While the army was intrenching before Yorktown General McClellan was engaged in sending dispatches to the President for more men and making complaints that he was not properly supported by the Government. This continual complaint and demand worried the President, as he knew there was no real cause, and on the 8th of April he wrote to the General, reviewing all his complaints, and closing by saying: "I beg to assure you that I never have written to you, nor spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, but you must act." On the 30th of April General McClellan called upon the War Department for Parrott guns, and on the 1st of May the President wrote to him: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" The rebels opened the way for the General's advance by quietly retiring from their fortifications at Yorktown, May 4th, and on the 5th occupied their second line of defenses at Williamsburg.

On the 5th of May a portion of the army was ordered forward under Generals Hooker, Heintzleman, Sumner and Hancock, and found the enemy near Williamsburg and engaged them early in the day. General McClellan was at his headquarters near Yorktown and was informed by a messenger that a bloody battle was in progress and that his presence was needed on the field. He arrived on the battlefield late in the afternoon. His presence aided materially in producing a favorable result of the battle and the retreat of the enemy. Next morning no portion of the rebel army was found in the vicinity.

We leave the army for a time, making its way towards Richmond, to narrate some events taking place at Fortress Monroe and in the vicinity. The President and a member of his Cabinet had arrived at the fort for consultation and an examination of the state of affairs. Nothing could be effected on James river on account of the presence of the formidable Merimac, and because Norfolk was held by the rebels. An expedition was fitted out at Fortress Monroe, under General Wool, to take Norfolk. To show how this was done and to illustrate how the President dealt with his officers, we shall let Mr. Lincoln tell his own story. In conversation with General Garfield, he said: "We went down to Fortress Monroe in Chase's revenue cutter, and consulted with Admiral Goldsborough on the feasibility of taking Norfolk by landing on the north side and making a march of eight miles. The Admiral said there was no landing on that shore, and that we should have to double the cape and approach the place from the North side, which would be a long march and a difficult one. I asked him if he ever tried to find a landing and he replied he had not. 'Now, Admiral,' said I, ' if you don't know there is a landing on the North side I want you to find out.' The Admiral took the

hint. He fitted out an expedition, and taking Chase and Wool along with some marines, he went on a voyage of discovery, and Stanton and I remained at Fortress Monroe. That night we went to bed, but not to sleep, for we were very anxious for the fate of the expedition. Next morning, about 2 o'clock, I heard the heavy tread of Wool ascending the stairs. I went into the parlor and found Stanton hugging Wool in the most enthusiastic manner as he announced that he had found a landing and had taken Norfolk." Thus, by a hint from the President, the capture of Norkfolk was accomplished on the 9th of May, and on the 11th the Merrimac was blown up by her own officers and the passage of James river was opened to Drury's Bluff.

Returning to the army of the Potomac, which lay at Williamsburg, five days after the battle. During this time General McClellan was busy with his dispatches to the President. The replies of the President indicate their purport. Under date of May 15, he writes: "I have done all I could or can do to support you. I had hoped that the opening of the James river and putting Wool and Burnsides in communication with an open road to Richmond or to you had effected something in that direction.”

On the 7th of May, General Franklin landed at West Point with his division, supported by the divisions of Sedgwick, Porter and Richardson. The rebels were obliged to attack this force in order that their retreating troops from the battle of Williamsburg could make their way back towards Richmond. The enemy, after a contest of six hours, were repulsed, but the object of the attack was effected. On the 16th of May General McClellan's headquarters had reached the White House, and on the 25th a movement was made to cross the Chicahominy, which was partially affected, and on the 30th and 31st of May a severe and well contested battle was fought, which resulted in the repulse of the rebels and such a severe loss to them as to greatly alarm Richmond; and the expectations and impressions of the enemy was that an immediate pursuit would be made by the Union forces. On the succeeding day General Heintzelman sent out a reconnoitering party which advanced within four miles of Richmond, and no enemy was found. Of this reconnoiter General McClellan was informed, and now it would seem that the favorable opportunity was at hand to advance and capture Richmond; but General McClellan thought otherwise. He ordered the troops to fall back and occupy their old positions. On the 7th of June General McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War that he should be ready to move as soon as General McCall should reach him with his division, which he did on the 10th of June. The Army of the Potomac landed on the peninsula the first day of April; two months and ten days had now elapsed and no decisive results had been accomplished. The long delay and procrastination had given time for the rebels to call in and concentrate their forces for the defense of Richmond, and each

