Schlussbemerkungen. Es ist ein buntes Bild, auf das wir von diesem Punkte aus zurückblicken: Bemerkungen in der Botschaft eines Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten lösen sich von den vergänglichen Zwecken, denen zu dienen sie bestimmt waren und werden, vom Willen der amerikanischen Nation getragen, zu einem ihrer politischen Glaubenssätze. Ungezählte Male wiederholt und wiederversichert, ausgelegt mißverstanden und den wechselnden Bedürfnissen und Forderungen der Nation angepaßt, erleben sie eine wandlungsreiche Geschichte: Was gegenstandlsos erscheint, wird ausgemerzt, neue Gedanken an seine Stelle gesetzt und eingefügt. Ihre Forderungen, hinter denen die des Völkerrechts zurückzustehen haben, festigen und stärken sich mehr und mehr zu drohenden, Gehorsam heischenden Verboten. Wir haben versucht, in dem Gewirr der Geschehnisse den. Faden ihrer historischen Entwicklung, der uns von 1823 bis zur Gegenwart führte, aufzufinden, festzustellen, was die Monroedoktrin von heute will und was sie nicht will und dadurch eine Basis für ihre Beurteilung vom Standpunkte des Völkerrechtes aus zu gewinnen. Wir haben diese Feststellung gemacht und diese Beurteilung unternommen, wobei wir als letztes Ergebnis eine teilweise Diskrepanz zwischen Monroedoktrin und Völkerrecht aufzuzeigen hatten. Zu einem Entwicklungsende hat die Untersuchung uns nirgends geführt. Die Monroedoktrin steht im vollen Flusse ständiger Umgestaltung. Jeden Tag kann eine neue Seite ihres Inhalts sich entfalten, eine alte verschwinden. Der Anzeichen dazu liegen genug vor; eine Menge Entwicklungstendenzen lassen sich hier nachweisen; viele ungelöste und gegenwärtig noch unlösbare Fragen allgemeiner wie be Kraus, Monroedoktrin. 26 sonderer Natur drängen sich auf: Wie wird sich das Verhältnis der Monroedoktrin zur Calvo- und Drago - Doktrin gestalten? Wie dasjenige zu der neuen, unter dem Namen Dollar-Diplomatie gehenden politischen Idee der Vereinigten Staaten? In welchem Umfange wird sie den nichtpolitischen Verkehr nichtamerikanischer Staaten mit amerikanischen beschränken? Wird die von Roosevelt ausgebildete Idee der Aufsichtspflicht der Vereinigten Staaten über das übrige Amerika zum Inhalte der Monroedoktrin werden und den Platz ihres zweiten obsoleten Unterprinzips, das sich gegen die politische Betätigung der Vereinigten Staaten Europa gegenüber aussprach, einnehmen? Wird sie zu einer festeren politischen Verbindung der amerikanischen Staaten unter einander führen, sei es zu einem Verhältnis der Gleichordnung oder der Unterordnung, oder wird sie etwa in einem solchen Verhältnisse aufgehen? Wird sie durch die Anerkennung anderer Staaten einmal zu einem Völkerrechtssatze werden? Wird sich der Riß zwischen ihr und dem Völkerrecht so oder auf irgend eine andere Weise schließen oder etwa erweitern? Und endlich, soll sie vielleicht in Zukunft aus dem politischen Repertoire der Vereinigten Staaten überhaupt verschwinden? Diese und eine Menge anderer Fragen drängen sich auf und harren der Lösung. Gegenwärtig sind sie Probleme, deren Beantwortung politische Prophezeiung bedeutet. Davor aber endet die Aufgabe dieser Arbeit. Anhang. I. Urkunden. 1. George Washingtons Abschiedsadresse vom 17. September 1796.') Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and Morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. . . . . Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you, to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican Government. ... The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connexion as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war as our interests, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand on foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with 1) Vergl. besonders oben S. 51 f. that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice? T'is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them. Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest". 2. Thomas Jeffersons Schreiben an Präsidenten Monroe Monticello Oct. 24. 23. DEAR SIR The question presented by the letters you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of independance. that made us a nation; this sets our compass, and points the course which we are to steer thro' the ocean of time opening on our view. and never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our 2d. never to suffer Europe to intermeddle in Cis-Atlantic affairs, America, North & South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. she should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. while the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere that of freedom. one nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. by acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty weigth into the scale of free government and emancipate at one stroke a whole continent, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. with her then we should the most sedulously nourish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more side by side in the same cause. not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. but the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be it's consequence, is not her war, but ours. it's object is to introduce and to establish the American system, of ousting from our land all foreign nations, of never permitting the powers of Europe to *) Vergl. besonders oben S. 47. intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. it is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. and if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side it's most powerful member, surely we should do it. but I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion, that it will prevent war, instead of provoking it. with Great Britain withdrawn from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all Europe combined would not dare to risk war. nor is the occasion to be slighted, which this proposition offers, of declaring our Protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of any one in the internal affairs of another; so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte and now continued by the equally lawless alliance, calling itself Holy. But we have first to ask ourselves a question. do we wish to acquire to our own Confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces? I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. the controul which, with Florida point this island would give us over the Gulph of Mexico, and the countries and the Isthmus bordering on it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. yet, as I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war; and as her independance, which is our second interest, and especially her independance of England, can be secured without it, I have no hesitation at abandoning my first wish to future chances, and accepting it's independance with peace and the friendship of England, rather than it's association, at the expence of a war, and her enmity. I could honestly therefore join in the declaration proposed that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between any of them and the mother country: but that we will oppose, with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, either as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and most especially their transfer to any power, by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think it therefore advisable that the Executive should encorage the British government to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these letters by an assurance of his concurrence with them, as far as his authority goes, and that as it may lead to war, the Declaration of which is vested in congress, the case shall be laid before them for consideration at their first meeting under the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself. I have been so long weaned from political subjects, and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, that I am sensible that I am not qualified to offer opinions worthy of any attention. but the question now proposed involves consequences so lasting, and effects so decisive of our future destinies, as to kindle all the interest I have heretofore felt on these occasions, and to induce me to the hazard of opinions, which will prove my wish only to contribute still my mite in what may be useful to our country, and praying you to accept them at only what they are worth, I add the assurance of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect. |