across an open field; they encountered the enemy at the brow of a declivity, up which the rebels struggled in vast numbers, and with unwearying pertinacity. Fortunately, the Reserves were aligned upon a country road, which, having been somewhat worn by use, afforded partial protection, and also depressed their fire. The contest became hot and desperate. Greatly outnumbered by the rebels, they were only enabled to hold them in check by rapid and unceasing firing.

The field officers who rode upon the ground above the road, were much exposed and suffered severely. At one moment all seemed to be lost. The First and Second regiments were engaged in an almost hand to hand encounter; the left was pressed back, and to the consternation of the mounted officers, who from their positions had a view of the field, the troops on the right of the Reserves gave way in utter confusion. At this critical moment, the gallant Reynolds, observing that the flag-staff of the Second regiment had been pierced by a bullet and broken, scized the flag from the color-bearer, and dashing to the right, rode twice up and down his entire division line, waving the flag about his head and cheering on his men.

The rebel sharp-shooters rained fierce showers of bullets around the ensign thus borne aloft, but in vain did the missiles of death fill the atmosphere in which it moved. The effect upon the division was electrical; the men, inspired by the intrepidity of their leader, rent the air with cheers, plied their tremendous musket fire with renewed energy and vigor, and in a few moments, the thinned ranks. of the rebel regiments gave way before the steady and unrelenting volleys poured upon them. Night came on and put an end to the contest; but the famous Stone bridge over Bull Run was, by the genius and heroic daring of General Reynolds, and the valor of the brave men he commanded, preserved for the use of the National army. The enemy, thus beaten back, retired beyond the range of the loyal guns, appalled at the havoc they witnessed in their ranks,

and confounded by their failure to reach the turnpike. The sun was now setting, and the battle had ended.

General Reynolds says, in his report of the operations of his division in Pope's campaign:

On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my division on the left of the pike near the Henry house, and ordered by MajorGeneral Pope to form my division in column by company at full distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left; that I would be the pivot in the attack which Porter's corps was to make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on the pike and in retreat. Having formed my division in the position indicated, and opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods opposite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regiment was deployed to support them, and finally a second; in all, three regiments.

The advanced skirmishers were the First rifles, Colonel McNeil, and the First infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the Seventh infantry, Lieutenant-colonel Henderson. The Sixth regiment, Colonel Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond; and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy, formed for attack on my left flank when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed. Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the commanding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated; but before the rear of my column had left the position the threatened attack by the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it. Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the

retreating masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by which much time was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right, so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained, both in men and material, Kern losing his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper, his caisson.

Colonel Hardin, commanding the Twelfth regiment, was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my immediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, by the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position to the right of the Henry house, which position was most gallantly maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour and Ransom's battery for nearly two hours, when they were relieved by the division of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan.

In reference to the battle of Saturday, August 30, General Pope says:

Between twelve and two o'clock in the day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps, to attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike. At the same time I directed Heintzelman and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front towards Warrenton turnpike, and attack the enemy's left in flank, if possible. For a short time Rickett's division of McDowell's corps was placed in support of this movement on our right.

It was necessary for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy; nor did I think it good policy to do so under the circumstances. During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main body under Lee was arriving on the field to reinforce Jackson, so that by twelve or one o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack along the Warrenton turnpike, and the assault on the enemy was made by Heintzelman and Reno on the right, it became apparent that the enemy was massing his