Opinion of the court. stances must be taken within ten days; and provisions are made to facilitate sales of property, compromises of doubtful claims, and generally for the early discharge of the bankrupt and the speedy settlement of his estate. It is a wise policy, and if those who administer the law could be induced to act upon its spirit, would do much to make the statute more acceptable than it is. But instead of this the inferior courts are filled with suits by or against assignees, each of whom as soon as appointed retains an attorney, if property enough comes to his hands to pay one, and then instead of speedy sales, reasonable compromises, and efforts to adjust differences, the estate is wasted in profitless litigation, and the fees of the officers who execute the law. To prevent this as much as possible, Congress has said to the assignee, you shall commence no suit two years after the cause of action has accrued to you, nor shall you be harassed by suits when the cause of action has accrued more than two years against you. Within that time the estate ought to be nearly settled up and your functions discharged, and we close the door to all litigation not commenced before it has elapsed. But the appellant relies in this court upon another proposition which has been very often applied by the courts under proper circumstances, in mitigation of the strict letter of general statutes of limitation, namely, that when the object of the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discov ered or becomes known to the party injured by it. This proposition has been incorporated in different forms in the statutes of many of the States, and presented to the courts under several aspects where there were no such statutes. And while there is unanimity in regard to some of these aspects there is not in regard to others. In suits in equity where relief is sought on the ground of fraud, the authorities are without conflict in support of the doctrine that where the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts of the guilty party in conceal. ing the facts from the other, the statute will not bar relief Opinion of the court. provided suit is brought within proper time after the dis covery of the fraud. We also think that in suits in equity the decided weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that where the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.* On the question as it arises in actions at law there is in this country a very decided conflict of authority. Many of the courts hold that the rule is sustained in courts of equity only on the ground that these courts are not bound by the mere force of the statute as courts of common law are, but only as they have adopted its principle as expressing their own rule of applying the doctrine of laches in analogous cases. They, therefore, make concealed fraud an exception on purely equitable principles.† On the other hand, the English courts and the courts of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and others of great respectability, hold that the doctrine is equally appli cable to cases at law. As the case before us is a suit in equity, and as the bill contains a distinct allegation that the defendants kept secret and concealed from the parties interested the fraud which is * Booth v. Lord Warrington, 4 Brown's Parliamentary Cascs, 163; South Sea Company . Wymondsell, 3 Peere Williams, 148; Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 2 Schoales & Lefroy, 634; Stearns v. Page, 7 Howard, &19; Moore v. Greene, 19 Id. 69; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason, 143; Snodgrass v. Bark of Decatur, 25 Alabama, 161. Troup v. Smith, 20 Johnson, 33; Callis v. Waddy, 2 Munford, 511; Miles v. Barry, 1 Hill (South Carolina), 296; York v. Bright, 4 Humphry, 312. Bree v. Holbech, Douglas, 655; Clarke v. Hougham, 3 Dowling & Ryland, 822; Granger v. George, 5 Barnewall & Cresswell, 149; Turnpike Co. v. Field, 3 Massachusetts, 201; Welles v. Fish, 3 Pickering, 75; Jones v. Caraway, 4 Yeates, 109; Rush v. Barr, 1 Watts, 110; Pennock v. Frceman, Ib. 401; Mitchell v. Thompson, 1 McLean, 9; Carr v. Hilton, 1 Curtis, 230. Opinion of the court. sought to be redressed, we might rest this case on what we have said is the undisputed doctrine of the courts of equity, but for the peculiar language of the statute we are considering. We cannot say in regard to this act of limitations that courts of equity are not bound by its terms, for its very words are that "no suit at law or in equity shall in any case be maintained . . . unless brought within two years," &c. It is quite clear that this statute must be held to apply equally by its own force to courts of equity and to courts of law, and if there be an exception to the universality of its language it must be one which applies under the same state of facts to suits at law as well as to suits in equity. But we are of opinion, as already stated, that the weight of judicial authority, both in this country and in England, is in favor of the application of the rule to suits at law as well as in equity. And we are also of opinion that this is founded in a sound and philosophical view of the principles of the statutes of limitation. They were enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from asserting rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or had been satisfied, transferred, or extinguished, if they ever did exist. To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure. And we see no reason why this principle should not be as applicable to suits tried on the common-law side of the court's calendar as to those on the equity side. While we might follow the construction of the State courts in this matter, where those statutes governed the case, in construing this statute of limitation passed by the Congress of the United States as part of the law of bankruptcy, we hold that when there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to Statement of the case. conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to, the party suing, or those in privity with him. The result of this proposition is that the decree of the Circuit Court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill must be REVERSED, with directions for further proceedings, IN CONFORMITY TO THIS OPINION. MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES. A resident of a loyal State, who, after the 17th of July, 1861, and just after the late civil war had become flagrant, went, under a military pass of a Federal officer into the rebel States, and in November and December, 1864, bought a large quantity of cotton there (724 bales), and never re turned to the loyal States until just after that and when the war was not far from its close-when he did return to his old domicile-having, during the time that he was in the rebel States transacted business, collected debts, and purchased the cotton, held, on a question whether he had been trading with the enemy, not to have lost his original domicile, and accordingly to have been so trading. APPEAL from the Court of Claims. That court found the following facts: At the beginning of the late rebellion, Mitchell, the claimant and appellant, lived in Louisville, Kentucky. He was engaged in business there. In July, 1861, and after the 17th of that month, he procured from the proper military authority of the United States in Kentucky a pass permitting him to go through the army lines into the insurrectionary territory. He thereupon went into the insurgent States and remained there until the latter part of the year 1864. He then returned to Louisville. While in the Confederate States he transacted business, collected debts, and purchased from different parties 724 bales of cotton. He took possession of the cotton and stored it in Savannah. Upon the capture of that place by General Sherman the cotton was Opinion of the court. seized by the military authorities. It was subsequently sold by the agents of the government. The proceeds, amounting to the sum of $128,692.22, were now in the treasury. Mitchell bought the cotton in November and December, 1864. He remained within the insurrectionary lines from July, 1861, until after the capture of Savannah by the arms of the United States. The Court of Claims was equally divided in opinion as to whether the claim of Mitchell could be sustained, and accordingly dismissed his petition. Mitchell then removed the case to this court by appeal, assiguing for error that on the facts found the Court of Claims should not have dismissed the petition, but should have decided that he acquired a valid title to the cotton. Mr. J. B. Harlan, for the appellant; Mr. G. H. Williams, Attorney-General, and Mr. John Goforth, Assistant AttorneyGeneral, contra. Mr. Justice SWAYNE, having stated the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: At the time when Mitchell passed within the rebel lines the war between the loyal and the disloyal States was flagrant. It speedily assumed the largest proportions. Important belligerent rights were conceded by the United States to the insurgents. Their soldiers when captured were treated as prisoners of war, and were exchanged and not held for treason. Their vessels when captured were dealt with by our prize courts. Their ports were blockaded and the blockades proclaimed to neutral nations. Property taken at sea, belonging to persons domiciled in the insurgent States, was uniformly held to be confiscable as enemy property. All these things were done as if the war had been a public one with a foreign nation.* The laws of war were applied in like manner to intercourse on land between the inhabitants of the loyal and the disloyal States. It was adjudged that all *The Prize Cases, 2 Black, 687; Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace, 417; Mauran v. The Insurance Company, 6 Id. 1. 4 |