Literary and Critical Notices of Books,

THEOLOGY.

Outlines of Theology. By Rev. A. ALEXANDER HODGE. New York: Carter & Brothers. 1860. 8vo, pp. 522. As we stated in our last number, this work was prepared by a son of the Professor of Didactic Theology in the Princeton Theological Seminary, on the basis of questions drawn up by Dr. Hodge, for the use of his classes in 1845-6. The author first used these questions, somewhat modified, for the instruction of his congregation. The answers are derived from various sources; chiefly, however, from the lectures and published works of Dr. Hodge. The latter says of it, that in reading the book, he is "conscious of contact with a mind exterior to his own, differing from it in its modes of thought and expression"-(Princeton Review, Oct. 1860, p. 760). This we had supposed must be the case, as some of the statements in the work could hardly have come from a veteran in theology, and some of them misrepresent (undesignedly) the views of a large body of Christians.

The volume as a whole is well adapted to its object. It treats the main topics of theology by the method of questions and answers. though unfavorable to systematic unity, has its advantage in popular inThis method, struction. The work does not pretend to be a system, but only a succession of topics. The idea of the covenants, if any one, is the central conception; but it is not so applied as to construct from it a regular system. Yet these Outlines will be found to be a useful help in the study of the doctrines.

The work will also be consulted for another object, viz. as a statement of what is called Old School theology, and of the way in which, what it calls New School theology, is represented by the Old School. And here, too, we are glad to see and say, that if the Old School be what is here represented, and if the New School be allowed to state for themselves what they really believe, and are not to be held responsible for opinions which they disavowthat the differences are reduced to narrow limits, limits so narrow as to give no reasonable ground for withholding ecclesiastical and ministerial fellowship on either side. We do not mean, that there are no differences in the technical statements and the philosophical explanations of certain doctrines; but, that these are minor points, when compared with the real unity upon the doctrines themselves. And the explanations and statements of this work, the modifications it suggests upon points sharply debated in the past, may also contribute to this desirable end. It is upon the whole, fairly interpreted, rather irenic than polemic.

There are four chief points in respect to which the doctrinal controversy has been conducted: the Sonship of Christ; Ability and Inability; the Imputation of Adam's Sin; and the Extent (involving in part the Nature) of the Atonement.

As to the Sonship of Christ, the orthodox doctrine is here said to be (p. 145) "that Christ is called Son, to indicate his eternal and necessary personal relation in the Godhead to the first person, who, to indicate his reciprocal relation, is called the Father." And on p. 147, it is said, that "the idea of derivation, as involved in the generation of the Son by the Father, appears rather to be a rational explanation of revealed facts than a revealed fact itself. On such a subject, therefore, it should be held in suspense. this we readily subscribe. The doctrine of the Sonship is a doctrine about a "relation;" and it need not tell us (it cannot) how the relation came to be. Almost all the difficulties about it have come from taking it in the latter

sense.

To

Upon the subject of Ability and Inability, in connection with the theory of the Will, the statements of this work are, we think, less consistent, than those of the old New England doctrine of natural ability and moral inability, as held by Edwards and Smalley. (On Edwards, see p. 44, of this number of our REVIEW.) The soul, says Mr. Hodge, "truly originates actions;" it is "an original cause of its own acts;" it is even implied that it is an "absolute cause; and that here "is a transcendental element of the human will." These statements might satisfy even one who held to the self-determining power. But, on the other hand, ability is formally denied; and it is even argued, that man's inability may properly be called "natural." Ability, as denied, is defined (p. 265) "as the power of the agent to change his own subjective state, to make himself prefer what he does not prefer ;" and it can, of course, be held, in this sense, only by those who maintain a 66 transcendental element" in the will. The phrase "natural ability," in the sense of Edwards, is objected to (p. 267), as giving an 66 unusual sense" to the words; but this "unusual sense" is in fact the current sense in our theological discussions. The position, that the "inability" of the sinner is "natural," is quite as liable to be perverted.

On the question of Imputation these Outlines, of course, adopt the theory of immediate imputation. Mediate imputation is put in a false light. It is defined only as held by Placæus (p. 247), and even then, inconsistently, viz. "that God charges the guilt of Adam's sin upon his posterity only in consequence of that inherent depravity which they inherit by natural generation, e. we are associated with Adam in his punishment, because we are, like him, sinners." Now, the two clauses here separated by the-i. e. (as if they were equivalent)-give two entirely different, and even inconsistent, theories. The second statement would of course exclude imputation. And even the first statement is incorrect in the phrase "only in consequence;" for the theory does not hold that the charge of guilt is "only" on the basis of inherent depravity; though it does say, that this inherent depravity is the "medium" of the imputation, and not strictly a part of the imputation itself. The theory recognizes distinctly the connection between Adam's transgression and our condemnation, but says that this condemnation is "mediated" by our inherent depravity. And even immediate imputation concedes that our condemnation is mediated by our natural union with Adam. The words "immediate" and "mediate" are, in fact, hardly precise enough to designate the real theological differences. The representation here given, of what is called the "realistic theory so prominent in scholastic theology and mediæval philosophy" is equally objectionable. This theory, it says, asserts

