The moral rectitude of God must consist in a due respect to things that are objects of moral respect. . . And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom the most is due, that is, God, for He is infinitely the most worthy of regard. And if it is fit and holy that God should have a supreme regard to himself, it is fit that He should act in such a manner as to show that He has. That this regard to the infinite excellence of his own nature, should be his last end in creation, is evident-Because it is fit and desirable that his attributes should be exerted, that they should be known by other beings than himself, that they might be the objects of joyous affection.

To the objection that this makes God a selfish Being, acting for his own glory, Mr. Edwards replies, If God be the Infinite Good, and all other excellence less than nothing in comparison, it is fit that He should value himself accordingly, and therefore it is not selfishness but moral rectitude. Selfishness is opposition of one's self to the public good. But this supreme regard of God to himself is just the identification of himself with that good which secures it in the highest degree. If his excellence and glory are worthy to be made the end of his creatures, certainly they must be worthy to be made his end. Thus God's regard to himself as supremely good, is the opposite of selfishness. The perfection of his government depends upon it. Should He turn from it, the good of the universe would fail. The objection is based on misapprehension, and is therefore sciolistic and nugatory.

III. The dissertation on The Nature of True Virtue is constructed on the same ground-principle as that on the End of God in the Creation. Edwards uses the term virtue in the sense of holiness.*

Virtue he defines as something beautiful or excellent, belonging to beings that have perception and will, and as consisting in benevolence to being in general.

The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, simply considered, and its ultimate propensity is to the highest good

* Vol. III, p. 94-162.

of being in general. The second, is benevolent being. This benevolence of a being, and the qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, constitute that spiritual and moral beauty wherein all true virtue consists, and is the pri mary ground of the love of complacency.

The divine virtue consists primarily in love to Himself as both the infinite Being and the infinite Beauty, and secondarily in a regard to his creatures, which is proportional to their being and beauty. Their virtue consists in a similar supremacy of love of Him, and a proportional love to their fellow-creatures. This love is the sum of creaturely excellence, and the fulfilling of the whole law.

Self-love, or benevolence to a particular person or private system, is not of the nature of true virtue, because the good will is confined to a single person, or a small part of universal being. It is against general benevolence, and will set a person against general existence and make him an enemy to it.

The following are some points in what Edwards regarded as the New Divinity, against which he reäffirmed these general principles of the old.

1. That God's chief end in creation is happiness. Rev. Mr. Dwight, the able editor of the N. Y. edition of his works, says, the point demonstrated by Edwards is, that this end was "the manifestation of his own glory in the highest happiness of his creatures." This we think is a misconception. For the highest happiness of all his creatures is not the effect of creation. But Edwards says: "Whatsoever thing is actually the effect of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely valuable in itself, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world." The doctrine of both these dissertations looks for God's end in creation to something higher than happiness, as the "absolutely valuable," namely, to the illustration of infinite excellence, in the production of a similar finite excellence. This bars out the Universalist dogma, which is the logical sequence from the happiness theory, and also the Divine Impotence scheme, that God fails of his end, the happiness of his creatures, only because He is not able to accomplish it.

2. That happiness is the chief end in the virtuous affections

of created beings. Some writers have claimed the dissertatior on the Nature of True Virtue in support of this view. Bu. a careful examination will show that this is one of the errors especially assailed in it. It is a cardinal principle of both the essays, that the chief end of the creatures in a virtuous affection, is the same as God's chief end in his creationthe excellence and glory of the Creator. The author expressly teaches that "a truly virtuous mind, being under the sovereign dominion of love to God, above all things seeks the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end."

*

3. The Utilitarian dogma, which makes virtue not a good in itself, but a means to happiness. The Biblical Repertory,* in an able article on Dr. Alexander's Outlines of Moral Science, appears to impeach Edwards on this point. It is true, a repulsive Utilitarianism is taught in the elaborate note by Dr. Williams, the editor of the English edition. He defines virtue as "a laudable mean of real happiness." But the editor should not be confounded with the author. If we do not mistake, the text confutes the commentary.