succeeding day made the success of the Union army more difficult and the capture of Richmond more improbable. Among the many complaints and demands of General McClellan during those seventy days of progress from Fortress Monroe to the Chicahominy was his request for the reorganization of his army. He was not satisfied with the appointment of the corps commanders, which were made by the President, and such officers as Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes were not of his choosing; and on the 9th of May he wrote to the Secretary of War, asking permission to reorganize the army corps. The Secretary informed him that the President would write to him relative to that subject. The letter of the President is here subjoined; it is frank, friendly and characteristic, and is as follows: "I have just assisted the Secretary of War in forming the part of a dispatch to you relative to army corps, which dispatch, of course, will have reached you long before this will. I wish to say a few words privately on this subject. I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unànimous opinion of the twelve generals of the divisions, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from, and every modern military book, yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it is indispensable for you to know how your struggles against it is received in quarters which we cannot disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have no word from Sumner, Heintzleman and Keyes. The commanders of these corps are, of course, the three highest officers with you; but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Porter, and perhaps General Franklin.. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the corps commanders disobey your orders in anything? Are you strong enough even with my help to put your foot upon the neck of Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question to you." General McClellan thought it advisable, after the receipt of the President's letter, not to press the change in the corps commanders which he had thought so essential and necessary. But he created two additional corps which he placed under the command of Generals Porter and Franklin, the men mentioned by the President as his favorites. The tenor of the President's letter plainly indicated that he was aware of the trouble and dissensions that were injuring the efficacy and imperiling the success of the Army of the Potomac, and that veteran officers, high in command and in the confidence of the Government and people, as were Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes, could not be deprived of their commands at the caprice and wish of the commanding General. General McClellan had now nearly for a month been

delaying daily his intention to march upon Richmond. Several specific days had been named, although in every instance something occurred to prevent a movement and cause a further postponement. He had been idle so long that the rebels had fully prepared for his reception, and they were now disposed that he should move one way or the other.

CHAPTER XXV.

GENERAL M'CLELLAN'S FAILURE.

The battle of Fair Oaks was fought on the 31st of May, and for almost a month General McClellan's army lay inactive astride the Chicahominy, and now it was the 25th of June and the rebels were now prepared for action. On the 26th of June his right was attacked, but the enemy was repulsed. This engagement disclosed the purpose of the enemy, which was to crush his right wing and cut off his communications. Here was opened for his adoption two plans. He could have crossed the river with his left wing and so have reinforced his right as to have given it a victory; or, he could have withdrawn his right across the river, which was in itself a strong defensive line, reunited his army, and marched into Richmond on the flank and rear of the attacking enemy. Concentration and a vigorous effort would have given victory. Division invited and insured defeat.

General McClellan left the right wing of his army of thirty thousand men the next day, without any support from the left wing, to contend against the main body of the rebel army. Porter was so severely pressed that the division of Slocum and the brigades of French and Meagher were sent to his aid, and by their assistance he was enabled to hold his position until dark, when he withdrew across the Chicahominy. On the evening of the battle, June 27th, General McClellan informed his corps commanders that his right wing would be withdrawn across the Chickahominy and the army would fall back to James river. During the month that General McClellan had laid inactive on the Chicahominy his pen had been active in calling on the President for more troops, while his inactivity prevented the President from complying with his requests and demands. Had he pressed the enemy within the environs of Richmond, Jackson would have been recalled from the valley of the Shenandoah and the President would have been relieved of the pressure on Washington and have been able and willing to send more troops to his assistance.

It may be said that at this time the large and magnificent peninsula expedition, so far as offensive operations were concerned, had come to a close.