"that the same numerical substance, which now subsists in individual men, sinned in Adam." Who holds that "a substance" sinned? or, that the substance of the race is "numerically the same," in the strict sense of numeri cal identity, as applicable, e. g. and only applicable, to the Godhead? The human race is indeed one, and made one by common descent; the same human nature has been propagated, but propagated in and through distinct individuals, who, though distinct as individuals, yet have a common nature. The objections here urged to the "realistic", theory are, 1. That it is an "hypothesis;"" there can be no evidence of any such generic human nature, if all known phenomena can be otherwise accounted for." Of course not; the objection is equally good against any theory. 2. It is "rationalistic." But only as any general theory may be so called. 3. It leads to "manifold absurdities and contradictions" to say, "that community in a propagated nature... involves all in the relations moral and legal of their common progenitor." But whatever difficulties there may be about this matter, they are not peculiar to the "realistic" theory; they lie equally against any doctrine of hereditary sinfulness. The author of this work believes in hereditary depravity; if this does not lead him to the inference, that we are involved in the moral eharacter and conduct of each and all our progenitors, it need not compel the "realist" to the same inference. Community in nature involves the descendant in the generic character and liabilities of the race; what is specific and individual may or may not be transmitted. This is the fact of the case; and the theory should be conformed thereto. If the advocate of immediate imputation holds, that through the nature the imputed sin can be in some way transmitted, without transmitting all sins, then, the "realistic" doctrine of transmitted depravity may hold the same, we suppose, and with equal consistency. And the latter, too, is relieved from the difficulty so forcibly stated by President Edwards (Works, ii, 481): "Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, and another the guilt arising from having a corrupt heart, they have not so well considered the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God." And this theory, stigmatized as "realistic," is certainly more consistent, than is that of immediate imputation, with the doctrine of the Catechism, that, "we sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression:" for, if we sinned in him, it is certainly something more than sinning by "covenant;" and if we fell with him, our fall is rather a participation than a punishment. The 4th objection urged against this theory, in these Outlines, is on the ground of the imputation of Christ's righteousness; if Christ's righteousness is immediately imputed, so, it says, must be Adam's sin, or else no imputation is left. "Our partici pation of Christ's righteousness," says this critic, "is declared by Scripture to be analogous to our participation of Adam's sin." It is analogous in the general sense of imputation, viz. reckoning to account of one what another has done in his stead or behalf. But the mode in which this reckoning takes place may, and must be, different in different cases. In the case of sin, there is at the basis a natural union with Adam by descent; in the case of Christ the union is spiritual, by faith. The case of sin is one of strict legal procedure; in the case of righteousness, the imputation is through and by grace. In this case of Christ's righteousness, there is nothing analogous

to what is strictly asserted about Adam, that we sinned in him and fell with him; we were not holy in Christ, and did not redeem ourselves in him. And even in respect to Christ's righteousness, there is a "medium" in faith, by which we receive him, and so become partakers of his justifying righteousness. If it be said, that if there must be inherent depravity in order to our being condemned, there must also be inherent righteousness in order to our being justified, the answer is derived, in part, from the fact, that the systems of law and of grace are different in their procedures and reckonings; and, in part, from the consideration, that what is needed in both cases is a real bond of union between the parties. In the case of Adam, that union is, as a matter of fact, found in our inherited depravity; in the case of Christ, that union is found in faith. Imputation, as a merely external, outside, abstract scheme, is not applicable either to the one or the other. And whichever view may be advocated, the differences, after all, are of such an abstract, and even tenuous character, that no reasonable person would insist upon entire agreement as essential to church fellowship.

