the commissioners would seek, by means of well-ordered | and profound deliberation, whether these interests are definitively irreconcilable, whether separation is an extreme that can no longer be avoided, or whether the memories of a common existence, the ties of every kind which have made of the North and the South one whole Federative State, and have borne them on to so high a degree of prosperity, are not more powerful than the causes which have placed arms in the hands of the two populations.

The suggestion is not an extraordinary one, and it may well have been thought by the Emperor of the French, in the earnestness of his benevolent desire for the restoration of peace, a feasible one. But when M. Drouyn de l'Huys shall come to review it in the light in which it must necessarily be examined in this country, I think he can hardly fail to perceive that it amounts to nothing less than a proposition that, while this Government is engaged in suppressing an armed insurrection, with the purpose of maintaining the constitutional national authority, and preserving the integrity of the country, it shall enter into diplomatic discussion with the insurgents upon the questions whether that authority shall not be renounced, and whether the country shall not be delivered over to disunion, to be quickly followed by ever increasing anarchy.

If it were possible for the Government of the United States to compromise the National authority so far as to enter into such debates, is it not easy to perceive what good results could be obtained by them.

sities, and therefore can seldom be conformed to precedenta, Great Britain, when entering on the negotiations had man ifestly come to entertain doubts of her ultimate success; and it is certain that the councils of the colonies could not fail to take new courage, if not to gain other advantage, when the parent State compromised so far as to treat of peace on the terms of conceding their independence.

It is true, indeed, that peace must come at some time, and that conferences must attend, if they are not allowed to precede the pacification. There is, however, a better form for such conferences than the one which M. Drouyn de l'Huys suggests. The latter would be palpably in deroga tion of the Constitution of the United States, and would carry no weight because destitute of the sanction necessary to bind either the disloyal or the loyal portions of the people. On the other hand, the Congress of the United States furnishes a constitutional forum for debates between the alienated parties. Senators and Representatives from the loyal portion of the people are there already, freely empowered to confer; and seats also are vacant, and inviting Senators and Representatives of the discontented party who may be constitutionally sent there from the States involved in the insurrection. Moreover, the conferences which can thus be held in Congress have this great advan tage over any that could be organized upon the plan of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, namely: that the Congress, if it were thought wise, could call a national convention to adopt its recommendations, and give them all the solemnity and binding force of organic law. Such conferences between the alienated parties may be said to have already begun. Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri— States which are claimed by the insurgents-are already represented in Congress, and submitting with perfect freedom, and in a proper spirit, their adv o upon the course best calculated to bring about, in the shortest time, a firm, lasting, and honorable peace. Representatives have been sent, also, from Louisiana, and others are understood to be coming from Arkansas.

On the other hand, as I have already intimated, this Government has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided to it by the nation, under the most solemn of all political sanctions; and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized. Whatever, in the case of an insurrection, the people of France, or of Great Britain, or of Switzerland, or the Netherlands would do to save their national existences, no mutter how the strife might be regarded by or affect foreign nations, just so much, and certainly no less, the people of the United States will do, if necessary to save for the com. mon benefit the region which is bounded by the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, and by the shores of the Gulfs of St. Law rence and Mexico, together with the free and common navi. gation of the Rio Grande, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, St. Lawrence, Hudson, Delaware, Potomac, and other natural highways by which this land, which to them is at Once a land of inheritance and a land of promise, is opened and watered. Ev n if the agents of the American people now exercising their power, should, through fear or faction, fall below this height of the national virtue, they would be speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by others or sterner character and patriotism.

I must be allowed to say, also, that M. Drouyn de l'Huyu errs in his description of the parties to the present conflict. We have here, in a political sense, no North and South, no southern and northern States. We have an insurrectionary party, which is located chiefly upon and adjacent to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico; and we have, on the other hand, a loyal people, who constitute not only northern States, but also eastern, middle, western, and southern States.

