REBELLION, THE (continued). cial intercourse with the insurrectionary States recognized and confirmed these regulations. Hamillon v. Dillon, 74. 3. The charge of four cents per pound required by these regulations, was not a tax, nor was it imposed in the exercise of the taxing power, but in the exercise of the war power of the government. Ib. 4. Payments made under this act were voluntary payments, and could not be recovered back. Ib 5. The internal revenue acts of 1862 (12 Stat. at Large, 465) and 1864 (13 Id. 15), in imposing specific duties by way of excise on cotton, were not inconsistent with or repugnant to the charge in question. Ib. 6. Nashville, though within the National military lines in 1863 and 1864, was nevertheless hostile territory within the prohibition of commercial intercourse, being within the terms of the President's proclamation on that subject; which proclamation in that regard was not inconsistent with the act of July 18th, 1861, properly construed. Ib. 7. The civil war affected the status of the entire territory of the States declared to be in insurrection, except as modified by declaratory acts of Congress or proclamations of the President. Ib. RECEIVER. See National Bank. RECOUPMENT. See Set-off. REMOVAL OF CAUSES. 1. A suit in a State court against several defendants, in which the plaintiff and certain of the defendants are citizens of the same State, and the remaining defendants citizens of other States, cannot be removed to the Circuit Court under the act of March 2d, 1867. Vannevar v. Bryant, 41. 2. Nor if the plaintiff was a citizen of one State and the defendants all citizens of one other State, could such removal be made where one trial has been had and a motion for a new trial is yet pending and undisposed of. Ib. 8. To authorize a removal under the abovementioned act, the action must, at the time of the application for removal, be actually pending for trial. Ib. REPLEVIN. See Minnesota; Replevin Bond. Where, in an action of replevin, the declaration alleges property and right of possession in the plaintiffs, and the answer traverses directly these allegations, under the issue thus formed any evidence is admissible on the part of the defendant which goes to show that the plaintiffs have neither property nor right of possession. Evidence of title in a stranger is admissible. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 45. REPLEVIN BOND. 1. Under the statute of Maryland, passed in 1785 (chapter 80, % 14), where, in a replevin suit, the party from whom the goods were taken is reinstated in his possession by executing a bond, and a bond is given for the restoration of the specified goods, and these goods are delivered to the sheriff on the writ de retorno habendo, issued on a REPLEVIN BOND (continued). judgment recovered; this is a satisfaction of the obligation, though the goods were not in like good order as when the bond was executed. Douglass v. Douglass, Administrator, 98. 2. If the obligor has injured them, or culpably suffered them to become injured while they were in his possession, a recovery cannot be had against him on the bond, if the marshal have once taken possession. The marshal's possession is that of the obligce in the bond. Any redress for such injury must be had by a separate proceeding. Ib. REPORTS. Of adjudged cases in State courts not received to show a state of things different from that presented by the record sent here. Edwards v. Elliott, 532. RES JUDICATA. 1. When no defence has been made to the liability of a city for its bonds in a State court having general common-law jurisdiction in the place where the city was sued on them, no question can be raised here, on error to a judgment obtained in a Circuit Court of the United States, on the record of the judgment of such State court. City of Sacramento v. Fowle, 120. 2. When in a State court a right or immunity is set up under and by virtue of a judgment of a court of the United States, and the decision is against the right or immunity set up, so that a case is presented for review by the Supreme Court of the United States under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, the question whether due validity and effect have or have not been accorded to the judgment of the Federal court will depend on the circumstances of the case. If jurisdiction of the case was acquired only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the State law alone was administered, then only such validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment as would be due to a judgment of the State courts under like circumstances. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 180. 3. Where in a proceeding in a Federal court to foreclose a mortgage, a party in interest is not served nor by any way brought in, and judgment is given notwithstanding, a State court does not fail to give full effect to the judgment of the Federal court, when on a proceeding in the former by the party not served nor brought in, it does not treat the judgment of the Federal court as having concluded him. Ib. REVERSAL. See Practice, 1–9; Res Judicata. 1. Though on appeals in admiralty, involving issues of fact alone, this court will not, except in a clear case, reverse where both the District and the Circuit Court have agreed in their conclusions, yet in a clear case it will reverse even in such circumstances. The Lady Pike, 1. 2. In a suit for goods sold, when a witness proves by testimony not competent that they have been delivered, the reception of his testimony is not ground for reversal where competent primâ facie evidence, wholly uncontradicted, has also been given of the delivery. Cooper & Co. v. Coates & Co., 105. REVERSAL (continued). 8. When in a State court a right or immunity is set up under and by virtue of a judgment of a court of the United States, and the decision is against the right or immunity set up, so that a case for review exists bere under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, in such a case, the Supreme Court will examine and inquire whether or not due validity and effect have been accorded to the judgment of the Federal court, and if they have not, and the right or immunity claimed has been thereby lost, it will reverse the judgment of the State court. Dupas seur v. Rochereau, 180. 