The same is the case with the differences about the extent of the Atonement. The alleviations to the limited atonement theory, which these Outlines present, are such as really to make the controversy almost a logomachy; especially if the writer, as in fairness he ought, would correct his misrepresentation of what he calls the "New School" view of the atonement, The original author of the questions need not, we trust, be held responsible for this statement, which is, that "the governmental theory" is "distinctively New England and New School," and that its advocates "agree with the Socinians in their fundamental propositions: 1st. That sin does not intrinsically deserve punishment, i. e. that the true end of punishment is rather to prevent sin than to satisfy vindicatory justice, and, 2d, That there is no principle in God which demands the punishment of all sin for its own sake alone." To bring such a sweeping charge of holding "Socinian" views on this point, against the "New School" is hardly creditable to the writer. In what authorized representations of that School are such principles avowed? What prominent minister or theologian can be named, who would deny the positions, that sin intrinsically deserves punishment; or, that there is a principle in God, which demands the punishment of sin for its own sake alone? Some may hold, that there are other reasons for punishment than this; but few, if any, would deny that this is a sufficient reason. But to come to the limitation of the Atonement. On this point it is conceded (p. 312), "1st. That the atonement . . . was sufficient in its moral value to satisfy justice for the sins of all men; and, 2d, that it was exactly adapted to meet the requisitions of justice, growing out of the legal relations of all men." (The Italics are ours.) In another passage (p. 316), it is even declared, "that it is exactly adapted to the redemption of all;" and "that God designs that whosoever exercises faith in Christ, shall be saved by him." The only difference now, says the writer, is on the point, of the "purpose" or "design" of Christ in dying; that purpose or design was "limited" to the salvation of the elect. Of course, this whole subject runs back into the theory of the covenants, and the order of the decrees, about which some of our Old School brethren seem to know a good deal more than we are able to find in the Bible. But, at any rate, in the above statements, the difference is reduced to its lowest terms-in fact, to the simple question, what does "design" mean? And here, too, we readily grant, that in the "Covenant," there was included the "design" of saving the elect. But, who knows that this was all the "design" there was in the "covenant"? May it not also have been a part of the "design" to make the salvation of all possible, and

to offer it to all on condition of repentance and faith. For, if the atonement, as is conceded, is "sufficient to satisfy justice for the sins of all men," if it is "adapted to meet the requisitions of justice growing out of the legal relations of all men," if it is "exactly adapted to the redemption of all," and if "God designs that whosoever exercises faith in Christ shall be saved by him,"-how do we know but that all this formed a part of the "covenant"? How do we know that the "covenant" was not "designed" to ef fect all this? What right have we to limit the "design," to only a part of what is actually accomplished by and through Christ's work? As it is in fact, so it was in purpose. And we may certainly reason back from what the atonement actually accomplishes to what it was designed to accomplish; and perhaps this is a safer course, than to make a theory of the covenants first, and then state the facts so as to accord with the theory. Is there any safer and surer way of finding out what was contained in the covenant, than by asking, what do the Scriptures tell about Christ's work and its effects? And if the Bible assures us that Christ died for the sins of the world, and for all, it is more reasonable to conclude, that in some proper sense of the word he "designed" to do this, than to limit the import of that gracious assurance, which expresses the whole truth about this matter, that Christ "is the Saviour of all men, especially of them that believe."

CODEX ALEXANDRINUS. Novum Testamentum Græce ex antiquissimo Codice Alexandrino a C. G. WOIDE, olim descriptum: ad Fidem ipsius Codicis denuo accuratius edidit B. C. CowPER. Londini, Williams et Norgate. New York. B. Westermann et Soc. 1860. Pp. xxx. 504. We have received this beautiful edition of the Alexandrine Codex only in time to announce its publication. The New Testament of this Codex A has been published only once before, in 1786, by Woide. The present work is more correct. It is a very important addition to the critical helps for the study of the New Testament. The paper and typography are all that could be desired. Westermann & Co. are the New York publishers. We shall give a more full account of it in the next number of the REVIEW.

Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount. By Dr. A. THOLUCK. Translated by Rev. R. L. BROWN. Philadelphia. Smith, English & Co. 1860. Pp. 443. The Commentary has a standard reputation. The present translation is from the fourth German edition, and appears to be well executed, though retaining traces of the German edition. The work itself is indispensable to the scholar, being one of the best examples, in modern biblical literature, of full and minute interpretation.

Beneficium Christi. The Benefit of Christ's Death: Originally written in Italian, and attributed to AONIO PALEARIO. With an Historical Sketch of the Book and its Writer. Philadelphia: Presb. Pub. Committee. The Publication Committee have done a good service in reprinting this little work, which, after a circulation of 40,000 copies, in the 16th century, had almost passed into oblivion. It was one of the dawning fruits of the Reformation in Italy. The present reprint is from the English translation of 1573, discovered by Rev. John Ayre in 1843 or 1844. It cannot be read without profit, and a deeper sense of the import of Christ's work. It is written in a simple and earnest manner, by one whose soul was filled with a conviction of its own sinfulness, and of the absolute need of that righteousness which is of God through faith in Jesus Christ. We notice that Bell & Daldy of London announce, The Life and Times of Æonio Paleario: or, a History of the Italian Reformation in the Sixteenth Century; Illustrated by Original Letters and Unedited Documents. By M. Young. In 2 vols.