cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside, at Acquia. Instead of promptly obeying, he sent reasons for delay, and said he would "obey as soon as circumstances would permit." On the 9th, General Halleck telegraphed as follows:

"I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them, and move forward to the Potomac.

"You must send reënforcements instantly to Acquia Creek.

"Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity."

This was August 9th, and yet reënforcements did not leave Fortress Monroe for Acquia, until the 23d of August! On the 10th, a week after the order was first given, Halleck again telegraphed:

"The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day. There must be no further delay in your moveThat which has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily explained."

ments.

Pope was gallantly fighting against an overwhelming force. Lee was massing troops to crush him and reach Washington, and yet McClellan did not move. On the 12th of August, General Halleck telegraphed:

"The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. Burnside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Aquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All the vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten thousand of your men could be transported daily. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington."

On the 21st, Halleck again telegraphed to McClellan at Fortress Monroe:

"The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition, etc."

On the evening of August 23d, the reluctant and tardy McClellan, at last sailed from Fortress Monroe, arriving at Acquia Creek on the morning of the 24th, and at Alexandria on the 27th of August!

Meanwhile, Pope had not sufficient force to hold the fords. and banks of the Rappahannock. His line was so extended that it was necessarily very weak. He called for reënforcements which should have been with him long before from the army of the Potomac; but McClellan and his army, had lingered on the James. The Commander of the army of the Potomac had received the order to move his sick and wounded on the 1st of August. On the 3d, he was ordered to prepare to move his army; but it was not until the 23d, that his troops began to leave Fortress Monroe, and he did not reach Alexandria in person until the 27th of August. It is scarcely possible for a candid mind to read the correspondence between the President and General Halleck on the one side, and General McClellan on the other, from the time of the President's visit to Harrison's Landing, until McClellan arrived at Alexandria, without coming to the conclusion that it was the deliberate purpose of McClellan so to delay his movements that Pope should be left to his fate. It is clear that he did not obey orders, and that Pope's defeat was the result.

On the 10th, General Halleck informed McClellan that "the enemy are crossing the Rapidan. They are fighting General Pope to-day. Let not a moment's time be lost." When McClellan reached Acquia on the 24th, Pope who had been defending the line of the Rappahannock for nearly a week against the whole rebel army, found that Lee was turning his right, and his rear and communications were threatened, and thus he was compelled to fall back from the Rappahannock. On the 27th of August as we have seen General McClellan himself arrived at Alexandria, and was immediately ordered "to take entire direction of the sending out of troops from Alexandria." Those which arrived before McClellan, under the leadership of Heintzelman and Hooker, had already marched to the relief of Pope, and were doing good service. After the arrival of McClellan, no troops of the army of the

Potomac did join General Pope. He was fighting desperately against superior numbers and being driven towards Washington. McClellan was within sound of the enemy's guns; he knew that his comrades were being driven towards the Capital, yet not a soldier reached the scene of conflict from Alexandria after McClellan's arrival. While he was thus loitering at Alexandria within sound of the enemy's guns, the following were the orders he disobeyed. It will be seen that he was informed of Pope's position, of the emergency, and that Pope wished reënforcements sent to Gainesville. He was ordered to move out Franklin's Corps by forced marches. This order was given on the 27th. On the evening of the 29th, Franklin's corps was at Anandale, seven miles from Alexandria, and Franklin himself at the latter place! In the meantime Pope's forces were fighting bloody battles on the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and were to fight again the 30th, without the aid of Franklin.

At 12 M. on the 27th, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan: *

"Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville, McDowell, Sigel and Ricketts near Warrenton, Reno on his right, Porter is marching on Warrenton, to reenforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad."

At 1.50 P. M., General Halleck telegraphed to McClellan:

"I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the Commanding officer at Edward's Ferry, asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him? The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?

On the morning of the 28th Halleck telegraphed to Franklin:

"On parting with General McClellan about 2 o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day, towards Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just

*See Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, p. 32, 33, 34.

learned that the General has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this."

At 3.30, he telegraphed to McClellan :

"Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is reënforced." "1*

And at 8.40 P. M., he telegraphed:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready, there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 3 P. M. on the 29th, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan, in reply to his despatch of 12 M.:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale, as to prevent his going further, otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is, I am tired of guesses."

At 2.40, the President, in his intense anxiety to know the fate of the army fighting against odds, telegraphed to McClellan to know: "What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?

At 2.45, General McClellan replied:

"The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville, and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second, To LEAVE POPE TO GET OUT OF HIS SCRAPE, and at once use all means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to

* Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I, p. 459, 461.

accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. will not do to delay longer."

It

How perfectly clear from all the telegrams, that McClellan had long since determined "to leave Pope to get out of his scrape!" The President, suppressing his indignation, looking only to the safety of the Capital and the army, and conscious of the cabal among some of the officers of the Army of the Potomac sent the following reply:

"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, towit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels."

General Halleck telegraphed the following peremptory order, at 7.50 P. M. on the 29th.

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad, and open our communication with Manassas."

McClellan replied that he was responsible for the failure of Franklin to advance; that it was not safe for Franklin to go beyond Anandale! At 7.15, Franklin sends a dispatch to McClellan, dated Anandale, giving rumors of a battle with Pope, and saying that "Pope is said to be short of provisions." At 5 A. M., on the 30th, from a hard fought battle-field, General Pope sent the following telegram to Halleck :

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's and Sturges' regiments to Centerville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from General Franklin, written by order of General McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station, as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them