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134 Remarks at the Airport Upon Departing From Guam.

March 21, 1967

General Crumm, distinguished United States officials, men of the Andersen Air Force Base:

Before I returned to Washington, I wanted to come here to see some of the men and their families who are carrying the burdens of this war, as I did last fall when I went to Cam Ranh Bay.

In some respects, our engagement in Vietnam is familiar to America.

In World War II and in Korea, as in Vietnam, there was a conflict of ideology between ourselves and our adversaries. But the struggle was not limited to one of ideology.

Force had to be met with force. Americans had to shoulder rifles, man tanks and warships, and take bombers into the air, all at great risk to their lives and at a great distance from their homelands.

The ideological debates continued over the wisdom of involvement or noninvolvement:

The "America Firsters" had their say, but the aggressors could not be stopped by argument.

People who desired to live in freedom. could not be protected by debating points. The defense of freedom required then, as it requires now, the willingness of brave men to face danger, to risk death, and to live with their fears for months and years on end.

Today we are here to decorate 12 men, all of whom risked their lives many times in the air over Vietnam.

As their Commander in Chief and the representative of the people whom they have so gallantly served, I salute them with all my heart.

There are some respects, as professional soldiers know, in which this war is different from the others that we have waged. There are no sharply defined battlelines. The ran

dom terror of the subversive-not the methodical power of a conventional army in the field-is the enemy's main weapon.

Political and social forces are at work that complicate the struggle and make it necessary to do far more than wage a traditional military campaign.

We met these past 2 days here with leaders-Vietnamese and Americans—to discuss some of the elements of this different kind of war in Vietnam.

We brought here the new team of American representatives to Vietnam:

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who has served his country with great distinction in the Dominican crisis, in India, in Italy, and many other posts of the highest responsibility; Ambassador Eugene Locke, who now represents us in Pakistan; and Robert Komer, who until now has been in the White House as my counselor on the civil side of the Vietnamese war.

We wanted these distinguished Americans to meet the leaders of Vietnam with whom they will be working in the months ahead. We came here to discuss seven of our major concerns in Vietnam today:

First, the military progress of the war, both in the South and in the North; Second, the political progress that is being made in South Vietnam.

Prime Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitution which the freely elected Constituent Assembly had just adopted in South Vietnam and which the Directorate had just approved. This is the third and the most significant step that South Vietnam has taken toward granting its people the fundamental rights of democracy.

Third, we discussed in some detail the morale, the health, the training, the food, the

clothing, and the equipment of our superb young fighting men.

I questioned General Westmoreland closely on all of these matters and his response was deeply gratifying to me.

Fourth, the national reconciliation program in Vietnam;

Fifth, the land reform program which is moving steadily forward;

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and what is being done to help those who are injured or who are wounded by the war;

Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an end to this conflict at as early a date as possible by an honorable settlement.

We did not adopt any spectacular new programs at this meeting. We said in advance that that was not our plan. The nature of this war is not amenable to spectacular programs or to easy solutions. It requires courage, perseverance, and dedication-exactly the qualities that men such as you are providing today.

So to all of the men of this Command, and their families who so loyally stand by them in this hour of trial, let me say as we leave Guam that all America honors you and is grateful to you.

We feel refreshed by the conviction that on every front-military, political, and social—we and our allies are making substantial progress. When the inevitability of that progress finally gets through and becomes clear to Hanoi, we shall then arrive at what

135

Churchill would have called "the beginning of the end."

So I leave you today with pride-great pride in what you are doing, and great confidence for the country that you serve.

I do not want to let this occasion go by without presenting to you some of the great public servants who lead this Nation in this critical period.

I want to introduce your Secretary of State-Dean Rusk.

Next I want to introduce your Secretary of Defense-Robert McNamara.

Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador

Locke.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler; Admiral Sharp; General Maxwell Taylor; General Westmoreland; and your distinguished Governor of Guam.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle

men.

NOTE: The President spoke at 5:16 p.m. at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. In his opening words he referred to Maj. Gen. William J. Crumm, base commander. Later he referred to Ellsworth Bunker, successor to Henry Cabot Lodge as Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, and Eugene Locke, Deputy Ambassador. At the close of his remarks he referred to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, Jr., Commander in Chief, Pacific, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Consultant to the President, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and Governor Manuel F. L. Guerrero of Guam.

