"P. S. General Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better toward York River, than toward the James. As Pope now has charge of the Capital, please confer with him through the telegraph."

"A. LINCOLN."

The Hills, and Longstreet marched out of Richmond to coöperate with Jackson, and McCall was vigorously attacked at Mechanicsville. The position of McCall was a strong one, with a deep creek in the Union front. Hill not waiting for a junction with Jackson, attacked with great vigor, and was defeated with severe loss.

It seems that McClellan before this attack, had been anticipating a retreat, for he says in his report, that "more than a week previous," that is on the 18th, he had prepared for a retreat to the James, and sent supplies to that river. The attack at Mechanicsville, clearly indicated the purpose of Lee to crush the right of the army of the Potomac. It has been suggested by able military critics, that the leader of that army might have adopted with success, either of two expedients; he might have brought over his left wing, and thus strengthened his right and secured a victory; or he might have withdrawn his right across the Chickahominy. He did not, however, attempt a concentration of his army, but left his right, consisting of about thirty thousand, to withstand the whole rebel force, and to fight the bloody battle of Cold Harbor, or Gaines' Mill, on the 27th of June, when Porter's command, after maintaining its position for a long day, and repeatedly repulsing and driving back the enemy, was finally as night approached, driven back by superior numbers and fresh troops. But what threatened to be a rout was prevented by the gallantry of Meagher's and French's brigades, which came up at evening and checked the rebel advance. While the forces of Porter, weary and exhausted with the long struggle, were giving way, and pressed with numbers, the retreat was likely soon to become a rout, a shout announced the presence of the gallant Irishman, and his fighting brigade, the General leading in his shirt sleeves. They came on with a rush and the fugitives stopped and reformed; the rebels were checked and driven back. The presence of these troops two hours, or one hour earlier,

might perhaps have given Porter a victory. As it was he had inflicted greater loss on the rebels than he received. Union loss was 4,000, rebel 9,500.

On the evening of that day, McClellan announced to his corps commanders, his intention to retreat to James river. It was no longer a question of taking Richmond, but of saving his own army as he thought. While on this retreat, and while his gallant army was struggling across the White Oak swamp, McClellan telegraphed to the Secretary of War, "If I save this army, I tell you plainly, I owe no thanks to you, nor to any one at Washington. You have done your best to destroy this army."

Such a message, so insolent and false, so mutinous and insubordinate, would, if addressed to any other Government than that of which the forbearing Lincoln was the head, have insured his arrest and trial.

But Mr. Lincoln, with a forbearance which many thought had long "ceased to be a virtue," sent the following reply:*

"Save your army at all events. Will send reënforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reenforcemonts. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago, you notified us that reënforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame. Please tell at once the present condition or aspect of things."

on you.

The great army, with its spirit unbroken, retreated doggedly at times turning at bay, and repulsing the attacking columns of the rebels.

Lee had indeed been victorious, but at a heavy loss. Up to the retreat of McClellan, the rebels' loss, in killed and wounded, exceeded 10,000, while the Union loss did not *Report on Conduct of War, Part I, p. 340.

nearly reach that number. He had destroyed McClellan's communications with York River, but Lee was now, on the evening of the retreat of the Union army, in a position which, if known to McClellan, and he had possessed the vigor and enterprise necessary for the required movement would have made the capture of Richmond morally certain. Two-thirds of Lee's army was north of the Chickahominy, and McClellan's army was between it and Richmond. Had McClellan with his whole army struck at Richmond, it could not have resisted for a day. Magruder who was in command of the forces left at Richmond, says:

*

"I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion was on the other side of the Chickahominy. The bridges were destroyed. * * There were but 25,000 men between his (McClellan's) army of 100,000 and Richmond. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced against any point of our line, its momentum would have insured success and the occupation of our works."