I have on many occasions heretofore submitted to the French Government the President's views of the interests and the ideas more effective for the time than even interests which lie at the bottom of the American Government and people to sustain the Federal Union. The President has done the same thing in his messages and other public dec. larations. I refrain, therefore, from reviewing that argu. ment in connection with the existing question.

M. Dronyn de l'Huys draws to his aid the conferences which took place between the colonies and Great Britain, in our Revolutionary war. He will allow us to assume, that action in the crisis of a nation must accord with its neces

so would be of pernicious example, the congressional conference, on the contrary, preserves and gives new strength to that sacred writing which must continue through future ages the sheet anchor of the Republic.

You will be at liberty to read this dispatch to M. Drouyn de l'Huys, and to give him a copy, if he shall desire it. To the end that you may be informed of the whole case, I transmit a copy of M. Drouyn de l'Huys's dispatch. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS UPON FOREIGN
MEDIATION.

Third Session, Thirty-Seventh Congress. Whereas it appears from the diplomatic correspondence submitted to Congress that a proposition, friendly in form, looking to pacification through foreign mediation, has been made to the United States by the Emperor of the French and promptly declined by the President; and whereas the idea of mediation or intervention in some shape may be regarded by foreign governments as practicable, and such governments, through this misunderstanding, may be led to proceedings tending to embarrass the friendly relations which now exist between them and the United States; and whereas, in order to remove for the future all chance of misunderstanding on this subject, and to secure, for the United States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign interierence which is one of the highest rights of independent States, it seems fit that Congress should declare its convictions thereon: Therefore,

Resolved, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That while, in times past, the United States have sought and accepted the friendly mediation or arbitration of foreign pow ers for the pacific adjustment of international questions, where the United States were the party of the one part and some other sovereign power the party of the other part; and while they are not disposed to misconstrue the natural and humane desire of foreign powers to aid in arresting domestic troubles, which, widening in their influence, have afflicted other countries, especially in view of the circumstance, deeply regretted by the American people, that the blow aimed by the rebellion at the national life has fallen heavily upon the laboring population of Europe; yet, notwithstanding these things, Congress cannot hesitate to regard every proposition of foreign interference in the present contest as so far unreasonable and inadmissible that its only explanation will be found in a misunderstanding of the

visable, but I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the southern States altogether; but it was plain that it was not though: prudent to avow this desire. Indeed some hints of it, dropped before the elections, were so ill received that a strong declaration in the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic leaders.

At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and reproach the Government with slackness as well as with want of success in its military measures. But they repudiate all idea of interfering with the institutions of the southern people, or of waging a war of subjugation or extermination. They maintain that the object of the military operations should be to place the North in a position to demand an armistice with honor and effect. The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a convention, in which such changes of the Constitution should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its slave property, and would enable the North and the South to reunite and to live together in peace and harmony. The Conservatives profess to think that the South might be induced to take part in such a convention, and that a restoration of the Union would be the result.

The more sagacious members of the party must, however, look upon the proposal of a convention merely as a last experiment to test the possibility of reunion. They are no doubt well aware that the more probable consequence of an armistice would be the establishment of Southern independence, but they perceive that if the South is so utterly alienated that no possible concessions will induce it to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless war.

It is with reference to such an armistice as they desire to attain, that the leaders of the Conservative party regard the question of foreign mediation. They think that the offer of mediation, if made to a radical administration, would be rejected; that, if made at an unpropitious moment, it might increase the virulence with which the war is prose cuted. If their own party were in power, or virtually controlled the administration, they would rather, if possible, obtain an armistice without the aid of foreign governments, but they would be disposed to accept an offer of mediation if it appeared to be the only means of putting a stop to hostilities. They would desire that the offer should come from the great powers of Europe conjointly, and in particular that as little prominence as possible should be given to Great Britain.