Remarks at Andrews Air Force Base Near Washington Upon Returning From the Guam Conference. March 21, 1967

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen:

As I said upon my departure from Guam, we discussed seven of our major concerns at our meeting there.

First, the military progress of the war,

both in the South and in the North.

Second, the political progress that is being made now in South Vietnam. Prime Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitution, which the freely elected Constituent Assem

bly has adopted, and which the Directorate has just approved. This is the third and most significant step that South Vietnam has taken toward granting its people the fundamental rights of democracy.

Third, we discussed the morale, the health, the training, the food, the clothing, and equipment of our superb young fighting men. I questioned General Westmoreland very closely on these matters. His response was extremely gratifying to me.

Fourth, the national reconciliation program in Vietnam.

Fifth, the land reform program, which is moving steadily forward. Premier Ky told me that he had distributed 27,000 titles just recently.

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and what is being done to help those who are injured or who are wounded by the war. Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an end to this conflict by an honorable settlement.

We did not adopt any specific or spectacu

lar new programs at this meeting. The nature of this war is not amenable to spectacular programs or easy solutions. It requires courage, perseverance, and dedication.

During my flight home I learned that Hanoi had made public an exchange of letters between me and Ho Chi Minh. His reply to me of mid-February and his earlier public reply to His Holiness, the Pope, were regrettable rebuffs to a genuine effort to move toward peace. This has been the consistent attitude of Hanoi to many efforts that have been made by us, by other governments, by groups of governments, and by many leading personalities throughout the world. Nevertheless, we shall persevere in our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until that is achieved, of course, we shall continue to do our duty in Vietnam.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:53 p.m. at Andrews Air Force Base.

For the text of the President's letter to President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam, see Item 136.

136 Letter to Ho Chi Minh Proposing Bilateral Discussions on the Vietnam Conflict. March 21, 1967

[Released March 21, 1967. Delivered February 8, 1967]

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to you in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can be brought to an end. That conflict has already taken a heavy tollin lives lost, in wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and in simple human misery. If we fail to find a just and peaceful solution, history will judge us harshly.

Therefore, I believe that we both have a heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to peace. It is in response to that obligation that

I am writing directly to you.

We have tried over the past several years, in a variety of ways and through a number of channels, to convey to you and your colleagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settlement. For whatever reasons, these efforts have

not achieved any results.

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our attitudes and yours, have been distorted or misinterpreted as they passed through these various channels. Certainly that is always a

danger in indirect communication. There is one good way to overcome this problem and to move forward in the search for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to arrange for direct talks between trusted representatives in a secure setting and away from the glare of publicity. Such talks should not be used as a propaganda exercise but should be a serious effort to find a workable and mutually acceptable solution.

In the past two weeks, I have noted public statements by representatives of your government suggesting that you would be prepared to enter into direct bilateral talks with representatives of the U.S. Government, provided that we ceased “unconditionally" and permanently our bombing operations against your country and all military actions against it. In the last day, serious and responsible parties have assured us indirectly that this is in fact your proposal.

Let me frankly state that I see two great difficulties with this proposal. In view of your public position, such action on our part would inevitably produce worldwide speculation that discussions were under way and would impair the privacy and secrecy of those discussions. Secondly, there would inevitably be grave concern on our part whether your Government would make use of such action by us to improve its military position.

With these problems in mind, I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your Government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U.S. forces in South

Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Viet-Nam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace.

I make this proposal to you now with a specific sense of urgency arising from the imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam.

If

you are able to accept this proposal I see no reason why it could not take effect at the end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The proposal I have made would be greatly strengthened if your military authorities and those of the Government of South Viet-Nam could promptly negotiate an extension of the Tet truce.

As to the site of the bilateral discussions I propose, there are several possibilities. We could, for example, have our representatives meet in Moscow where contacts have already occurred. They could meet in some other country such as Burma. You may have other arrangements or sites in mind, and I would try to meet your suggestions.

The important thing is to end a conflict that has brought burdens to both our peoples, and above all to the people of South VietNam. If you have any thoughts about the actions I propose, it would be most important that I receive them as soon as possible. Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

[His Excellency Ho Chi Minh, President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam]

NOTE: The President's letter was made public on March 21 after the text of the letter and President Ho's reply had been broadcast in English by Radio Hanoi earlier that day. A translation of President Ho's reply is printed in the Department of State Bulletin (vol. 56, p. 596).

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