But retreat was ordered, and the army was fighting its way to the James under Sumner. On the 29th, the rear guard, under the brave Sumner, repulsed a rebel attack in the bloody battle of Savage Station, and on the 30th, at Glendale. The stubborn heroism of the army, under Heintzelman, Hooker, Kearney and Porter, repelled the enemy whenever it turned at bay, and continually suggests the inquiry, that with such an army, why retreat at all? Fighting and marching for seven weary days and nights; stifled with dust, faint with hunger and thirst and heat, yet never turning its face to the foe without driving him back; alas, how much less of suffering and of death, if that proud and gallant army had been led directly and boldly upon Richmond!

On the 30th of June, Heintzelman met a large force of the rebels, under command of Hill. They were again repulsed with terrible slaughter, and General Lee sent all his disposable troops to reënforce Hill. They were driven back, and the Union force following up their success, raised the cry of "On to Kichmond!" A rebel officer describing the

scene which followed, says, "everything seemed lost. Regiments and brigades broke and fled; batteries dashed to the rear in headlong flight."

Orders were given to Jackson to cover the retreat, and directions were sent to Richmond to get the public property ready for removal. But this success was not followed up, and the Union army resumed its march towards the James.

The troops reached the vicinity of James River on the 1st of July, and were massed on Malvern Hill. Here was high, open table land, a mile and a-half long by three-quarters of a mile wide, crossed by several roads. Porter's corps held the left, Heintzelman and Sumner the center, and Keys the right. The left flank was protected by the gun-boats on James River. Here, after their terrible march through the White Oak Swamp, the gallant Army of the Potomac, with spirit yet unbroken, and with the ability yet to conquer, prepared to meet the whole rebel force. As the weary troops lay down to rest that night upon Malvern Hill, after five days of incessant fighting and marching, they knew the strength of their position and felt the ability yet to go into Richmond. They looked for the morning, to wipe out the mortification of their retreat. With the morning came most fierce and persistent attacks upon this position; charge after charge was repulsed. The whole field was strewn with rebel dead and wounded. After being brought up again and again to the assault, and as often driven back with fearful slaughter, the rebels retired.

The next morning, the rebel army was in no condition to withstand an attack. General Trimble, of the rebel army, says: "at dawn the next morning, I found the whole army in the utmost disorder." An attack by the unbroken Union forces would inevitably have defeated it. But when the rebel army awoke, and looked up that hill from which they had been so often repulsed, the grim batteries and gleaming muskets, and glorious banners had disappeared. The Union general had retreated from victory which seemed to invite his approach. McClellan had turned his back on victory and Richmond.

Many high-spirited officers like Kearney, and gallant soldiers begged permission to follow the discomfited Confederates into Richmond. McClellan, so far from following up this success, retired to Harrison's Landing, and thus ingloriously closed the Peninsular Campaign.

The faults of this campaign have been settled by the judgment of the brave officers and soldiers who took part in it, and have ceased to be the subject of partisan controversy. No troops ever fought better than the Army of the Potomac. No troops were ever worse handled by a commanding general.

The fatal errors of McClellan were First, A month unnecessarily wasted at Yorktown. Second, A tardy pursuit after the success at Williamsburg, in a battle fought without his knowledge and against his wishes. Third, Long delay and hesitation at the Chickahominy-failure to strike when Jackson was away, and before reënforcements arrived. And yet, in spite of these faults, victory, and the capture of Richmond was often within the reach of a bold, decided movement, and especially at Fair Oaks, and at Malvern Hill. Indeed the seven days' battles show that the rebels could not, at any time, have withstood a vigorous and persistent attack by the entire Army of the Potomac. The Union loss in the campaign was 15,249; the rebel loss, 19,000.

At Harrison's Landing, McClellan encamped, and began calling for reenforcements. He wanted 50,000 men; on the 3d of July, "100,000 men, rather more, than less." To these calls, the President patiently replied:

"I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. To reenforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose,) and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5,000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you can; and secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that