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of the means of deliverance, is incompatible with the Divine goodness. Mr. Watson must pull down his own system; he must unsay every thing that he has said in reference to the original covenant with Adam, and to the consequences of its violation,-which consequences he admits have overtaken the race, in that state of condemnation and depravity in which every member of the human family enters the world,-before he can consistently maintain, that even the provision of the means of salvation for a part of the race only would be a violation of Divine goodness, in reference to the rest.

But this, we think, is not the true state of the case. It is admitted by most modern Calvinists, and in subsequent Lectures I shall endeavour to show that they are right in this admission, that the means of salvation have been secured for the whole race. God has provided an atonement of infinite value" the blood of Christ, which cleanseth from all sins." He proffers salvation, on the ground of this atonement, to the whole family of man-to all, at least, who hear the gospel. All men are invited, and all are equally welcome to come to the Saviour; and all who choose to go to him shall unquestionably be saved. Election does no more than dispose certain individuals to comply with the invitations of mercy, by securing that special influence of the Holy Spirit which makes them willing in the day of God's power. "But," it will perhaps be said, "this influence should be minds of all, since the want of it leaves those to whom it is not imparted, destitute of the power to avail themselves of the means of salvation, and every view we take of the Divine goodness constrains us to believe that such power ought to be imparted to the whole race." Now, if it were true that Calvinistic principles did involve the notion that the non-elect are left without power to secure their salvation, it might be fairly doubted whether, even in that case, they would impeach the Divine goodness; for, if God were not bound to provide the means of salvation for any, how can he be bound to impart power to all to use those means? Not doing what he is under no obligation to do, or all that he is able to do, is not inconsistent with perfect goodness; or what shall we say

exerted upon the

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of the fact, that there is no provision of mercy for fallen angels? But we ask the opponents what they mean by the term power in the objection as stated by them? Do they mean power in the sense of physical capacities, means, and opportunities of salvation? Or, power in the sense of disposition to avail themselves of those means and opportunities? In the former sense all men, as we have seen, (vide, p. 70,) possess power to secure their salvation-power to love God; for his character is infinitely amiable, and they are physically capable of experiencing the emotion of love; and, consequently, they have power to do all that he commands. In the sense of disposi

tion, even our opponents do not believe that all men possess power to secure their salvation; for, on their own principles, numbers do not secure it, because they are not disposed to secure it. It is worthy of especial remark, that the notion of common grace, or grace dispensed to all men on the ground of the atonement, does not relieve the Arminian from any difficulty on this point, which he conceives to embarrass the Calvinistic scheme. The only obstacle to a sinner's salvation, now that the door of hope has been set open to all men by the atonement, (I leave those Calvinists who suppose that the door has not been set open to all, to answer for themselves as they best can; I am about as far removed from them, as from the Arminians,) is his want of disposition to be saved. "Why will

ye

die?" &c. "Ye will not come unto me," said Christ, "that ye may have life." Now, if common grace does not restore to all men a disposition to be saved, (and we have the evidence of fact that it does not,) it does not remove the only obstacle to their salvation. It does not impart, we might retort upon them, the power to be saved. Yes, replies the Arminian, it gives them sufficient grace or power to be saved, if they improve that grace. If they do this! Well, and does not the Calvinist maintain that all men have power to secure their salvation, if they are disposed to use that power as they ought to do? What advantage, then, has Arminianism, on this point, over Calvinism? Surely none at all. The common grace of our opponents just restores to the whole race what we contend the race never lost, and could not lose, because

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essential to accountability. The only difference is, that the power of which both parties speak was, as the Calvinist thinks, bestowed by equity; and, as the Arminian imagines, by grace. The stubborn uncompromising fact is, that God has not given to all men a disposition to work out their own salvation; or, which is the same thing, has not exerted upon all men that special and holy influence which would have certainly led to the existence of the disposition. (Will an Arminian deny that he could have done this? If he should, he has sunk into Atheism.) The same difficulties, in reference to the Divine goodness, press, and equally press, (if there be supposed to be any difficulties at all,) upon both systems. The resolution of the difficulty appears to me to be this,-that perfect goodness does not require God to do every thing to promote the happiness of his creatures, which he is able to do; nor to bestow the same measure of aid, and of the means of happiness, upon all.