At Washington I have had fewer opportunities than I had at New York of ascertaining the present views of the chiefs of the political parties. At the interview which I had with Mr. Seward the day after my arrival he showed no disposition to enter upon political matters. He did not appear to expect or to desire to receive from me any special communication from her Majesty's government. The President, when I waited upon him, talked to me only on ordinary topics. I, for my part, gladly shunned all allusion to foreign intervention, my principal object being to avoid saying anything which might embarrass me in carrying out any instructions on the subject which I may receive from your lordship.

All things considered, my own opinion certainly is that the present moment is not a favorable one for making an offer of mediation. It might embarrass the peace party, and even oblige them, in order to maintain their popularity, to make some declaration against it, and this might make it difficult for them to accept a similar offer at a more propitious time. It would in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to have thrown himself into the arms of the extreme radical party.

The views of that party are clear and definite. They declare that there is no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people; that the war must be pursued, per fas et nefas, until the disloyal men of the South are ruined and subjugated, if not exterminated; that not an inch of the old territory of the Republic must be given up; that foreign intervention, in any shape, must be rejected and resented. This party would desire to turn an offer of mediation to account, for the purpose of inflaming the war . spirit and producing a reaction against the Conservatives. Is is probable, too, that the Government would urge, in answer to an offer of mediation, that it has by no means abandoned the hope of putting down the rebellion within a reasonable time; that at all events, this is not a moment at which it can reasonably be called upon to put a stop to hostilities. It would observe that the armies of the United States are everywhere advancing, and that expeditions are prepared against Texas, as well as against Charleston, Mobile, and other points on the coast. It would point out that it had equipped a considerable number of war-vessels, iron-clad as well as others, at a vast expense; that the season had just arrived when the autumn rains would render

the rivers navigable by armed vessels, and when the Southern coast would be free from epidemic disease. It might even represent an advance of the Army of the Potomac to Richmond as a probable event. The experience of the past is certainly not calculated to inspire any great confidence in the results of these warlike preparations, but the political interests of the party now in power render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military oper ations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure of power become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a severe account for their extra-legal proceedings. During the session of Congress which begins next month, the present Administration has indeed reason to expect an uncompromising support from a majority of both Houses of Congress. But on the 4th of March next, the existing House of Representatives is dis solved by the terms of the Constitution, and at the same time several of the present Senators go out of office. The majority of the members chosen at the recent elections for the new House of Representatives are of the Democratic or Conservative party, and in some States, Senators of that party will be returned in the room of those whose term of office expires next March. The new Congress is likely to be hostile to the Administration and to the Radical party; and although it will not, in the ordinary course of things, assemble until the last month of next year, the President will hardly be able to persist in his present policy and in his assumption of extraordinary powers, unless he can, in virtue of military successes, obtain a reputation with the people which will sustain him in a contest with the Legislature.

It would seem, then, to be vain to make an offer of mediation to the present Government, in their present mood, with any notion that it would be accepted. A change of mood may, however, take place after the 4th of March, if no great military successes occur in the interval. Such a change may possibly be produced sooner by military reverses. A proposal, however, to mediate, made even under the present circumstances, by three or more of the great powers of Europe conjointly might not produce any great inconvenience.

It is, indeed, urged by some people that mediation should be offered, not so much with a view to its being accepted as to its clearing the way for a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. And, indeed, if it were determined that the time had come for recognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer of mediation would be a suitable preliminary. But I do not clearly understand what advantage is expected to result from a simple recognition of the southern government; and I presume that the European powers do not contemplate breaking up the blockade by force of arms, or engaging in hostilities with the United States in support of the independence of the South.

