonment of their ground by the South. That ground they would not abandon, and hence the rebellion.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REBELLION.

71

CHAPTER III.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REBELLION.

As in regard to the cause of the rebellion, so also as to the responsibility for it, there has been a wide diversity of opinion. While the former is too plain to admit of doubt, there appears to be more plausible ground for dif ference about the latter; and yet, laying aside prejudice, the facts seem to place this also within the pale of complete moral certainty.

It has been very freely charged, and is still, by many in the loyal States, that the abolitionists have brought all the troubles upon the country, have provoked the South to rebel, and are therefore responsible for the war and all its consequences. Another class divide the responsibility about equally between the abolitionists and secessionists. Still another class charge the whole responsibility upon the rebels, insisting that whatever grievances they may have had, real or imaginary, they were not justified in seeking to redress them by revolution.

Few questions, either political or moral, connected with the contest, can be more important than this; important as affecting the interests of the country at large; important in the eyes of the nations of the world, and in the judg ment which posterity will form; as well as important, officially and personally, to the rulers, and the leaders of parties, both North and South, and to every individual who has given aid on either side, in however small a degree; and not only important for the life that now is, but in reference

to that account which all must render to God when He shall make inquisition concerning the responsibility for having plunged thirty millions of people, in a Christian land, into a war which has in its bearings and magnitude no parallel in history. No question, therefore, deserves to be approached with more candor and examined more dispassionately.

ABOLITIONISTS CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY.

On this point we refer again to the papers of Judge Robertson; chiefly because he represents an extensive class. He condemns the secessionists unsparingly, but he holds the abolitionists largely responsible for the woes which have befallen the land. He says: "For that pernicious ferment, abolitionists are primarily and pre-eminently accountable, and are, therefore, justly chargeable with a large share of the responsibility for all the consequences; for, had there been no abolitionism, there would have been no secession yet, if ever, and had there been no secession there would have been no war." He plainly does not mean by "abolitionists" those who are simply emancipationists, or opposed to slavery, as nearly the whole North and many in the Border slave States are; for, he says, even of himself: "I am not, nor ever was, proslavery in feeling or in principle; I would delight to see all men free." By "abolitionists" he means those of the Garrison and Phillips school; for in the same article he describes them thus: "Abolitionists, it is true, have complained of the Constitution as a league with hell,' only because it tolerates and protects slavery in the slaveholding States; and this pestilent band of fanatics and demagogues have, for thirty years, been plotting a dissolution of the Union as the only or most speedy and sure means of abolishing slavery."

FALLACIOUS REASONING TO SUSTAIN THE CHARGE. 73

By this description the Judge means by "abolitionists" those whom the country commonly accept under this designation, headed by Garrison, Phillips, and their coadjutors, some of whom have heretofore joined with their opposition to slavery, opposition to the Sabbath, the ministry, the Church, and the Bible. He quotes one of their pet phrases which shows that he means them. We enter no defence of this class, as abolitionists. We have always been opposed to their schemes and to the spirit by which they seem to have been actuated. We make these quotations, however, and we remark upon them, for the purpose of endeavoring to determine where the real responsibility we are seeking lies. We believe in giving "the devil his due," and even William Lloyd Garrison and his associates are entitled to at least that measure of consideration. As we totally disagree with the eminent. jurist in locating this responsibility, we cannot refrain from a vindication of these men, so far as the charge is concerned, that they are "primarily and pre-eminently accountable" for the rebellion and the horrors of the war. We not only deny the allegation, and shall give ample evidence to sustain the denial, and show where the responsibility lies, but we are amazed at the reasoning by which the Judge would sustain the charge, though we have frequently met with the like before.

FALLACIOUS REASONING TO SUSTAIN THE CHARGE.

In the first place, we do not see why, in the chain of sequences which the Judge employs, he should either begin or end just where he does. His point is, that the abolitionists are responsible for the war; "for, had there been no abolitionism, there would have been no secession yet, if ever, and had there been no secession there would have been no war."

Why may we not, with equal cogency, so far as the logic of the case is concerned, begin with at least one prior step?-thus: "Had there been no slavery, there would have been no abolitionism," &c. The case admits of this, beyond question. The proposition is logically true, and true in fact. Abolitionism, whether right or wrong, is aimed only at slavery, and could not exist without it. They have lived side by side, and they will die together. Nor is there any logical necessity for beginning with this one prior step. With perfect truth, we may reason thus: "Had there been no sin there would have been no slavery." And the chain might be extended further. But the position of slavery in this longer chain is not only logically correct, but it is so in morals; and this, too, whether slavery is a sin per se or not. It is, at the very least, the fruit of sin, as all classes admit, and one of the palpable signs of a fallen race. The ablest defenders of slavery as a divine institution, declare it to have originated in a "curse" inflicted for sin, and to be one of its most striking badges; and all this, while arguing that in these latter days it has been transmuted into a "blessing" to all concerned, political, social, and moral, by a sort of metaphysical alchemy in which its defenders are peculiarly skilled.

THEY WOULD DISCUSS THE SUBJECT.

But in the next place, passing by the logic of this passage, there is a moral aspect which the case suggests beyond that which we have incidentally stated. Remarkably few, taking the general judgment of Christendom, agree with the men of the extreme South in their modern views of slavery. With a unanimity that has few parallels, it is regarded as an evil, political and social; and by great numbers, as a sin. Whether they are right or wrong in their judgment is not now material; they claim the right