4. When a court in a case where a jury is waived, under the act of March 5th, 1865 (Revised Statutes, & 649), and the case is submitted to it without the intervention of a jury, finds as a fact that a conveyance was made to certain persons as trustees, and then finds as a conclusion of law, that the legal title remained in those trustees, that finding does not bind this court as a finding of fact; and if it was the duty of the trustee to have reconveyed to the grantor (as stated infra, title Trust and Trustee, 2), this court will reverse the judgment founded on that conclusion. French v. Edwards, 147. 5. Though there may be plain error in a charge, yet if the record present to this court the whole case, and it be plain from such whole case that if the court had charged rightly the result of the trial would have been the same as it was, this court will not reverse. Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 294. 6. Though a court erroneously overrule a demurrer to a special plea specially demurred to, yet if on another plea the whole merits of the case are put in issue, the error in overruling the demurrer is not ground for reversal. Chambers County v. Clews, 817. REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. 66 858. See Evidence, 6. " 8707. See Court of Claims. RIPARIAN RIGHTS. A pier erected in the navigable water of the Mississippi River for the sole use of the riparian owner, as part of a boom for saw-logs, without license or authority of any kind, except such as may arise from his ownership of the adjacent shore, is an unlawful structure, and the owner is liable for the sinking of a barge run against it in the night. Atlee v. Packet Company, 890. RIVER PILOTS. See Pilots on Rivers. SALINES. Are reserved from private entry by the general policy and statutory enactments of the government, and the policy applies in Nebraska as elsewhere. Morton v. Nebraska, 660. SERVICE OF WRIT. Under a statute (such, ex. gr., as the Process Act of California), enacting SERVICE OF WRIT (continued). that in a suit against a corporation the summons may be served on "the president or other head of the corporation," service is properly made on the president of a board of trustees, by whom it is declared in the city charter that the city shall be "governed," and which president of the board of trustees, the charter further declares, shall be "general executive officer of the city government, head of the police, and general executive head of the city." City of Sacramento v. Fowle, 119. When a price fixed by contract and agreed to be paid for a perfect structure is demanded for imperfect and defective work, the law will allow a party in a suit upon the contract to deduct the difference between that price and the value of the inferior work, and also the amount of any direct damages flowing from existing defects, not exceeding the demand of the plaintiffs. The deduction is allowed to prevent circuity of action. Railroad Company v. Smith et al., 255. SHERIFF'S RETURN. See Pleading, 1; Service of Writ. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. See Revised Statutes of the United States. The following, among others, referred to, commented on, and explained: 1. The amount of a supersedeas bond as well as the sufficiency of the security are matters to be determined by the judge below, under the provisions of the twenty-ninth rule. Jerome v. McCarter, 17. 2. The discretion thus exercised by him will not be interfered with by this court. Ib. 3. If, however, after the security has been accepted, the circumstances of the case, or of the parties, or of the sureties upon the bond, have changed, so that security which at the time it was taken was 66 good and sufficient" does not continue to be so, this court, on proper application, may so adjudge and order as justice may require. Ib. SURETIES. See Internal Revenue, 3. TAX, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A BONUS OR WAR LEVY. See Constitutional Law, 5; Rebellion, The, 3. TAXATION. Sec Internal Revenue. It being settled law that the language by which a State surrenders its right of taxation, must be clear and unmistakable, a grant by one State to a corporation of another State to exercise a part of its franchise within the limits of the State making the grant, and laying a tax upon it at the time of the grant, does not, of itself, preclude a right of further taxation by the same State. Erie Railway Company v. Pennsylvania, 492. TENNESSEE. See Trust and Trustee. TEXAS. A mere intention to make a lot adjoining one on which a man and wife have their dwelling-the two lots being separated only by a small alley-a part of a homestead, and the subsequent actual building of a kitchen on such adjoining lot, will not make that lot part of the homestead, within the laws of Texas, if before the building of the kitchen, the husband, then owner of the lot, have sold and conveyed it to another person. Grosholtz v. Newman, 481. TIMBER. Whilst timber is standing it constitutes a part of the realty; being severed from the soil its character is changed; it becomes personalty, but its title is not affected; it continues as previously the property of the owner of the land, and can be pursued wherever it is carried. All the remedies are open to the owner which the law affords in other cases of the wrongful removal or conversion of personal property. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 45. TIME. When of the essence of a contract. Jennisons v. Leonard, 303. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY. See Domicile; Rebellion, The. TREASURY NOTES. See Government Bonds and Notes TRIAL BY JURY. See Constitutional Law, 8. TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See Confidential Relation; Husband and Wife; Patents, 6. 1. Though statute may enact that a trustee to whom property is assigned in trust for any person, "before entering upon the discharge of his duty, shall give bond" for the faithful discharge of his duties, his omission to give such bond does not divest the trustee of a legal estate once regularly conveyed to him. Gardner v. Brown, 36. 2. Where the owner of land in fee makes a conveyance to a person in trust to convey to others upon certain conditions, and the conditions never arise, so that the trust cannot possibly be executed, a presumption arises in cases where an actual conveyance would not involve a breach of duty in the trustee or a wrong to some third person, that |