I have, indeed, heard it maintained that Great Britain should recognize the independence of the South as soon as possible, with a view to impede the success of the efforts of the conservative party to reconstruct the Union. The advocates of this opinion consider a re-union as a probable event, and apprehend that the first result of it would be that the combined forces of the North and the South would be let loose upon Canada. I certainly do not at present share these apprehensions. All hope of the reconstruction of the Union appears to be fading away, even from the minds of those who most ardently desire it. But if the reconstruction be still possible, I do not think we need conclude that it would lead to an invasion of Canada, or to any consequences injurious to Great Britain. At any rate dangers of this kind are remote. The immediate and obvious interest of Great Britain, as well as of the rest of Europe, is that peace and prosperity should be restored to this country as soon as possible. The point chiefly worthy of consider ation appears to be whether separation or reunion be the more likely to effect this object.

The French in Mexico. Third Session, Thirty-Seventh Congress. IN SENATE. 1863, January 19-Mr. McDOUGALL offered the following concurrent resolutions:

Resolved by the Senate, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That the present attempt by the government of France to subject the Republic of Mexico to her author ity by armed force is a violation of the established and known rules of international law, and that it is, moreover, a violation of the faith of France, pledged by the treaty made at London on the 31st day of October, 1861, between the allied governments of Spain, France, and England, commu. nicated to this Government over the signatures of the re

of France.

presentatives of the allies by letter of the 30th day of November, 161, and particularly and repeatedly assured to this Government through its ministers resident at the Court Resolved further, That the attempt to subject the Republic of Mexico to the French authority is an act not merely unfriendly to this Republic, but to free institutions every where, and that it is regarded by this Republic as not only unfriendly, but as hostile.

Resolved further, That it is the duty of this Republic to require of the government of France that her armed forces be withdrawn from the territories of Mexico.

Resolved further, That it is the duty and proper office of this Republic now, and at all times, to lead such aid to the Republic of Mexico as is or may be required to prevent the forcible interposition of any of the States of Europe in the political affairs of that Republic.

Resolved further, That the President of the United States be requested to cause to be communicated to the government of Mexico the views now expressed by the two Houses of Congress, and be further requested to cause to be negotiated such treaty or treaties between the two Republics as will best tend to make these views effective.

1863, February 4-The resolutions were, on motion of Mr. SUMNER, laid on the table-yeas 34, nays 10, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Arnold, Carlile, Chandler, Clark, Collamer, Cowan, Daris, Dixon, Doolittle, Fessenden, Foot, Foster, Grimes, Hale, Harding, Harlan, Harris, Hen derson, Howard, Howe, King, Lane of Indiana, Lane of KanBas, Morrill, Pomeroy, Sherman, Sumner, Ten Eyck, Wade, Wilkinson, Wilmot, Wilson of Massachusetts-34.

NAYS Messrs. Kennedy, Latham, McDougall, Powell, Rice, Richardson, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Turpie, Wilson of Missouri-10.

First Session, Thirty-Eighth Congress. IN SENATE.

1864, Jan. 11-Mr. MCDOUGALL offered this joint resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations :

IN RELATION TO THE OCCUPATION OF MEXICO.

Resolved, &c., That the occupation of a portion of the territory of the Republic of Mexico by the armed forces of the government of France, with the purposes avowed by the government of France, is an act unfriendly to the Republic of the United States of America.

SEC. 2. And be it further resolved, That it is the duty of the proper department of this Government to demand of the government of France the withdrawal of her armed forces from the Mexican territory within a reasonable

time.

SEC. 3. And be it further resolved, That in the event the government of France shall decline or refuse to so withdraw her armed forces, or shall fail to take measures to that effect, on or before the fifteenth day of March next, then it will become the duty of the Congress of the United States of America to declare war against the government of France.

June 14-Mr. MCDOUGALL sought to introduce this resolution, but objection was made: Resolved, That the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any foreign power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government on the western continent, and that they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such power to obtain any footholds for monarchical Governments sustained by foreign military force in near proximity to the United States.

IN HOUSE.

