Opinion of the court. say, after having complied with the condition without murmur or objection, that the bonus was extorted from them by compulsion. Whether, therefore, the President and Secretary of the Treasury did or did not rightly judge as to their powers under the act, the plaintiffs evidently agreed with them and voluntarily applied for permission to engage in the trade on the conditions imposed, and voluntarily paid the bonus which is now sought to be recovered back. The case does not come within any class of cases on which the plaintiff's rely to take it out of the rule as to voluntary payments. In our judgment, therefore, the defence in this case might have rested on this ground alone. But we are also of opinion that the conditions imposed were authorized by the act of July 13th, 1861. Its language has been already quoted. The material part in reference to the question under discussion is the proviso of section three, which is as follows: "The President may, in his discretion, license and permit commercial intercourse . . . in such articles, and for such time, and by such persons as he in his discretion may think most conducive to the public interest; and such intercourse . . . shall be conducted and carried on only in pursuance of rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury." It is contended that the imposition of the bonus of four cents per pound was not a "rule" or a "regulation” within the fair meaning of the act; and it is conceded that in many cases the power to make rules and regulations on a particular subject is a limited power, having respect to mode and form, and time and circumstance, and not to substance. But it must also be conceded that in other cases the power is much more extensive and substantial. Thus, in the Constitution, the several powers "to regulate commerce," "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization," "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States," are understood to give plenary control over those subjects. The power to regulate commerce has been held to include the power to suspend Opinion of the court. it;* and the power to make rules and regulations respecting the territory of the United States, has been held to include the power to legislate for and govern such territory, and establish governments therein.t The extensive effect given to these clauses is undoubtedly largely due to the character of the instrument and that of the donee of the powers, to wit, the legislature of the United States, to whom the grant of a power means the grant of a branch of sovereignty. It shows, however, that the rule of construction depends, at least in some sort, upon the nature of the subject-matter. In the case before us, the power of the government to open and regulate trade with the enemy was intended to be conferred upon the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. The power of regulation in such a case is to be taken in its broadest sense, and, in our judgment, included the power to impose such conditions as the President and Secretary should see fit. The statutes relating to the internal revenue, passed July 1st, 1862, and March 7th, 1864, which have been referred to for the purpose of showing that Congress imposed a special tax upon cotton, and, therefore, could not have intended by the act of 1861 to sanction the regulations of the treasury now in question, do not, in our judgment, have that effect. The act of 1862 imposed a tax of half a cent per pound on all cotton, to be paid before its removal from the place of production. The same act and section imposed various taxes on a hundred other articles. The question is, did Congress intend, by the imposition of these taxes, to revoke by implication, any power given to the Executive Department of imposing such regulations as it might see fit for the carrying on of trade with insurrectionary districts? We answer, certainly not. The two subjects were eutirely distinct. No conflict or repugnancy could arise in relation thereto. When, in March, 1863, the President issued his license to trade in cotton and other articles in the insurrectionary districts, under and subject to the conditions contained in the regula * 1 Kent, 432. † 4 Wheaton, 422; Story on the Constitution, & 1328. Opinion of the court. tions adopted by the Secretary of the Treasury, his action was not inconsistent with or repugnant to the internal revenue law passed the year before. It had nothing to do with that law or the subject-matter of it. The conditions exacted by him were not imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but of the war power of the government. The exaction itself was not properly a tax, but a bonus required as a condition precedent for engaging in the trade. Whether, when the condition was fulfilled, the cotton became subject to the internal revenue law is a question we are not called upon to decide. There was no inconsistency between the regulations and the law any more than there is between a license tax for carrying on a particular trade and the excise imposed on the products of that trade. The act of March 7th, 1864, raised the internal revenue tax on cotton to two cents a pound where no duty had already been levied, paid, or collected thereon. Neither does this act present any inconsistency with the regulations in question. If it refers to them at all (when speaking of duties already paid) it