I have only one more remark,—not very intimately connected, indeed, with the preceding train of reasoning, but yet, as it appears to me, of some importance, to make before I proceed to the consideration of another objection. The threatening by which the tree of knowledge of good and evil was guarded did not contemplate the extinction of the race; or, to speak more correctly, it was not a threatening that, in case of disobedience, the race should not exist. Had that been the case, as Dr. Russell remarks, and the remark is of great importance, we should exist now only in consequence of the interposition of Christ, and could have no connexion with Adam as a federal head. The depravity of a moral kind which cleaves to us by nature could not be the result of Adam's transgression; since the conception of its being such would involve the absurdity that we suffer something which was not included in the original threatening. And what is that but in effect saying, that, if any human law threatens to imprison a man if he commit a certain offence, it may afterwards justly hang him for that offence? The language of God to Adam was, on the contrary, a threatening that, if he transgressed, the condition of the race should, in every point of view, be

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seriously affected by his transgression;-that that sovereign and holy sustaining influence which is the exclusive source of every thing spiritually good in man should be withdrawn from him, and withheld from the race, in token of the moral Governor's disapprobation of his sin. The violation of the Adamic dispensation must, then, have drawn after it universal transgression, and universal punishment, but for the interposition of mercy. Now, if mercy had not interposed, and it was not obliged to interpose, would universal punishment have been incompatible with the Divine goodness? If our opponents answer in the negative, as they must do, we may further ask them, how a decree, resting on reasons which are not revealed, to exempt some from punishment, can be more irreconcilable with the goodness of God than the actual infliction of punishment upon all?

OBJECTION 2.-Predestination is incompatible with the justice of God.

In examining this objection, it will be again necessary to bear in mind what the doctrine of election really is; and, in addition to this, to refer to the rule by which the equity of God's conduct towards moral agents is to be tried and ascertained. Till we know what justice requires, it is manifestly impossible for us to form an enlightened opinion, whether a particular decree, or a certain mode of conduct, is a violation of justice or not.

I commence my remarks on this subject, then, by observing that justice requires a moral governor to give, and is satisfied by his giving, to every individual what is due to him. When every person, over whom the authority of the governor extends, has received from him to the full amount of his claims, every thing has been done that justice requires, and none have any right to complain. All this is so perfectly self-evident, that there is no controversy in regard to it; indeed, there can be none. It is only when we come to specify the claims which the creature possesses upon the Creator, or to state what is due from God to man as a subject of moral government, that any marked and radical difference of opinion commences. To this point, then, it becomes us to direct our

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particular attention; and the following remarks in reference to it are submitted to the reader.

To a creature, contemplated in that relation exclusively, the Creator manifestly owes nothing. He might strip him of all that he possesses, yea, deprive him of existence itself, without doing him any wrong. All that he has, even life itself, must be included in the class of sovereign gifts, (for he could not merit any thing before he was brought into being,) and a sovereign gift may at any time be resumed. God does the beast no wrong when he takes away its life.

To an innocent creature, whose life is destined to be perpetuated, some have said that the Creator owes the means of happiness. The late Bishop of Lincoln, indeed, in one of the most remarkable passages of his remarkable volume, affirms that He possesses an abstract right to destine such a creature, as innocent, to suffering, either temporary or eternal. Both opinions appear to me incorrect, (and the latter, as avowed by an Arminian, self-contradictory and absurd,) for an innocent creature must be, as we have seen, (vide p. 19,) a subject of moral government, and so must be contemplated, along with the subjects of moral government.

To an accountable creature the Creator owes a revelation of the law, or sufficient means of knowing the law, (the equity of the law as established by God is pre-supposed here,) by which he is to be hereafter judged; and physical capacities, or powers, which render him capable of yielding the obedience required of him. He must have, in contradistinction from brutes, an intellect capable, if rightly exercised, of understanding what the moral Governor requires of him. He must have motives presented to him,-i. e., the promise of some great good, adapted to his intellectual and moral nature, if he yield obedience; and the threatening of some great evil, if he determine to withhold it,-to induce him to do what is thus required: for motives are the instruments of moral government. He must have the power of determining, or the faculty of choice or volition; for it is essential to moral government that the proximate cause of moral actions should be in the creature; and not in the instinct of the creature, as