1864, April 4-Mr. H. WINTER DAVIS, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, reported to the House of Representatives the following joint resolution, which was passed-yeas 109, nays none, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. James C. Allen, William J. Allen, Alloy, Allison, Ames, Ancona, Anderson, Arnold, Ashley, Baily, Augus'us C. Baldwin, John D. Baldwin, Baxter, Beaman, Blaine, Francis P. Blair, jr., Bliss, Blow, Boutwell, Boyd, Brooks, Broomall, James S. Brown, William G. Brown, Chanter, Ambrose W. Clark, Clay, Cobb, Cole, Cox, Cravens, Creswell, Henry Winter Davis, Thomas T. Davis, Dawson, Denison, Dixon, Driggs, Dumont, Eckley, Eden, Eldridge, Eliot, English, Fenton, Finck, Frank, Ganson, Garfield, Gooch, Grider, Grinnell, Griswold, Hale, Harding, Harring

ton, Herrick, Higby, Holman, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, Jenckes, Philip Johnson, Julian, Kalbfleisch, Kasson, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, Orlando Kellogg, Ker nan, King, Law, Lazear, Long, Longyear, Mallory, Marcy, Marvin, McBride, McClurg, McKinney, Middleton, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Daniel Morris, James R. Morris, Morrison, Amos Myers, Leonard Myers, Nelson, Norton, Odell, Charles O'Neill, John O'Neill, Orth, Patterson, Pen dleton, Perham, Pike, Pomeroy, Price, Pruyn, Samuel J. Randall, William H. Randall, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Rogers, Edward H. Rollins, James S. Rollins, Schenck, Scofield, Scott, Shannon, Sloan, Smithers, Spalding, Starr, John B. Steele, Stevens, Strouse, Stuart, Sweat, Thayer, Tracy, Upson, Van Valkenburgh, Voorhees, Ward, Ellihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Webster, Whaley, Wheeler, Chilton A. White, Joseph W. White, Williams, Wilder, Wilson, Windom, Winfield, Benjamin Wood, Woodbridge, Yeaman-109. NAYS-None.

The resolution is as follows:

Relative to the substitution of monarchial for republican Government in Mexico, under European auspices. Resolved, &c., That the Congress of the United States are

unwilling, by silence, to leave the nations of the world

under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico; and they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowl edge a monarchical government, erected on the ruins of any republican government in America, under the auspices of any European power.

IN SENATE.

1864, April 5-The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and it remained unreported at the close of the session.

April 27-Mr. McDOUGALL offered a resolution that the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to report to the Senate the joint resolution printed above.

May 28-Mr. MCDOUGALL offered a resolution that the committee be discharged from the subject, both of which went over.

IN HOUSE.

May 23-Mr. H. W. DAVIS offered this resolution, which was agreed to without a division: Whereas the following announcement appeared in the Moniteur, the official journal of the French Government: "Le gouvernement de "The Emperor's Governl'Empereur a reçu du gou- ment has received from that vernement des Etats-Unis of the United States satisfac des explications satisfai- tory explanations as to the santes sur le sens et la portée sense and bearing of the resde la résolution prise par olution come to by the House l'assemblée des représentans of Representatives at Washà Washington, au sujet des ington relative to Mexico. affairs du Mexico.

"On sait, d'ailleurs, que le Sénat ayait déjà ajourné indéfinement l'examen de cette résolution, à laquelle, dans tous les cas, le pouvoir exécutif n'eût point accordé sa sanction."-Moniteur.

Therefore,

"It is known, besides, that the Senate had indefinitely postponed the examination of that question, to which in any case the executive power would not have given its sanction."

Resolved, That the President be requested to communicate to this House, if not inconsistent with the public interest, any explanations given by the Government of the United States to the Government of France respecting the sense and bearing of the joint resolution relative to Mexico, which passed the House of Representatives unanimously on the 4th of April, 1864.

May 24-The PRESIDENT transmitted the following correspondence, communicated by the Secretary of State, in response to the resolution of the House :

MR. SEWARD'S LETTER TO MR. Dayton, dated DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, APRIL 7, 1864.