Upon this point, Mr. Dwight seems to have misconceived the animus of the essay, when he says Edwards represents "virtue as founded in happiness, and as being love to the greatest happiness." Edwards, on the contrary, says that virtue is founded in being and in benevolence. The first objective ground of it "is being, simply considered," and of course, exclusive of the happiness and misery of that being. The second ground is "benevolent being," neither as happy nor otherwise, but as holy.§ And as God is the chief of all greatness and excellence, of all being and beauty, true holiness is founded objectively on this double element in Him, and consists in love to Him.

The connection between holiness and happiness in the Edwardean scheme is inviolate, as it must be in a moral government; but virtue is made a good in itself, and is sought as the chief and ultimate end, as it must be, that the govern

*Vol. 25, p. 19. Ed. Works, III, p. 100. Vol. I, p. 543. § III, pp. 97, 98.

ment may be one of moral rectitude; and happiness is a good, but not the highest, and hence neither God's nor a holy man's chief end.

The divine excellency of God and of Jesus Christ, says Edwards, in the Essay on Religious Affections, “the Word of God, his Works and Ways, is the primary reason why a true saint loves these things, and not any sup posed interest that he has in them, or any conceived benefit that he has received or shall receive from them." This antagonism of the Edwardean theology to the Utilitarian dogma, is still further evident from its repugnance to a kindred proposition:

4. That all love arises from self-love. If self-love be taken in the sense of a man's loving whatsoever is pleasing to him, which is the truism of his "loving what he loves," it is no wonder that "all love may be resolved into self-love." But "this is calling that self-love which is only a general capacity of loving or hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will." Self-love "most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined private self," or that interest which most immediately consists in those pleasures or pains which are personal.* It is confined to a private system, and will set a person against general existence and make him an enemy to it.† There is an apparent conflict between this view and another presented in "Charity and its Fruits," where he says that "charity, or the spirit of Christian love, is not contrary to all self-love." It is not contrary to Christianity that a man should love himself, or, which is the same thing, his own happiness.

There are three senses in which Edwards employs the term self-love. 1. As a regard for one's self, which is a part of benevolence to being in general; then it is legitimate and Christian, in accordance with the duty of love to one's self implied in the command, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." 2. A love of one's happiness, which belongs to the nature

* Works, III, pp. 118, 119. + P. 119.

Charity and its Fruits, p. 229.

of all intelligent beings, and is as necessary to man's nature as the faculty of the will. In this sense Edwards employs the term, when he speaks of it as "a capacity of being either pleased or displeased, which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will," and of "loving what he loves." 3. The most common and only proper sense of the term, is, a man's regard to his private interest, which sets him against the general good. A careful examination of all Pres. Edwards has said on the subject, and of the different senses and relations in which he employs the term, will disclose his essential consistency. The Treatise on the Religious Affections presents the same dislike to self-love, or desire of happiness, as the source of all love.

"Some say that it is impossible in the nature of things for any man to love God, or any other being, but that love to himself must be the foundation of it. But I humbly suppose it is for want of consideration they say so. They argue that whoever loves God and so desires his glory, or the enjoyment of him, desires these things as his own happiness. . . But how came these things to be so agreeable to him that he esteemed it his highest happiness to glorify God? Is not this the fruit of love? Must not a man first love God, or have his heart united to him, before he will esteem God's good his own, and before he will desire the glorifying of God as his happiness? It is not strong arguing because after a man has his heart united to God in love, and as a fruit of this, he desires His glory and enjoyment as his own happiness, that therefore a desire of this happiness must needs be the cause and foundation of this love; unless it is strong arguing that because a father begat a son, therefore the son certainly begat him. . . . . Something else entirely distinct from self-love might be the cause of this, namely, a change made in the views of the mind and relish of his heart, whereby he apprehends a beauty and a glory and a supreme good in God's nature as it is in itself. This may be the thing that first draws his heart to him and causes his heart to be united to him, prior to all considerations of his own interest or happiness, although after this, and as a fruit of it, he necessarily seeks his interest