Chairman FASCELL. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized in support of his amendment.

Mr. ATKINS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply adds language which encourages the United States to seek to ensure that the refugee camps controlled by the Khmer Rouge are open to inspection by international organizations, and that those people within those Khmer Rouge camps have the freedom to move to non-Khmer Rouge controlled camps.

This is, I think, an essential matter. It's our general refugee policy that people ought to have this kind of freedom. It's unthinkable that these people should be held in these camps, many of them, as many as 80 percent, against their will in camps that are closed to international observers.

Chairman FASCELL. Is there further discussion on the pending amendment.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me just say briefly that I think this is a very desirable amendment. The U.N. itself is attempting so far without success to gain access to these Khmer Rouge camps. I think the adoption of this amendment would lend weight to their effort.

It is really unacceptable for the Khmer Rouge to be receiving assistance for people living in camps under their control without giving the agencies that provide the aid access to those facilities in order to make sure that the materials and supplies are being used by the people for whom they are intended.

I think the gentleman is to be congratulated for suggesting we include this language in the resolution.

Chairman FASCELL. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. All those in favor signify by saying aye.

[Chorus of ayes.]

Chairman FASCELL. All those opposed, no. [No response.]

Chairman FASCELL. The ayes have it and the amendment is agreed to.

The Chief of Staff will report the next Atkins amendment.

Mr. BRADY. Amendment offered by Mr. Atkins, page five, line 4 strike "and;" in line 12 strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof "and".

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection further reading of the amendment will be dispensed with, printed in the record, and open for amendment.

[The amendment follows:]

HJR602A2

1

2

3

AMENDMENT TO H.J. RES. 602

OFFERED BY MR. ATKINS

Page 5, line 4, strike out 'and''; line 12, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof ``; and ́ ́; and after line 12, insert the following:

(9) should attempt to halt immediately the flow of arms and military equipment to the Khmer Rouge by urging those nations providing support and sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge to cease doing so.

Chairman FASCELL. The gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for five minutes in support of his amendment.

Mr. ATKINS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would call on the administration to attempt to halt immediately the flow of arms and military equipment to the Khmer Rouge by urging those nations that are providing that support and that sanctuary to cease doing so.

That essentially involves China which is supplying the military equipment and Thailand which is providing the sanctuary.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment arose out of something that occurred last Thursday when the administration came before the Asia subcommittee and stated that they had not encouraged either China or Thailand to cease immediately in providing weapons to the Khmer Rouge.

It seems totally contradictory to stated U.S. policy. Right now, according to U.S. estimates, the Khmer Rouge have at least two years of arms caches available. There is no possible way that these additional arms will assist in any way in putting pressure on the Vietnamese presently.

The only purpose that these arms have is to assure that the Khmer Rouge will take control of Cambodia after any kind of settlement is reached.

It seems to me that it's absolutely unthinkable that the United States would not at this time encourage both the Chinese and the Thai and put ourselves publicly on record as being opposed to continued shipments of arms by the Khmer Rouge.

The administration has made the case that they don't want to do this because they don't want to offend the Chinese. I find that, frankly, incredible. We tell all of our other allies what our policy is for fear that somehow it would offend them. And particularly, given the absolute atrocities of the Khmer Rouge regime which the Chinese still refuse to recognize, that for the administration to be tiptoeing around on this kind of an issue puts us back in a situation where we really are tolerating the Khmer Rouge.

And the fact of the matter is that the United States hands are not clean in this matter. We encouraged the Chinese and the Thai to provide arms and to rearm the Khmer Rouge after they were thrown out of Cambodia in 1979. We voted in the U.N. Credentials Committee to seat the Khmer Rouge as part of the coalition government and to recognize them as the government in Cambodia.

I think it's time, particularly now as people in Asia and inside Cambodia are seeking signs as to whether the United States will hold firm or whether the United States is going to abandon Cambodia once again and leave it to the Khmer Rouge, for us to send this important signal.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I personally have no objection to this amendment, but the committee ought to be alerted to two aspects of this, one of which is procedural. This is a joint resolution requiring not only passage in both bodies but signature of the President. Therefore it implies executive as well as legislative policy.

In that regard, the executive branch, (a) differs with this provision, and (b) I think is a bit offended that Congress has directed it to act in a way that it is not currently acting.