I send you a copy of a resolution which passed the House of Representatives on the 4th instant, by a unanimous vote, and which declares the opposition of that body to a recog nition of a monarchy in Mexico. M. Geofrey has lost no time in asking for an explanation of this proceeding.

It is hardly necessary, after what I have heretofore written with perfect candor for the information of France, to

say that this resolution truly interprets the unanimous sen- | timent of the people of the United States in regard to Mexico. It is, however, another and distinct question whether the United States would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form adopted by the House of Representatives at this time. This is a practical and purely Executive question, and the decision of its constitutionality belongs not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United States. You will, of course, take notice that the declaration made by the House of Representatives is in the form of a joint resolution, which, before it can acquire the character of a legislative act, must receive, first, the concurrence of the Senate, and, secondly, the approval of the President of the United States; or, in case of his dissent, the renewed assent of both houses of Congress, to be expressed by a majority of two-thirds of each body. While the President receives the declaration of the House of Representatives with the profound respect to

which it is entitled, as an exposition of its sentiments upon a grave and important subject, he directs that you inform the Government of France that he does not at present contemplate any departure from the policy which this Government has hitherto pursued in regard to the war which exists between France and Mexico. It is hardly necessary to say that the proceeding of the House of Representatives was adopted upon suggestions arising within itself, and not upon any communication of the Executive department; and that the French Government would be seasonably apprised of any change of policy upon this subject which the President might at any future time think it proper to adopt.

MR. DAYTON'S LETTER, DATED PARIS, APRIL 22, 1864. SIR: I visited M. Drouyn de l'Huys yesterday at the department of foreign affairs. The first words he addressed to me, on entering the room, were: "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" I asked him to what he referred, and he said he referred more immediately to those resolutions recently passed by Congress in reference to the invasion of Mexico by the French, and the establishment of Maximilian upon the throne of that country. I said to him, in reply, that I did not think France had a right to infer that we were about to make war against her on account of anything contained in those resolutions; that they embodied nothing more than had been constantly held out to the French government from the beginning; that I had always represented to the government here that any action upon their part interfering with the form of government in Mexico would be looked upon with dissatisfaction in our country, and they could not expect us to be in haste to acknowledge a monarchical government, built upon the foundations of a republic which was our next neighbor; that I had reason to believe you held the same language to the French Minister in the United States. This allegation he did not seem to deny, but obviously viewed the resolutions in question as a serious step upon our part; and I am told that the leading secessionists here build largely upon these resolutions as a means of fomenting ill-feeling between this country and some others and ourselves. Mr. Mason and his secretary have gone to Brussels to confer with Mr. Dudley Mann, who is their commissioner at that place. Mr. Slidell, it is said, was to have gone to Austria, although he has not yet got off.

SECOND LETTER FROM MR. DAYTON, PARIS, MAY 2, 1864, BEING IN REPLY TO MR. SEWARD'S OF APRIL 7.

SIR: Immediately upon the receipt of your dispatch No. 525, I applied to M. Drouyn de l'Huys for a special interview, which was granted for Saturday last. I then said that I knew that the French government had felt some anxiety in respect to the resolution which had recently been passed by the House of Representatives, in reference to Mexico; and inasmuch as I had just received a copy of that resolution, together with the views of the President of the United States, I begged, if agreeable, to read to him your dispatch in reference to the latter. To this he assented, and as the shortest and most satisfactory mode, following out my instructions, I read to him that entire portion of your dispatch which applies to this subject, stating, at the same time, that I thought it was a remarkable illustration of the frankness and straightforwardness of the President. When the reading was closed, M. Drouyn de l'Iluys expressed his gratification, and after asking some questions in regard to the effect of laying a resolution upon the table in the Senate, the conversation terminated.