contains an implied recognition of them. If it does not refer to them, it does not contravene them. The position that Nashville, being within the National lines, was not hostile territory in 1863 and 1864, and, therefore, not within the prohibition of commercial intercourse contained in the act of 1861, is not tenable. The State of Tennessee was named in the President's proclamation as one of the States in insurrection; and, as we have seen, the exceptions made in his first proclamation in favor of maintaining commercial intercourse with parts of such States remaining loyal, or occupied by the forces of the United States, were abrogated by the proclamation of April 2d, 1863, except as to West Virginia and certain specified ports. There was nothing in this action of the President repugnant to, or not in conformity with, the act of 1861. "This revocation," as remarked by this court in the case of The Venice,* "merely brought all parts of the insurgent States under the * 2 Wallace, 278. Opinion of the court. special licensing power of the President, conferred by the act of July 13th, 1861." The act gave the President power, where a State or part of a State remained irreclaimable, to declare that the inhabitants of such State, or any section or part thereof where such insurrection existed, were in a state of insurrection. This power clearly gave the President a discretion to declare an entire State, where the insurrection was persisted in, or only a hostile district therein, in a state of insurrection. Finding the attempt to discriminate between the different parts of a State (except in peculiar cases) impracticable, he abandoned the attempt, and declared the entire State in a state of insurrection. He clearly had authority so to do, more especially as the insurrection was supported by State organizations and the actual State authorities. Thenceforth the war became a well-defined territorial war, and was in great measure conducted as such. The further provision of the act, that all commercial intercourse with the insurrectionary districts should cease long as such condition of hostility shall continue," could not be construed as allowing such intercourse to be resumed by individuals at will, as fast and as far as our armies succeeded in occupying insurgent territory. The "condition of hostility" remained impressed upon the insurrectionary districts until it was authoritatively removed by the proclamation of the President at the close of the war. 6680 This view of the meaning of the act of 1861 is corroborated by the act of March 12th, 1863, respecting abandoned and captured property. On the 1st of July, 1862, the President had issued a procla mation declaring what States and parts of States were in insurrection, with a view to the provisions of the act imposing a land tax, and made no exception of any fractions of States, except the counties constituting West Virginia. Expressly referring to this proclamation, Congress, in the fourth section of the act referred to, enacted "that all property coming into any of the United States not declared in insurrection as aforesaid, from any of the States declared in insurrection, through or by any other person than any agent Opinion of the court. duly appointed under the provisions of this act, or under a lawful clearance by the proper officer of the Treasury Department, shall be confiscated."* This is a clear recognition on the part of Congress of the President's demarcation of insurrectionary territory. It is also a recognition of the treasury regulations as to intercourse with that territorynot, perhaps, of any specific regulations, but of the applicability of such regulations to all portions of insurrectionary territory, whether under occupation of the Union forces or not. But it is unnecessary to pursue this subject. We have frequently held that the civil war affected the status of the entire territory of the States declared to be in insurrection, except as modified by declaratory acts of Congress or proclamations of the President; and nothing but the apparent earnestness with which the point has been urged would have led to a further discussion of the point.† We are also of opinion that the act of July 2d, 1864,‡ recognized and confirmed the regulations in question. It is sufficient to quote a portion of the third section to evince the correctness of this conclusion. It enacts as follows: "That all moneys arising from the leasing of abandoned lands, houses, and tenements, or from sales of captured and abandoned property collected and sold in pursuance of said act, or of this act, or from fees collected under the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, and approved by the President, dated respectively the 28th of August, 1862, 31st of March, and 11th of September, 1863, or under any amendments or modifications thereof, which have been or shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the President, for conducting the commercial intercourse, which has been or shall be licensed and permitted by the President, with and in States declared in insurrection, shall, after satisfying therefrom all necessary * Act of March 12th, 1863, 12 Stat. at Large, 820, ¿ 4. † See Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace, 404; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Id. 542 ; McKee v. United States, 8 Id. 163; and numerous other cases. 13 Stat. at Large, 375. |