The only reason I raise this is that the committee ought to be alerted to that fact with regard to this particular amendment because it could invite some difficulty in achieving a presidential sig

nature.

Now having said that, it strikes me that the substance of the amendment is entirely valid, that this should be the policy of the United States of America, particularly now that the Vietnamese are leaving. But even if the Vietnamese weren't leaving, it should be the policy of the United States of America.

For that reason, I have no objection to the substance of the amendment. I think everyone should realize, however, that here, unlike a case in which we tell foreign states to do things now and again, we are telling our own administration to do certain things. We are telling them in a circumstance in which American policy seems to be doing rather well rather than rather poorly, and people at least ought to be alerted that there is executive branch displeasure over the precise way in which this amendment is worded.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in support of the amendment. I would like to respond to the thoughtful observations made by my very good friend from Iowa.

The resolution was specifically drafted as a joint resolution precisely because the gentleman from Massachusetts wanted it to have the force of law.

I would remind my friend that if for some reason the President decided not to sign it—and by the way, I believe he would sign it— it would become law anyway unless he vetoed it. There is no way that he is going to veto a resolution like this.

Actually the administration is in a little bit of a peculiar position here, based on their testimony last Thursday before our subcommittee.

I should make it clear lest any of my friends on the other side of the aisle have any apprehensions, there is no suggestion being made by any of us that the administration is not interested in preventing the Khmer Rouge from coming back to power; obviously they are. And they are going to support efforts to prevent that. I take them at their word. They have said that over and over again and I believe it.

But during the hearing we had on Thursday the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, Mr. Sigur, was asked: If we had our druthers, would the United States like to see, the Chinese and the Thais stop supporting the Khmer Rouge right now? His answer was: Yes. That was his answer.

If we had our druthers we would like them to stop supporting the Khmer Rouge now. Why? The reason, obviously, being that they know very well that every extra rifle, every extra bullet the Khmer Rouge get between now and the time the Vietnamese leave enhances their capacity to seize power once the Vietnamese are gone.

And as Mr. Atkins pointed out, the Khmer Rouge have pretty much stopped attacking the Vietnamese. If they attack anybody now, they're attacking the other non-Communist resistance forces. Why then is the administration reluctant to support the Atkins amendment? The reason is because they believe that if we say to the Chinese or the Thais that we don't want them to help the Khmer Rouge right now, the Chinese and the Thais won't like it. Well, I'm not overly optimistic that this amendment will result in a decision by China to stop sending arms to the Khmer Rouge. I don't think it will. I rather doubt that it will result in a decision by Thailand to kick the Khmer Rouge out of their territory prior to a settlement. But I do believe that it is important for us to take a position on this. We are not saying anything more really than what Mr. Sigur said on Thursday, that if we had our druthers, we would like them to stop.

This amendment doesn't say, we're going to send in the Marines to stop it. It doesn't say, we're going to cut off all trade with China or Thailand if they don't stop it. It simply calls upon the administration to urge the Chinese and the Thais to stop aiding the Khmer Rouge.

I don't think we need to be embarrassed about that. I really don't. I think that is a moral position for us to take and I think it's the right position for us to take.

Now if the Chinese and the Thais say, no, which they probably will, that leaves open the question of what they will do in the context of a political settlement. The administration is a little bit concerned that if we urge the Chinese and the Thais to cut off aid now they might be less willing to agree to cut off aid in the context of a settlement. I think that they're dead wrong on this point.

Indeed, by taking the strong position now, before there is a settlement, with respect to the Khmer Rouge, we may well create an inclination on the part of the Chinese and the Thais to be more responsive to our concerns on the Khmer Rouge in the context of a settlement, precisely because they will probably reject this proposal

now.

I would simply say in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that if one opposes this amendment, one is saying in effect that we should not even urge the Chinese to cut off arms to the Khmer Rouge; we should not even urge the Thais to cease permitting them to use Thai territory for sanctuary.

Given the record of the Khmer Rouge in murdering up to two million of their own people it seems to me that that's not a position with which anyone in our committee or in the Congress would really want to be associated. We do want them to stop. That's what Mr. Sigur said last Thursday. We do not want arms to continue going to this group of murderers, fanatics, xenophobes, and ultranationalists who have acted in the past in the way in which we are all familiar.

So I would hope that we could adopt this amendment and put our country squarely on record in terms of this issue.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.