The extreme sensitiveness which was manifested by this government when the resolution of the House of Representatives was first brought to its knowledge has, to a considerable extent, at least, subsided.

cerning Mexico, as you have reported it, is entirely approved. The resolution yet remains unacted upon in the Senate. Mr. Corwin was to leave Vera Cruz on the 3d instant under the leave of absence granted to him by this department on the 8th of August last.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of May 2, (No. 461,) and to approve of your proceedings therein mentioned. We learn that Mr. Corwin, our minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, is at Havana, on his return to the United States, under leave of absence. June 4-Mr. Davis, of Maryland,. asked unanimous consent to make a written report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in response to the above message of the President. Mr. BROOMALL objected.

June 6 He asked consent, and Mr. ARNOLD objected. He then moved to suspend the rules, which was rejected-yeas 43, nays 55, (two thirds being required,) as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Allison, Ancona, Augustus C. Baldwin, Cox, Henry Winter Davis, Dawson, Eden, Edgerton, Eldridge, Finck, Ganson, Garfield, Grider, Griswold, Harding, Har rington, Charles M. Harris, Herrick, Holman, Jenckes, King, Knapp, Lazear, Le Blond, Long, Mallory, Marcy, James R. Morris, Morrison, Noble, Odell, Orth, Pendleton, Perry, Robinson, Ross, Scott, Spalding, Strouse, Sweat, Wadsworth, Chilton A. White, Joseph W. While 43.

NAYS-Messrs. Alley, Ames, Arnold, Baily, John D. Baldwin, Beaman, Blaine, Jacob B. Blair, Broomall, Ambrose W. Clark, Freeman Clarke, Cobb, Coffroth, Cole, Thomas T. Davis, Dawes, Dixon, Donnelly, Driggs, Eliot, Farnsworth, Fenton, Frank, Gooch, Grinnell, Hale, Hotchkiss, John H. Hubbard, Ingersoll, Kelley, Orlando Kellogg, Littlejohn, Longyear, Marvin, Samuel F. Miller, Moorhead, Daniel Morris, Amos Myers, Charles O'Neill, Patterson, Perham, Price, Alexander H. Rice, John H. Rice, Edward H. Rollins, Shannon, Smithers, Thayer, Tracy, Upson, Ellihn B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Wilson, Windom-55.

June 27-Mr. DAVIS made this report, which was ordered to be printed:

The Committee on Foreign Affairs have examined the correspondence submitted by the President relative to the joint resolution on Mexican affairs with the profound respect to which it is entitled, because of the gravity of its subject and the distinguished source from which it emanated.

They regret that the President should have so widely departed from the usage of constitutional governments as to make a pending resolution of so grave and delicate a character the subject of diplomatic explanations. They regret still more that the President should have thought proper to inform a foreign government of a radical and serious conflict of opinion and jurisdiction between the de positories of the legislative and executive power of the United States.

No expression of deference can make the denial of the right of Congress constitutionally to do what the House did with absolute unanimity, other than derogatory to their dignity.

They learn with surprise that, in the opinion of the President, the form and term of expressing the judgment of the United States on recognizing a monarchical government imposed on a neighboring republic is a "purely executive question, and the decision of it constitutionally belongs not to the House of Representatives, nor even to Congress, but to the President of the United States."

This assumption is equally novel and inadmissible No President has ever claimed such an exclusive authority. No Congress can ever permit its expression to pass without dissent.

It is certain that the Constitution nowhere confers such authority on the President.

The precedents of recognition, sufficiently numerous in this revolutionary era, do not countenance this view: and if there be one not inconsistent with it, the committee have not found it.

All questions of recognition have heretofore been debated and considered as grave questions of national policy, on which the will of the people should be expressed in Congress assembled; and the President, as the proper medium of foreign intercourse, has executed that will. If he has ever anticipated its expression, we have not found the case.

The declaration and establishment of the independence of the Spanish American colonies first brought the question of recognition of new governments or nations before the

Government of the United States; and the precedents then set have been followed ever since, even by the present Ad

The correspondence now before us is the first attempt to